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International labor migration has become an increasingly common livelihood 
strategy in rural Cambodia, in some villages becoming a defining and normative part of 
community life. This dissertation is an ethnographic study of one such rural community, 
where migration to Thailand has become a primary livelihood strategy over the past 
decade. Drawing on three years of fieldwork in Chanleas Dai, a commune (khum) in 
Northwest Cambodia, my research explores the complexities of the migration decision-
making process, and the meanings of migration for rural households. 
 
This work is motivated by debates within the dialogues of migration and 
development, most of which seek to understand the potential for migration to promote 
development by focusing on the impacts of migration. My work departs from previous 
studies by focusing explicitly on decision-making, seeking to understand how and why 
families make developmentally important migration decisions. This is a critical area of 
inquiry, as the potential that migration has to promote or sustain development rests on a 
series of individual choices, for example who migrates, or how households invest 
remittances. Yet research tends to focus on the outcomes of these choices, neglecting a 
sufficient understanding of why they were made.  
 
 viii 
In Chanleas Dai indiviudals are deeply ambivalent about migration, understanding 
it as both a constituent cause of insecurity and also the best path to security, mobility, and 
status. Whereas migration is perceived as low-risk and high-reward, village-based 
livelihoods are widely perceived as insufficient, impossible, or too financially risky to be 
meaningful. These perceptions are strongly linked to the recent history of environmental 
distress in the area. As a result, households often prioritize investment in further 
migrations, rather than using wages earned abroad for local investment or production. 
These is particularly true among youth, who see few potential worthwhile strategies to 
“make it” at home.  Credit and agriculture programs theorized to curb migration, and/or 
promote local investment have not substantively challenged these perceptions. My 
conclusions discuss these findings in terms of their implications for the migration and 
development dialogues, definitions and understandings of development, and rural 
development policies both within and outside of Cambodia. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Trucks stop nearly every day on the wide dirt road that cuts through Chanleas Dai 
Commune.  Women and men of all ages board the vehicles to begin the two-day journey 
across the Thai border, a crossing that is treacherous by all accounts.  Piled on top of one 
other in the cabins and beds of beaten up Nissans, they lie in stacks three or four bodies 
high for most of the drive, covered by tight tarps. They are silent, understanding the 
urgency of being quiet and still regardless of the bumps and potholes the truck navigates 
along the route. Those at the top of the stacks consider themselves lucky. Those 
underneath quickly lose feeling in their limbs under the intense pressure of the limbs of 
others.  Often they later have to be lifted out of the truck, shaken and massaged before 
they can walk.  Though overwhelming, everyone tries to ignore the smell and feel of 
sweating bodies. With luck, no one become sick. With wives and husbands separated by 
the arms and legs of strangers, modesty disappears until the cars reach a small village 
near the Banteay Meanchey border. There, under the cover of night, meekjal1 direct 
migrants out of the trucks and across kilometers of densely forested landscapes.  They 
wade across a river, which can be up to chest-high in depth, and then run as fast as 
possible, sometimes to the sound of distant bullet fire from Thai police.  To the meekjal 
who navigates their path, and ensures their safety once in Thailand, they pay fees of 
between 2,000-3,000 Thai baht.2 Though a seemingly small amount (the equivalent of 
                                                 
1 Literally translated as “master of the wind,” meekjal are middlemen/brokers. Typically they are former 
migrants, and they play multiple roles in the migration process: transporting workers, acting as agents for 
migrants, locating jobs, facilitating remittance transfer and at times ensuring safety.   
2 A note on currency: It is common throughout Cambodia to use both the Khmer Riel and other forms of 
currency, in part because when riel were introduced in 1980 Cambodians were skeptical of its power and 
relied heavily on alternative sources of foreign exchange (Clark 2006). Today, both informal and formal 
transactions (banks, ATMs, markets, moneylenders) commonly use Khmer riel (KHR) and US dollars 
(USD). In areas near Thailand, the Thai baht (THB) is also common; often predominate over either dollars 
or riel. Locals regularly shift between currencies in their references. In this dissertation I also routinely 
move between referring to baht, riel and dollars, retaining the currency reported by my respondents in 
conversation, and reporting estimated dollar equivalents using static exchange rates of 4,000 KHR and 33 
THB to 1 USD, which were average exchange rates during my fieldwork. 
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60-90 USD), most people have to borrow from friends, moneylenders or microfinance 
institutions.  Borrowing is costly, with interest rates between 3% and 6% per month, 
meaning that successful migrations and an ability to remit wages quickly become crucial.   
 Despite the dangers and difficulty of the cross-border journey, most residents of 
Chanleas Dai, a rural community in Northwest Cambodia, have made the trip at least 
once. Their words, collectively, form the description above. Though they speak of the 
actual transit across the border with varying degrees of hardship and terror, they recount 
their general experiences with migration as largely positive: a means to a better life, a 
way to support family members, “easy money”, a fun and modern lifestyle, and far better 
than the alternative of staying home to “watch the rice grow.”  Most households have 
someone currently away, about to leave, or recently returned.  Often these migrations 
begin in childhood or early adulthood, and continue in cycles through young people’s 
transitions into marriage and their own family creation.  Though one might briefly return 
to Cambodia for any number of reasons (marriage, childbirth, caring for older relatives), 
the default is leaving the village for work elsewhere.  The exception-- for the wealthy, the 
highly educated, the sick, the old, the unusual, the stubborn, or the disabled-- is to 
remain.  
 During my time living in and visiting Chanleas Dai I had few conversations that 
didn’t include a discussion of migration to Thailand, a pervasive social pattern across 
every village in the commune.3  Whether it was news of a relative’s recent departure, a 
disgruntled comment from a village or school administrator about low community 
participation in a recent event, or news of a returnee’s wedding or childbirth, migration 
was an ever-present part of village life, even for non-migrants.  Its overarching presence 
incited ambivalence. Villagers, sometimes in the course of a short conversation, would 
denote their dependence on, excitement about, frustration with, and strong desire for 
                                                 
3 Communes (khum) are third tier administrative divisions in Cambodia.  The largest administrative unit 
are provinces (kaet) , followed by districts (srok) , communes (khum) , and villages (phum).  Chanleas Dai 
Commune is made up of 11 distinct villages:  Chanleas Dai, Ta Meak, Kna Jo, Dombrei Slap, Kok Tnaut, 
Ruun, Chouk Roat, Tram Kong, Preah Lean, Kambao, Rolom Svay. As reported by village chiefs, 1,683 
families (7,738 individuals) were registered as living in the commune in 2010. These are somewhat 
different figures than reported in 2009 commune reports listed in Chapter 4.   
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migration. Both at the household and community level, migration was seen as an 
essential livelihood strategy and a desired, accepted, life-enhancing and necessary part of 
life.  Paradoxically, it was also noted as a social problem, an undesirable pattern, a 
burden on families, a circle of dependence, and a testament to the underdevelopment and 
low education of the area.  Migration was a savior and a devil, sometimes both at the 
same time.  My dissertation is, at its heart, an exploration of these ambivalences and the 
rural realities behind them, aimed at shedding light on the meanings that migration has 
for rural families. Drawing on three years of qualitative fieldwork, my research explores 
the complexities of the migration decision-making process, the meanings of migration in 
rural households, and the disconnects that exist between economic theories of migration 
and the lived experiences of those in rural migrant communities.  In particular I seek to 
explain why the terrifying journey outlined above, which is followed by periods of wage 
labor in difficult and insecure jobs in Thailand, is still understood as the best and often 
only meaningful opportunity that individuals see as leading to “development.” This 
explanation, developed over the course of this dissertation, holds power not only for 
understanding migration decision-making, but also for clarifying the potential for 
migration to promote livelihood improvement, either by the standard economic 
definitions of development or by locally-defined perspectives of improvement.  
 
CONTEXT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS DISSERTATION 
 
Decision-Making 
This dissertation is situated within a long tradition of literature seeking to better 
understand what drives and sustains international migrations. Migration-related decisions 
operate on a variety of inter-connected levels. Macro-level social and economic 
conditions structure specific opportunities for migration (Lewis 1954; Todaro and 
Maruszko 1987; Sassen 1988); government policies and incentives determine the ease of 
cross-border movement (Zolberg 2000); community networks facilitate information and 
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access to work abroad (Massey et al 1987; Massey 1990); household relationships and 
calculated strategies mediate and often constrain individual choices (Stark and Bloom 
1985; Stark and Lucas 1988; Wolf 1992); and individuals weigh the specific costs and 
benefits of migration as a personal strategy to reach goals (Todaro 1969, Borjas 1989).  
 This nexus of decision-making is at the heart of all inquiries into the scope and 
consequences of migration. The processes which cause migration and the consequences 
of those migrations are strongly interrelated, as they are both responses to wider 
processes of social change (DeHaas 2008; Skeldon 2008).  In other words, the 
motivations for migration among would-be migrants say a great deal about the impacts 
we can expect their migrations may have on households and communities once they 
leave. Moreover, the processes that incite migration are the same social and economic 
realities that shape how migration leads to social change. This is particularly true in terms 
of how migration is expected to contribute to development (Massey and Durand 1992; 
DeHaas 2008).  As DeHaas argues, when we are considering the development related 
impacts of migration “it matters whether labor migration is to be seen as a desperate 
flight from misery by impoverished people forced to migrate or a voluntary endeavor by 
young, ambitious people to acquire sufficient capital to invest in their own enterprise 
upon return” (DeHaas 2008:3).  Where migration is used as a coping strategy, it is likely 
that the consequences of widespread migration will be substantively different from 
contexts where it is primarily undertaken as a strategy of mobility.  Thus understanding 
the factors motivating migration, how individuals make sense of their migrations and the 
alternatives to migration, and how social context plays a role in these decisions, is at the 
core of all research seeking to explain the social, economic, and demographic 
consequences of migration.  
 
Migration and Development 
In this dissertation, I analyze migration decision-making around areas of 
importance in the debates in migration and development, which generally seek to explain 
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the extent to which, also and how international migration can promote development.  
These discourses include varying, and at times contradictory, definitions of exactly what 
development is, ranging definitions based on basic economic indicators, to complex 
perspectives on freedoms, capabilities, and social/environmental justice. Moreover, the 
meanings put forth by scholars do not always resonate with views of what development or 
improvement means to individuals.  As this work will suggest, individual and household 
views of “development” (kaapiwatd, or karichomran) in rural Cambodia are often 
disconnected from the definitions of development articulated by social and economic 
theories. Thus this work does not assume that rural views of development are similar to 
that which scholars and practitioners argue for.  Rather it seeks to unpack the ways in 
which local goals conflict with the types of interventions and changes which scholars 
often refer to when they consider how migration might best lead to development. 
Chapter 2 discusses definitional issues in more detail.  However within the field 
of migration (as within the field of development in general) economic understandings of 
development are still dominant.  In part, this relates to the assumed motivations for labor 
migration, which most scholars still view as primarily economic.  As a result the bulk of 
studies in the field of migration and development explore the impact of migration on 
sending communities through economic lenses. At the macro level, they are primarily 
concerned to Gross Domestic Product (GDP), job creation, and other economic indicators 
of growth.  At the individual or household level, they are most likely to reference 
increased food security, poverty reduction, or an increased ability to earn a living (e.g. 
through increased education, skills, or knowledge). Though I do not agree that these are 
the best, more comprehensive, or most appropriate ways to define development, they are 
a particularly salient as they dominate the academic and policy literature in the field of 
migration and development.  Thus while I discuss alternative views of development and 
their relevance to my findings, in general when I discuss the “migration and 
development” literature or nexus, I refer to these economic understandings of 
development. 
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 A central point in how scholars evaluate the potential for migration to 
successfully promote development—as defined in these traditionally economic ways— is 
whether the wages migrants earn abroad lead to sustainable changes in poverty/well-
being, or whether they are immediately for consumption. The argument behind this focus 
is that for development strategies to be long term successes (again, in economic terms) 
they should not only increase the immediate standard of living of individuals and/or their 
families but also allow for sustainable reductions in poverty or increases in economic 
well-being in the future. Put simply, where remittances are used for consumption they are 
viewed to provide short-term palliatives for poverty, leading to increased dependency, 
whereas when they are put to use productively they are believed to stimulate more 
sustainable forms of growth.  This type of growth could occur for example through 
improved agriculture, expanded production, small-scale entrepreneurship, investment in 
education or human capital, or to a lesser extent through increased consumption that 
spurs the growth of local or national markets. As a result of these dominant views of 
development and how it occurs, scholars and practitioners often argue for the importance 
of policies that would both encourage migrant remittances, and also promote greater local 
investment using those remittances (Catrinescu et al 2009).  
As a result of this focus, the migration and development literature is dominated by 
quantitative studies measuring the impacts of migration and/or remittances, using data-
driven outcomes to support theories about why households migrate or how migration can 
support economic development. Thanks to this body of work, (described in more detail in 
the following chapter) sociologists clearly understand many of the determinants of 
migration, the mechanisms by which migration influences the economic well-being of 
sending communities, and the constraints and limitations on the power of remittances to 
lead to sustained growth. 
However this research also leaves us with important questions, namely an 
insufficient understanding of how and why families make developmentally important 
decisions, and how social context might mediate these decisions. This is a critical area of 
inquiry, as we know that the decision-making process of would-be migrants is 
 7 
inextricably linked to the kinds of outcomes that those studying migration and 
development are most interested in. The potential that migration has to promote or sustain 
economic development rests on a series of individual choices: who migrates, to what 
extent migrants remit money home, whether households invest remittances in productive 
goods, how migrants educate their children, and how they use and retain their skills. And 
yet research tends to focus on the outcomes of these choices, neglecting a sufficient 
understanding of how the reasons for migration relate to these outcomes. This is 
particularly important as much research in the area of migration and development is 
motivated by a desire to support migration working better to promote development.  
Where we understand the outcomes of migration but not the processes by which those 
outcomes are enabled, we are limited in our power to suggest appropriate policies.   
For example, theory and research suggest that productive investments are 
important in facilitating sustainable economic development (Massey et al 1998), yet we 
have a less clear understanding of how households perceive productive opportunities in 
their own communities and why they do or don’t seek to invest in them (Massey and 
Durand 1992). Similarly, while theories suggest that household migration is a form of 
risk diversification and specifically a response to inadequate credit and insurance markets 
at home (Stark and Levhari 1982; Katz and Stark 1986; Taylor et al 1996) the majority of 
studies supporting this concept rely on quantitative analyses of the uses and effects of 
remittance spending, not on actual or perceived variations in access to credit and 
migration (e.g. Durand Parrado and Massey 1996; Rozelle, Taylor and DeBrauw 1999). 
Thus we have less information on how households perceive the relative risk of migration, 
or how context matters in household perceptions of risk. Likewise while we know a great 
deal about trends in and impacts of remittance spending (Durand, Parrado and Massey 
1996; Ghosh 2006; Adams and Page 2005), we know less about how individuals defend 
or explain these choices in relation to their own ideas of what development, progress, or 
livelihood improvement means.   
Through an in-depth ethnographic analysis, this dissertation sheds light on these 
understudied how and why questions, moving one step behind literature that examines the 
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impacts of migration, and instead analyzing the critical, yet neglected process of how 
individuals are making migration-related choices, and related, their perceptions of both 
migration and its alternatives. A critical component of this analysis is bringing to light the 
ways in which social context matters in creating and sustaining perceptions of migration 
and its alternatives. Decisions on migration, remittance spending, and investment, while 
made at the individual level, are deeply influenced and often constrained by a web of 
institutions including environment, local labor markets, government policies, legal 
systems, values and social norms. Context doesn’t just matter: it is a constituent part of 
the process by which “what matters” is formed. Thus context remains in the foreground 
throughout this dissertation. In particular I use the concept of a culture of migration to 
frame how context mediates decision-making in Chanleas Dai, an area where migration is 
a normative social pattern.  
 
Cultures of Migration 
First explicitly defined by Massey and his colleagues (1998), the idea of a culture of 
migration derives from a vast array of work in Mexico noting ways that migration can 
transform communities (Reichert 1981; Reichert 1982; Mines 1981; Massey et al 1987) 
and become an explicit factor both structuring potential migration decisions, and 
mediating their outcomes (Massey et al 1998; Kandel and Massey 2002).  Specifically, 
once migration patterns begin in rural communities, they often promote further migration 
through processes of network formation, agrarian transformation, and income 
redistribution (Massey 1988). As migration becomes normative within rural 
communities, it can also alter value systems, traditions, and individual aspirations in 
substantial ways, to the extent that we can speak of such areas of having powerful 
cultures of migration (Massey 1988; Massey 1990; Kandel and Massey 2002). Most 
generally a culture of migration can be defined as a space where long-standing and/or 
high rates of migration have led to the valorization of wage labor abroad, as well as the 
behaviors, attitudes and lifestyles associated with migration (Kandel and Massey 2002).  
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This concept, discussed more explicitly in Chapter 2, acknowledges that culture is 
dynamic, and perceptions of risk, development goals, and livelihood preferences can 
quickly shift during periods of social change.   
Scholars of migration readily admit the importance of culture, institutions and 
social context in both contributing to and mitigating the impacts of migration (Massey et 
al 1987; Kandel and Massey 2002). And yet relatively little research incorporates the 
concept of cultures of migration into analyses of decision-making or the migration-
development relationship. The vast majority of the work that does is focused exclusively 
on Mexico.  Thus while scholars recognize that cultures of migration can be a constituent 
part of individual decision-making around migration, there has been less work 
interrogating more explicitly how context is important in terms of how migration 
decisions are constructed or justified, and what alternatives they are set against. In a 
recent article in International Migration, Maruja Asis and colleagues (2009) regarded this 
as one of the major gaps in theoretical knowledge within the field, acknowledging that 
cultures of migration can play a significant role in the links between migration and 
development, but noting that this relationship has been relatively unexplored.  
My work aims to incorporate context explicitly, elucidating the dynamics of how 
social and environmental context mediates migration decision-making. My goal is 
primarily to show how individuals understand the risk and reward of leaving, staying 
home, and investing in different kinds of futures for themselves and their families. In 
doing so, this case study sheds light on what I argue are important disconnects between 
how we expect migration to contribute to development, and the ways in which how local 
environment, institutions, value systems, and perceptions of risk mediate this potential. 
Thus this work isn’t aimed at predicting how migration will influence development 
outcomes in Chanleas Dai, or clarifying the impact of migration on any indicator of 
development.  Nevertheless, I argue that understanding the process by which migrants 
and their families are making decisions has much to clarify in terms of the potential for 
migration to contribute to social change. 
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Contribution 
This dissertation makes three specific contributions to the field of migration.  
First, it provides an in-depth, grounded case study on Cambodian migration to Thailand, 
a migration pattern that under-researched in general yet growing in importance in the 
Greater Mekong region. Scholars who have written reviews on international migration 
trends in Asia note that Cambodia is understudied (Asis et al 2009). Moreover, those who 
do work in Cambodia specifically note that in comparison to the relatively well-
documented patterns of urban migration and trafficking/forced migration, that there is a 
lack of research on international labor migration from the country (Maltoni 2010).  
Finally, the studies that do exist on the migration experiences of Cambodians to Thailand 
are primarily based on household surveys (e.g. Maltoni 2010; Deelen and Vasuprasat 
2010; Hing et al 2011).  Thus while they offer information on general patterns of 
migration and remittance spending, they are less well equipped to understand the 
complex motivations and relationships embedded in migration processes. 
The second gap this dissertation contributes to is the lack of awareness/focus in 
the migration literature on South-South migrations (broadly defined as migrations 
between developing countries), which are often between neighboring countries. South-
South movement are estimated to make-up nearly half of global migrations (Ratha and 
Shaw 2007; Blakewell 2009), and are even more important in some regions of the world.  
For example in East Asia/Pacific region, an estimated 84% of migrations are between 
developing countries (Ratha and Shaw 2007).  Yet South-South movements receive far 
less attention than South-North migrations, that is movements to the United States or 
Canada, Japan, Western Europe, or the developed Middle East (Hujo and Piper 2007; 
Blakewell 2009).  This is important as there is some reason to believe that these 
movements are substantively different than South-North movements, because they tend 
to be lower cost, more easily financed, and less restricted as borders are often quite 
porous.  This allows more flexibility for migrants to go and return, and also expands the 
accessibility of migration. These distinctions have implications who migrates, and also 
the consequences of migration. For example, while most migration discourses assume 
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that the poorest of the poor, and children are unlikely to independently migrate, this may 
not be true in South-South contexts (DeHaan and Yaqub 2008). 
The third contribution this dissertation makes is to the literature on migration and 
development, described in more detail above. My work seeks to expand our 
understanding of why and how migrants and migrant family members make decisions, 
with a particular eye towards how the social and environmental context matters in 
decision-making. I argue that focusing on meanings and decision-making also allows us 
to better understand some of the disconnects that exist between theories of migration and 
local realities, a point I’ll come return to at several points in this work.  
 
Ambivalences and Expectations  
This dissertation makes two broad, related claims about the way that migration is 
understood and experienced in Chanleas Dai. First, I argue that people are deeply 
ambivalent about migration, seeing it as both a constituent cause of insecurity and, at the 
same time, the only short-term solution possible for the precarious realities of rural 
livelihoods. Second, I argue that a significant factor in decision-making around migration 
is the widely held view of village-based alternatives to migration as insufficient, 
impossible, or too risky to be meaningful. As a result, many households continue to 
prioritize investment in further migrations, rather than perceiving migration as a short-
term development strategy. These claims have implications for how we might expect 
migration to lead to development, in part because they are at odds with some general 
theories of how migration may best lead to development: through local and/or sustainable 
investment. 
 These arguments together highlight a disconnect between the lived realities of 
current and former migrants, and dominant theories/discourses in the migration and 
development literature. Put simply, most discussions of how migration can or does lead 
to development draw on neoliberal economic perspectives of migration as a bottom-up 
development strategy, arguing that individuals can use wage labor abroad to start or 
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speed motors of development.  Typically this is expected to happen when migrants or 
their families investing their wages earned abroad in profitable ventures at home. In 
Chanleas Dai there are some individuals who hold similar understandings of migration---
who see their migration or the migration of others in their community in terms of an 
investment aimed at providing an increased ability to support livelihoods at home.  Yet 
these individuals are the exception and not the rule.   
In contrast, those who I spent time with in Chanleas Dai saw few real and 
meaningful opportunities for productive investment in their communities. In the 
mainstream view, the possibility that international migration might play a part in 
developing village-based productivity or allow for increased development of human 
capital was unclear at best and absurd at worst. Explicitly, I was told over and over again 
that the village had no potential for income-generation.  Both strategies and ambitions 
were directed away from the rural village as a potential place to make a living.  The 
village might be a place to “eventually grow old”, to stay in “for now”, to return to for 
celebration, and for a few people to live out their lives with “enough,” but it was not a 
place to achieve or to grow.  Common beliefs were that NGOs or factories entering into 
the area could perhaps shift this potential by providing wage labor, but without outside 
intervention, the community was not a viable place to earn “enough.”  Thus while 
theories of economic development assume that individuals will be see real potential for 
profitable productive investments in their local communities, I did not find this to 
generally be the case.  
 Early in my research I began trying to understand local livelihood strategies by 
questioning friends and former co-workers about what was possible, profitable, and 
common for households to do in the village to make ends meet.  Though I knew 
migration was common, I sought out information on what else was ideal, lucrative or 
simply mainstream.  In particular, I was curious what migrant households did with wages 
saved abroad, and what potential there was to invest in local productive activities---the 
kinds of activities that are expressions of “migration leading to development” as it is most 
often defined in the scholarly literature. 
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I sought out Rithy4, a friend from the area who was at the time working with a 
local NGO. One of the most educated people in his village, Rithy had a 12th grade degree 
and was soon to begin university studies.  He was one of a handful of youth who had 
completed school, a critical thinker, and particularly knowledgeable about village-based 
strategies as he was working with community advocacy groups through his NGO job. I 
asked him what people could do in the village to sustainably improve their lives if they 
happened upon some significant amount of money.  He looked at me blankly.  I thought 
at first he didn’t understand my often mispronounced Khmer, so I tried again.  He was 
thoughtful for a minute, smiled and said that he really didn’t know, he didn’t think there 
was much one could do in the village, even with a fair amount of money to invest.  I 
made some tentative suggestions, and each one was shrugged off.  Tractors might be 
useful, but lots of people had tractors, so it wasn’t really a great strategy to earn money 
these days.  A motorbike might be helpful if you had something to sell, but what would 
you sell? And to who? Land, of course, but that was expensive.  Plus, with the latest 
flooding and droughts no one wanted to risk buying land that might turn out to produce 
little or nothing.  The truth, he told me, is that most people don’t see much possibility 
here in the village.  He didn’t really either----his job with the local NGO was a stroke of 
luck, and meant he didn’t need to worry about having the land support him like most 
people.  Though he would still invest in his rice fields, and probably a small vegetable 
garden, this was to supplement something else, not to rely on.  He was one of the lucky 
ones with a job.   
 Rithy’s job was enough to motivate him to stay in the village, though several of 
his brothers and sisters were in Thailand or had recently returned.  His wife, a former 
migrant, was also interested in returning.  Migration, I soon learned, was compelling 
enough that it even drew individuals away from relatively high status NGO and 
government jobs, just as it drew students away from education even when they had 
government scholarships.  In several villages, local officials also sustained their families 
                                                 
4 All names have been changed 
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through remittances from abroad.  These trends underscored both the perceived potential 
of migration and also the growing pessimism around village-based livelihood strategies. 
 
Meanings and Decision-Making 
 In Chanleas Dai, cyclical migration to Thailand is a normative and accepted part 
of daily life, both for migrants and non-migrants at home.  This pattern has rapidly 
become an important feature in the social landscape, in such a way that its presence and 
its impact frame decisions around production, spending, consumption and borrowing 
even for non-migrants.  By paying attention to meanings that migration holds for 
families, the following chapters of this dissertation highlight how risk, development 
goals, and social status are related to the growing culture of migration in the area. More 
specifically, I argue that at the same time as migration has become a normative and quasi-
compulsory livelihood strategy in my research site, village-based alternatives have 
increasingly become perceived as higher risk, low status, and passive alternatives for 
livelihood improvement. These perceptions have not been fundamentally challenged by 
expanded access to credit, improved infrastructure, greater education opportunities, or 
local agricultural development programs in the area-- all mechanisms that past theory and 
research suggest as being important to improve the potential for rural development and 
thus shape migration patterns.  Despite these changes, for most individuals migration is 
articulated as the best (and often only) potential option for social mobility and security in 
the village, with village-based alternatives seen risky, boring, insufficient, or impossible.  
 Yet my research also highlights that there clearly are viable alternatives, many of 
which would be the preferred strategies of development economists and practitioners 
seeking to enhance the power of remittances to sustain long-term growth.  Just as clearly, 
there are reasons why from most villagers’ perspectives these strategies are understood as 
less powerful, less ideal, or less possible. The choices individuals make around migration 
and its alternatives are deeply connected to the precarious nature of local environments, 
the nature of uneven development in Cambodia, and the goals families are seeking to 
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attain--which are in turn related to the dynamic and complex ways in which development  
is defined.  
 
The Cambodian Context 
 Cambodia is an ideal location to study the complexities of migration, decision-
making, and rural development. Cambodia is overwhelmingly rural and agricultural, with 
striking levels of rural poverty.  Though internal migration has always been common in 
Cambodia, international labor migration is a relatively new phenomenon and one that has 
recently grown in significance (Maltoni 2007; Chan 2009; Chem et al 2011).  Yet there is 
little research on this trend, and even less that situates migration in the context of its 
potential for development (Maltoni 2007).  Until recently, most studies of Cambodian 
migration have focused on internal movements, which make up the bulk of migration 
(Maltoni 2007). Scholars on migration and development in Asia note the lack of research 
specifically on patterns within Cambodia (Asis et al 2009) and highlight the need for 
more research in this geographic area.  
 Thailand is the most common destination for Cambodian migrants (Maltoni 2010; 
CSES 2009).  The International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that in 2008 
there were at least 248,000 Cambodians in Thailand and that this migration pattern will 
continue to grow in size (Maltoni 2010).  Although approximations of migrant 
remittances into Cambodia vary quite widely, even conservative estimates highlight the 
importance of remittances on the Cambodian economy and the potential they hold for 
poverty reduction.  World Bank data indicate that Cambodia received $297 million 
dollars in remittances in 2006 (Ratha et al 2011), while IFAD data suggests nearly double 
that number the same year, $559 million (Orozco 2009).  Neither of these conservative 
estimates captures informal transfers, which form the bulk of remittances from Thailand 
to Cambodia (Maltoni 2010).  However even the more conservative estimates show a 
considerable impact on the Cambodian economy, with the World Bank’s figures 
representing 4.1% of GDP in 2006 (Maltoni 2010).  With a growing rural population, 
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high levels of rural poverty, accessible opportunities for wage labor in Thailand and 
relatively porous borders there is a strong potential for migration to contribute to rural 
development.  Indeed, preliminary research attempting to identify successful strategies 
for moving out of poverty in Cambodia suggests that labor migration is a primary means 
by which households move and stay out of poverty (Fitzgerald and So 2007). 
   
My story 
 My relationship with Chanleas Dai, and with this dissertation is more complex 
than that of researcher or ethnographer. Since 2005, I have been connected to the 
community, visiting, living, and working in the commune in several different roles over 
time.  Most of those roles were related to my involvement with PEPY, an NGO working 
in the area on education issues. Over time PEPY has had a variety of education-based 
projects in the area, but the organization began through a school construction project in 
Chanleas Dai in 2005. Subsequently, they began projects aimed at improved Khmer 
literacy, teacher training, community advocacy, and health and environmental education. 
 My first two trips to Chanleas Dai, in December 2005 and December 2006, were 
as a supporter of PEPY and the work they were doing with area primary schools. Though 
I was involved as a board member and volunteer with PEPY at that time, I was also a 
graduate student, studying in the first years of my PhD program. These trips to Cambodia 
offered me an intriguing new space to consider the theoretical and substantive questions I 
was researching at The University of Texas at Austin.  During that time Cambodia was 
experiencing rapid economic growth and dramatic social change, with a growing youth 
population, an expanding urban population, and increasing mobility.  Streets seemed to 
be redeveloped overnight, as Phnom Penh struggled to grow quickly enough to meet both 
the demands of a growing urban population and floods of foreign investment. I became 
interested in how migrations were playing a role in development and social change, 
particularly with respect to the rural areas where the majority of Cambodians live.  When 
I began to conceptualize my dissertation, I planned a study of the impacts of migration on 
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rural communities, and how those impacts related to individual experiences of urban 
migration, primarily to Phnom Penh.  I returned to Cambodia in June of 2007, after I was 
asked by PEPY’s Executive Director to help manage some small projects in Phnom Penh 
on a short-term basis.  As my plan had been to spend the summer studying Khmer in the 
U.S., I saw this as an ideal opportunity to learn Khmer, find a network of people able to 
help me with future dissertation research, and do pre-dissertation research to help guide 
my proposal.   
 During the summer months I learned a great deal about individual experiences of 
urban migration, and found useful contacts to facilitate my research.  However I also 
became deeply involved in PEPY’s education-based work, which was primarily taking 
place in rural Siem Reap province, 350 kilometers away from the capital. At that time, 
PEPY was working an area of Siem Reap where high numbers of families and individuals 
regularly migrated to Thailand for work. As I continued to work with PEPY supporting 
their education programs in and around Chanleas Dai it became clear that international 
migration was a pressing issue in rural and remote areas of the province, and growing in 
significance. Yet in comparison to the wealth of studies on urban migration in the 
country, there was almost no research at that time (2007) on Cambodian migration to 
Thailand.  My dissertation slowly, and then rapidly, evolved as I decided to take a 
position working full time with PEPY in Siem Reap and began to re-conceptualize my 
dissertation as a case study of international migration and decision-making from 
Chanleas Dai. 
 This opportunity resonated with my interest in action-based research and my 
desire to contribute to the areas where I would be benefiting personally from conducting 
academic research. It also resonated with the interests of the community leaders, as one 
of the biggest barriers to keeping children in school was the pull of migration. Commune 
and village leaders and local school officials felt that encouraging education, at least 
through primary and lower secondary school, was important, but weren’t sure how to best 
present that case to students and parents.  We all felt that a better understanding of the 
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causes and experiences of migration would be useful as a first step towards understanding 
how they could present and highlight local alternatives, including education. 
 For the next three years, I spent much of my time staying and working in PEPY’s 
target area of Chanleas Dai, helping to build their programs and monitoring and 
evaluation and eventually conducting my own fieldwork in area villages. During my time 
there I had the unique opportunity to have regular interactions with local officials, 
teachers, students, parents, former and current migrants, and NGO staff members in my 
dual roles of development practitioner and researcher. While all of the individuals I 
interacted with knew of my research interest in migration, my enrolment as a PhD 
student, and my dissertation topic, I was also seen more regularly as someone invested in 
helping to improve the community, the education system, and the general well-being of 
households.  Although my dual role as NGO worker and researcher complicated my 
story, and sometimes complicated the stories I heard, it also allowed me a unique 
connection in terms of duration, depth, and trust. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
The observations, discussions, and semi-structured interviews that inform this 
dissertation come from time spent in Chanleas Dai over a three year period, from 
September 2007-July 2010.  For most of this time I was formally working with PEPY in 
a role that included financial oversight, strategic planning, research and evaluation, and 
program oversight.  Thus it included attending Participatory Rural Appraisals throughout 
the commune and beyond,5  attending meetings with teachers, school support committees, 
the Ministry of Education Youth and Sport, and NGO partners, and regular interaction 
with local teachers, students, parents, and school directors. My work also included 
conducting interviews with teachers, parents, local officials or other stakeholders about 
                                                 
5
 Participatory Rural Appraisals are a participatory research tool often used in the evaluation, planning, and 
management of development projects.  Most typically they involve gathering groups of stakeholders to 
share local history, brainstorm needs and challenges, map social characteristics, identify, prioritize, and 
analyze problems, discuss root causes of these problems, and visualize potential futures. 
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topics relevant to PEPY’s work in education.  Between September 2007-July 2010 I spent 
on average half of my weeks in Chanleas Dai, primarily doing work for PEPY and 
staying on the grounds of a local primary school.  While I paid attention to discussions of 
migration, and often incited conversation about what it meant for people, the first two 
years I was largely interested in getting to know the community and the area, contributing 
to PEPY, understanding the dynamics of migration and daily life, and improving my 
Khmer language skills. I wrote fieldnotes, but I did not have a routine to speak of, and my 
writing was intermittent, at times a habitual practice and at times more irregular.  This 
reflects shifting patterns in my work and life over the years, which were ever-changing, 
often dominated by PEPY projects, and varied as to the extent of time I spent in Chanleas 
Dai.   
In 2009 I began a focused study; developing and translating an interview guide, 
selecting three study villages, meeting with local officials, and between June 2009 and 
May 2010, conducting 82 semi-structured interviews.  I also conducted one focus group 
with youth migrants who had returned home for the Khmer New Year holidays, and one 
with similarly aged non-migrant students in 9th grade at a local secondary school. In July 
2011, I returned for a brief visit and conducted seven additional interviews with 
moneylenders and microfinance providers. A full list of respondents and relevant 
characteristics is located in Appendix A. 
 
Study Initial Stages and Village Selection 
My first interviews, conducted in 2009, were with the Chanleas Dai commune 
chief, and ten of the eleven village chiefs of the commune, with the goals of obtaining 
permission to conduct research and learning about specific patterns of migration and 
livelihood strategies across villages. 6  All officials consented to the study and expressed 
enthusiasm for the topic.  These interviews included questions about the prevalence of 
migration in the community, perceived differences across the commune, population of 
                                                 
6 I was unable to coordinate an interview with one of the village chiefs. 
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the village, general livelihood strategies, and changes over time. I then used these 
interviews, along with ID Poor Data from the Cambodian Ministry of Planning (MoP), to 
select 3 villages from which to select additional interview respondents. My goal was to 
select areas that differed from each other as much as possible in terms of household 
poverty level, location, and geographic remoteness (distance to roads, schools).   
The ID Poor Project was useful in this process. The project, which continues at 
the time of writing, is led by the Ministry of Planning in coordination with the German 
Technical Cooperation (GTZ).  Its aim is to construct a national dataset of impoverished 
households, in order to allow both governments and development partners to offer 
services specifically to the most vulnerable, poor households.  Thus its final product is a 
list of severely and less severely poor households, including photo ID cards for members 
of those households, which entitles them to specific services (health care, emergency 
services, etc.). NGOs and development partners are encouraged to use these designations 
to provide services as well, and many of the large government partners (most notably the 
World Food Program) have done so, using the ID Poor system to designate entitled 
beneficiaries of their programs.  For this reason ID poor data is publicly accessible, not 
only at the village but also at the household level.   
As part of its first year of work, ID Poor conducted assessments in Chanleas Dai 
in 2007. Meant to be participatory and take into account local meanings of vulnerability 
and poverty often not measured by household surveys, the ID Poor designation process 
includes a set of proxy indicators for poverty which are based mainly on easily observed 
and verifiable assets, but also include dependency ratios, household composition, debts, 
crises or shocks and other elements of vulnerability. Village representative groups are 
part of the process of data collection and assessment, which allows for local 
understandings of special circumstances to be taken into account.  Two levels of poverty 
are defined by their criteria, Poverty Level 1 which indicates severe distress and Poverty 
level 2 which is a less severe level of poverty or insecurity.  After initial designations, 
villagers are free to complain or argue for changes at an open meeting.  Once final lists 
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are constructed, households designated as falling into one of the two levels of poverty are 
photographed and given ID cards.  
I referenced ID poor data primarily to select study villages, attempting to balance 
geographic considerations (more vs. less remote villages) with differing levels of 
household poverty within the commune. Though village and commune officials stressed 
that there was little disparity among villages, the ID poor data shows a wide difference of 
poverty levels across villages.  Within the commune villages ranged from 2.9%-14.8% of 
households designated as extremely poor, and 10.1%-53.1% of households designated as 
poor or extremely poor.  The average across villages within the commune was 28.5% of 
households in poverty (designated poor or extremely poor).  
The three villages I chose represented a cross-section of the commune in as many 
ways as possible. Geographically spread over the commune, the villages had 
substantively different access to primary and junior high schools, roads, and markets, and 
they had differing levels of household poverty. My final selection of villages included 
one village that is relatively remote, with levels of overall poverty close to the commune 
average but high levels of severe poverty, one village which is central in the commune, 
close to schools and roads, and has a high levels of overall, but not severe poverty, and a 
third which is moderately remote with substantively lower reported levels of severe and 
overall poverty. Though I intended the selection of villages to comparatively find 
differences between villages, instead I found similar experiences, perspectives, and 
stories across villages. 
 
Semi-Structured Interviews 
After initial interviews, village chiefs were asked if they would be willing to help 
introduce me to 4-5 households with experiences with migration who might be interested 
in speaking with me about their experiences. All officials in the three selected villages 
agreed, and we discussed my general goal of speaking with different kinds of people 
representing a diversity of men and women of different ages, migration experiences, 
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education, status, and socio-economic characteristics.  Interviews took place over two 
consolidated periods of time, first in May 2009 and later between December and June 
2010. This break in time allowed me to review interviews and revise the thematic guide 
to include new topics.   
Additional potential respondents were identified using a snowball sampling 
method, where following an interview I would ask the respondent if he or she would be 
willing to introduce me to friends, relatives, and neighbors who fit certain characteristics 
(i.e. a former migrant who had recently returned, etc.), and many were happy to do so. 
After being referred, potential respondents were contacted in person by a Cambodian 
research assistant who explained the study, specified that it was not related to any non-
profit or government organization and therefore provided no participation benefits, asked 
if they would be interested in participating, and if so arranged an available time.  Though 
most of those who were approached agreed to meet with me, a handful of individuals 
declined, either because they were too busy or because they were not interested in sharing 
their experiences. Because I was interested in learning about the context of migration 
decisions and perceived locally-based alternatives, I interviewed a wide variety of 
individuals, including former and current migrants, teachers, village officials, and the 
parents and spouses of current migrants. I also spoke with former meekjal, those who 
helped in the transmission of remittances, NGO workers, and students considering 
migration as a future option. During this process I regularly referenced the characteristics 
of respondents of prior interviews to seek out new and different perspectives. In 
particular, after about three dozen interviews primarily with migrants I began seeking out 
non-migrant perspectives, the perspectives of wealthier or more educated households, and 
those who had alternative or unique migration stories, such as being among the earliest 
group of migrants, or migrating for a period of time, returning to the village and deciding 
not to go back to Thailand. My respondents ranged in age from 16 to 78, and represented 
a cross-section of the village to the greatest extent possible.  Where I felt I needed a wider 
variety of experiences than I found via village chief or respondent networks, I relied on 
personal contacts who I knew via my work with PEPY.   This proved to be a very 
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successful strategy, as personal introductions from those who knew me on a more 
personal (or professional) level tended to be warmer and more compelling, prompting 
trust and more openness from respondents.   
  
Language 
 Though my Khmer is often mispronounced and less colloquial than I’d like, I 
possess a functional fluency that allowed me to conduct interviews and have informal 
conversations in Khmer without simultaneous translation. My Khmer study began in 
2006 with a summer of language training at the Southeast Asian Studies Summer 
Institute, and was supplemented with regular Khmer lessons upon arrival in Cambodia in 
2007. By 2009 I felt confident in my language abilities; however language and translation 
issues still proved to be challenging in a number of ways.   
My Khmer level at the time of my research is best described as advanced listening 
and highly functional speaking.  I can (and have) conducted short trainings in Khmer, can 
understand and participate in meetings in Khmer, and can have advanced conversations 
about rural development or education, but I am not a native or fluent speaker. Like most 
foreign language learners, I understood far more than I was able to say, at least if I 
wanted to be understood. This was particularly the case in Chanleas Dai, where the 
intonations and way of speaking were significantly different from the version of Khmer 
that I was most comfortable with.  This was true even for Cambodians, with many Khmer 
visitors and NGO workers noting the difficulty they had understanding local speech in 
the Kralanh area.  While not a different dialect, per se, the way of speaking in the area 
was distinct enough to make listening difficult even for a fluent speaker.  
Because of this, I had research assistants present in all semi-structured interviews, 
both for my own assistance and for the benefit of my respondents, who often had 
difficulty understanding my “textbook Khmer” word choice and intonations.  This also 
allowed me to ask questions when I encountered unfamiliar words or phrases, or needed 
clarification.  Prior to interviews I conducted a training for research assistants on semi-
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structured interview techniques and confidentiality, and we regularly debriefed interviews 
to discuss challenges and improvements. Research assistants also wrote daily fieldnotes. 
Though I primarily worked with one research assistant fluent in English and 
Khmer, I also worked at times with three local PEPY staff who had limited English skills 
but could help me navigate differences between standard and “Chanleas Dai” Khmer. 
Accustomed to more foreigner friendly wording, they translated from colloquial Khmer 
to a more standard version, greatly assisting my ability to understand and be understood.7  
Whenever possible, and in nearly all cases, interviews were recorded and transcribed.8  
Where respondents felt uncomfortable using the digital recorder, I relied on handwritten 
notes. In keeping with accepted standards of compensating interview respondents for 
their time, all interview respondents were given a small packet of soap or detergent as a 
token of appreciation.   
 
The Extended Case Method 
 This dissertation employs an extended case study framework, which is aimed at 
theory-building off a single case.  Often used in tandem with ethnographic research, the 
extended case method is generally preferred for inquiries into contemporary, complex 
social phenomenon which are best (and often only) understood by retaining the holistic 
nature of real life (Yin 2009). Case studies have the unique advantage of allowing for an 
analysis which encompasses a variety of important contextual conditions (Yin and Davis 
                                                 
7
 These young people were ideal in many respects as they knew the community well, held insider status, 
and were gifted interviewers as a result of their training in community work.  However their known role at 
PEPY reinforced the perceptions that my interviews were related to the non-profit’s work.  Working with a 
non-PEPY affiliated research assistant helped clarify to respondents and community members that this was 
an independent project.  Largely, my efforts to distinguish between the two were to protect PEPY, not 
because I perceived that there was an ethical dilemma in which respondents felt compelled or coerced to 
participate in interviews.  In contrast, it appeared that any perceived PEPY connection between my 
interviews and the organization led respondents to believe that the non-profit was going to start a 
migration-related development project (i.e. safe migration) and I was gathering information to do so. Thus I 
was concerned that being unclear could lead to disillusionment with the organization if a new program 
didn’t materialize.  To mediate this, I reiterated in interviews both prior and post-interview, as well as to 
village officials that my interest in this subject was not related to PEPY or research for future PEPY 
programs, and was in no way related to their potential benefit from the organization. 
8 I was not able to record any of the MFI or lender interviews.  All other interviews were recorded. 
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2007) and are often used to attempt to describe the essence of a phenomenon, 
illuminating decisions or sets of decisions in terms of why they were taken, how they 
were implemented and with what results (Yin 2009). In order to analyze social 
phenomenon holistically, case studies attempt to be exhaustive, relying on multiple 
sources of evidence, and building on theoretical propositions to guide data collection and 
analysis (Yin 2009). 
 The case study method resonates with the goals I had in understanding migration 
and rural livelihoods in Cambodia. Livelihood decisions, while often simplified and 
measured as discreet variables in quantitative work, are inherently complex. Migration 
and alternative livelihood choices are frequently made at the household level, but are 
driven by competing desires of individuals within families.  They are also mediated by 
social norms and values, opportunity structures, labor markets, structural conditions, 
power dynamics, and natural resources. To understand how migration decisions are being 
made in rural Cambodia necessitates a wide view that incorporates both macro-level 
processes, and micro-level institutions and dynamics.  The extended case study strives for 
this type of holistic analysis by requiring an extension of the observer into the world of 
the participant, an extension of observations over time and space, an extension from 
micro-processes to macro-level forces and an extension of theory (Burawoy 2000).   
 Case studies, while not generalizable to populations or universes, aim to be 
generalizable to theoretical propositions (Yin 2009).  Seeking to build on and improve 
existing theory, case studies “take the flaws of existing theory as points of departure” and 
engage in theory building through research which combines a historical or geographic 
context and a sensitivity to process, through a representative, revelatory, or extreme 
example (Yin 2009, see also Burawoy 1991).  Thus this dissertation does not aim to be 
generalizable to the character of rural migrant communities either in Cambodia or 
elsewhere.  Rather, it seeks to highlight instances where the realities of local situations 
are counter-instances to existing theory---places where what we expect to see deviates 
from what is occurring.  In doing so, this work will expand on and add complexity to 
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theories which inform the ever-present debate of the power of migration to contribute to 
or inhibit development. 
 The creation of theory and interpretation of realities is not an objective process.  
There exists, in any kind of qualitative research a double hermeneutic (Giddens 1993), 
meaning that just as respondents are doing interpretive work to construct the realities they 
share, researchers are doing interpretive work of their own, making sense of interview 
data in the context of their own presuppositions and value systems  (Burawoy 1991; 
Charmaz 2006).  Just as interview “stories” are not always indicative of prior realities 
(Silverman 2000), any analysis is situated in time, place, culture and the positionality of 
the researcher (Charmaz 2006).  An important role of the researcher is then to “test our 
assumptions about the world we study and not unwittingly reproduce these assumptions” 
through theory building (Charmaz 2006:19).  This involves not only respect for the 
dignity of our respondents, even where we disagree with their perspectives (Blumer 
1984), but also a call to try and deeply understand those perspectives we find surprising 
or disturbing (Charmaz 2006).  Cognizant of my positionality and interpretive work, I 
tried to be aware in the research process of my own assumptions, surprises, and the 
moments where I caught myself becoming disappointed, frustrated, angry, or making 
internal judgments about things I was seeing and hearing from respondents.  This was not 
a rare occurrence.  Burawoy (1991) calls ethnographic work a “feat of empathy,” and I 
often felt this very viscerally, connecting with the stories and choices of my respondents 
on a deeply emotional level.  Some interview respondents I only met once or twice, but in 
many other cases I attended respondents’ weddings, children’s births, or worked together 
with them during community projects.  I commiserated with community members when 
NGOs came and left with broken promises, surveyed the damage of inundated rice fields 
with them after disastrous floods, and was present when they banded together to rebuild 
roads and schools.  I felt connected, both to individuals and the community as a whole 
and wanted the best for my respondents---though admittedly my own version of the best, 
which was at times different from theirs.  In particular, my view of the “best” included 
promoting the education of young people, even where the systems of education didn’t 
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promise a well-paid job at its conclusion. This created a conflict where I saw young 
people dropping out of school at young ages to migrate; often encouraged to do so by 
peers, parents, and social pressures. Although I see migration, when chosen, as generally 
positive and empowering, I see education and information as even more critical.  My 
perspective, informed by capabilities approaches to development (e.g. Nussbaum 2011), 
was that education not only directly beneficial but also tended to promote other freedoms, 
life chances, and capabilities. In contrast while migration at young ages could be 
beneficial, it could also jeopardize or close off opportunities across a range of areas of 
life.9 
My views on the importance of education are of course directly related to my own 
status and life experiences, and reflect the fact that I’ve been privileged enough to have 
never needed to weigh basic consumption, security, or social mobility goals against the 
importance of education in my own life. However these views are perhaps important to 
state here, as I found my own internal judgments were difficult to “turn off” during the 
course of my research. Thus, they clearly impacted the questions I asked, and my 
construction and interpretation of conversations, particularly in conversations related to 
youth migration, which I address in Chapter 9. Aside from attempting to be both 
respectful and also aware of my own judgments and positionality during the course of my 
research, I have also tried through the course of this text to share these judgments, 
admitting and acknowledging my role as an interpreter of realities by including myself as 
an active character in this dissertation and the stories/analysis within it.   
 
Positionality and Limitations 
 A few additional aspects of my status are particularly worth noting, as they most 
clearly impacted my interactions.  Because the most visible work I was doing in Chanleas 
                                                 
9
 Nussbaum would call these concepts “fertile functionings” and “corrosive disadvantages.”  In her words, 
fertile functionings (i.e. education) are capabilities that promote additional capabilities, where as corrosive 
disadvantages (i.e. dropping out of school for migration for work at a young age) are deprivations that lead 
to, or make one vulnerable to further deprivations (Nussbaum 2011:44) 
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Dai was education focused via PEPY, interviewees and villagers largely saw me as an 
NGO worker interested in education.  This became an impossible identity to shed.  
Because the small NGO I worked with had a strong presence in the area, and I had a 
stated role within it, I was instantly recognized as a representative of that group, even 
after my employment with PEPY ended.  I attempted to minimize this in several ways.  
First, both village officials and the NGO staff I was working with knew my status as a 
researcher and PhD student and were aware of the topic of my research.  Additionally 
prior to each interview I explained my research goals and how this was different from the 
work in education that PEPY was doing nearby.  Though I openly stated that I was 
conducting research on migration, my dual role as an NGO worker in education and a 
researcher interested in migration was a difficult concept for many people to grasp.  They 
assumed that the questions I had about migration must have been education related, 
which of course they were in many ways.   
 Often my two identities worked in tandem together.  My role as a development 
practitioner and someone who was working for an education projects in the area helped 
me establish the relationships necessary for people to feel comfortable sharing about 
irregular migration, a potentially threatening topic. Though inevitably the responses I 
received to my questioning were shaped by my status and embodiment as an “education 
development worker,” as well as a young American woman, my impression was that this 
served only to give me more detailed and open responses about migration patterns.  
Rather than being fearful that I was associated with an organization trying to find 
information on something illegal, or cynical about offering time to yet another researcher, 
I felt I was treated as a concerned ally, with the interest of the community in mind.  
Parents and students were open with me about their desires to migrate, the difficult 
opportunity costs they met with as more insecurity led to higher levels of migration in the 
area, the desire to keep their communities and children safe.  If anything, my embodiment 
made people more likely to be open about the dangers and difficulties of migration and 
the high levels of young people leaving from their communities, as they hoped that the 
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NGO I was associated with would respond to these concerns with more educational 
support for students and parents. 
 The most significant area where I noticed my status shape my interactions was 
when I asked young people, particularly students, about their own desires to migrate.  
With only rare (but compelling) exceptions, current students and young people who were 
connected to PEPY programs hesitated to express their desires to go work in Thailand 
overtly, and where they did so stated that their migration aspirations were only because 
they wanted to support their families.  However from village gossip and informal 
conversations with adults, I also knew that many of the same young people who 
expressed their desire for education and disinterest in migration to me expressed different 
desires to parents, peers, and teachers.  Because of its association with consumption, 
status, modernity, and ideals of masculinity and femininity, many young people aspired 
to migration regardless of the economic needs for their family. However perhaps because 
students knew my ties to education, they rarely shared an outright desire to work abroad, 
linking any stated migration aspiration instead to a need to support their family’s 
livelihoods in a more socially acceptable fashion. I perceived they were hesitant to share 
desires for migration in a way that might question their support for education, an 
understandable choice given my background and position. When I traveled to villages in 
more remote areas of Chanleas Dai, where young people did not know my affiliations, I 
received more diverse responses, which often highlighted that migration was a way to 
meet desires of young people for status, consumer goods, and the respect of peers.  Thus I 
spent a great deal of time speaking with parents, teachers, young people who didn’t know 
me, and those who knew me well in order to better understand youth desires that I 
perceived were often unexpressed in informal conversations and interviews with young 
people who participated in NGO programs I was connected with. 
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Problematic Domains 
 Aside from the technical challenges of interviewing in a foreign language, I also 
encountered logistic difficulties while conducting interviews, some of which have 
implications for the data collected.  Though interviews were arranged in advance, more 
often than not respondents were in the rice fields, napping, at the market or otherwise 
absent when I appeared for previously scheduled interviews.  At times, scheduled 
interviewees had returned to Thailand the day before, or even that very morning.  In some 
cases, this led to interviews with a different member of the household than the originally 
selected respondent.  Because women were more often at home than men, my interviews 
are slightly disproportionately with women.   
 In addition, the geography and culture of Khmer villages made individual private 
interviews at respondents’ homes difficult in all but a handful of cases. Each of the 
villages of Chanleas Dai are clustered, with homes built in close proximity, often all but 
touching one another.  Neighbors are acutely aware of the presence of those nearby, and 
often relatives will live within a few houses of one another, a line or cluster of homes 
making a small unit of extended kin who might cook or complete household chores 
together. Typically guests and friends are entertained underneath the tall stilt homes, 
sitting on benches or rocks in the shade of the house floor above.  Social life is played out 
in visible ways in all respects, with most daily activities and all public or private 
celebrations shared among neighbors and those in close proximity. Doors or windows, 
where they exist are left open, and secrets are not easily kept. Domestic violence, 
alcoholism, poverty, wealth, indulgence, hard work, and laziness are all perceived as 
common knowledge, and often other household’s family business is referred to 
nonchalantly in conversation. Whether land and geographic necessity causes this 
communal nature of social life, or whether communal values influence home proximity, 
the two lead to a space where most individual pursuits are at least visible to those nearby. 
 Given this context, the visible presence of a white woman asking questions, even 
one who has been seen around for a few years, sparked curiosity and interest of 
neighbors, relatives, or those passing by. In many cases during interviews family 
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members or friends sat a few feet away; hushing younger siblings, preparing dinner, or 
simply sitting and listening.  In many interviews, one or two of the most vocal would 
chime in, adding thoughts, correcting the respondent’s memory of dates, or sharing their 
own ideas and personal experiences.  This kind of collective interviewing poses logistic 
as well as substantive challenges.  Often strong insights or forgotten details would come 
from those observing the interview, and in some cases where an observer was more 
engaged or interested in the topics than the intended respondent, their observations and 
experiences became as focal as those of the respondent.  In all interviews, these observers 
were noted, and their contributions transcribed.  As these family members and friends 
often contributed insightful comments, their voices appear in this dissertation as well 
although they are not listed in the index of respondents.   
 Although in cases I tried to facilitate more privacy or arranging interview times 
when others might be busy, many people told me they felt more, not less comfortable 
talking to me with someone else present. Qualitative research in other Cambodian 
contexts has noted this cultural challenge as well (Maltoni 2010). Thus I chose to 
prioritize the comfort level of my respondents over controlling the interview environment 
more efficiently.  Certainly, this type of communal interviewing has implications for my 
research.  In several cases, it likely influenced the stories that individuals told me about 
their migrations, their decision making process, and the impacts of migration on their 
family.  If a mother was present during an interview with a young man for example, he 
might be more likely to tell me that his migration was because he felt the need to help his 
family, for example whereas if he were alone he might tell me he wanted to follow his 
peers to Thailand simply for the experience of it. With little ability to “enforce” 
individual interviews when people peered around corners and into homes, I choose to 
deal with this methodological challenge on a case by case basis and take observers into 
consideration when analyzing responses.   
  
 32 
Anonymity 
All respondents with the exception of local authorities at the commune level have 
had their names and identifying characteristics changed, and I do not refer to the villages 
chosen for interview by name or the home villages of interview respondents.  However I 
have chosen not to anonymize my site of research.  I made this choice in agreement with 
a generally accepted principle that in ethnographic work it is desirable to disclose case 
locations where ethically possible, to allow readers to validate information and/or relate 
these observations and arguments to other relevant studies (Yin 2009). Openly stating my 
site of research also allowed me to conduct research in the areas where I was already 
connected with community members through NGO work without being concerned about 
the potential for deductive disclosure, that is the ease with which my readers could intuit 
or discover my “anonymous” research site.  Moreover, I believe this choice resonates 
with the realities of doing research in an increasingly global and connected world, where 
ethnographers often have sustained and “google-able” ties to their sites of research.  
 
OUTLINE OF THIS DISSERTATION 
 This dissertation is divided into two parts.  In the first, (Chapters 2-4) I examine 
the theoretical and empirical background for this study.  In Chapter 2, I summarize 
relevant literature in the field of migration, and position this dissertation within 
contemporary scholarship. In Chapter 3 I discuss the general context, significance, and 
scope of Cambodian migration to Thailand.  In Chapter 4 I introduce Chanleas Dai and 
discuss the historical influences and current realities that provide the background for 
contemporary migration trends in this area.   
 In the second section (Chapter 5-9) I move from the broad contextual background 
of Cambodian migration to Thailand to an empirical analysis of the patterns, meanings, 
and contradictions that migration decisions hold for families in Chanleas Dai.  In Chapter 
5 I explore the decision to migrate and how migration plays a role in household 
livelihood strategies.  In this chapter I focus specifically on understandings of ideal and 
possible household strategies for survival, looking at how individuals make decisions to 
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migrate and what alternatives they consider viable at home. In Chapter 6 I discuss 
decision-making around remittances, specifically exploring expenditures around home 
construction, the most predominant use of remittances beyond basic consumption and 
debt repayment. In Chapter 7 I describe the ways borrowing and credit are used in 
tandem as part of household strategies, arguing that household debt and the repayment of 
loans are fundamental to the migration decisions for many households.  By analyzing 
how households understand and use credit in tandem with migration, I argue that the 
expansion of microcredit in Cambodia has further enabled a strong culture of migration.  
In Chapter 8 I explore youth decision-making specifically, identifying the specific 
constraints that compel youth migration, and narratives which encourage youth to 
prioritize migration over the completion of primary and secondary education. Finally, in 
Chapter 9 I discuss the implications of my findings for the long-term prospects for 
development in Chanleas Dai, and point to the implications that this case holds for other 
geographic areas and for general theories of migration and development. 
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CHAPTER 2: MIGRATION, DECISION-MAKING AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
Literature within the study of migration has long tried to identify and clarify the 
determinants of migration. Over time, this literature has grown to recognize that the 
factors that cause migration are multi-level, vary by context, and change over time within 
communities. This chapter contextualizes this study by tracing the literature on 
migration-decision making, and then exploring the major threads of argument in the field 
of migration and development. 
 
MAPPING THE DETERMINANTS OF MIGRATION 
Theories of migration in the 1960’s and 1970’s, drew on neoclassical economic 
theory to explain migration decisions. Focusing almost exclusively on economic 
differences between sending and receiving countries, at a micro-level this perspective 
viewed migration choices as the outcome of a rational process of cost-benefit analysis, 
responding to wage gaps between sending and receiving societies (Todaro 1969; Borjas 
1989; Todaro and Maruszko 1987). Though powerful in explaining variation across some 
migration patterns (Massey et al 1994), neoclassical models did not address temporary or 
cyclical migration, as they generally based calculation assumptions on lifetime earnings 
in destination countries. They also focused exclusively on labor markets, while ignoring 
other markets of importance in sending and receiving areas (Stark and Levhari 1982; Stark 
and Bloom 1985) and the importance of social factors which mediate individual decision-
making (Mines and DeJanvry 1982, Massey et al 1987; Massey et al 1998). 
In the 1980’s, researchers developed a new theoretical paradigm that recognized 
that migration decisions are often part of household decision-making and not simply a 
matter of individual choice.  This theoretical shift, referred to as the New Economics of 
Labor Migration (NELM) approach focused critical attention on the economic realities of 
rural sending areas, pointing out that imperfect or missing credit, risk, and insurance 
markets constrain economic possibilities and therefore impact migration decision-making 
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(Stark 1978; Stark 1980; Stark 1982; Taylor et al 1996; Massey et al 1998).  Specifically, 
the NELM perspective asserts that missing credit markets stimulate migration, arguing 
that when credit is inaccessible for rural farmers to start or expand businesses, they may 
then be driven to migrate in order to loosen cash constraints (Stark 1980; Stark 1982; 
Taylor et al 1996; Taylor et al 2003).  According to NELM theories, where financial 
markets are imperfect or inaccessible, migration plays an important role in allowing 
households to reduce risk through income diversification, specifically through sending 
household labor abroad (Stark and Levhari 1982; Stark and Bloom 1985; Taylor et al 
1996; Taylor 1999; Massey et al 1998, Taylor et al 2003).   NELM theories also highlight 
the importance of relative deprivation in explaining migration decisions, arguing that 
migrants often seek work abroad not necessarily to improve their absolute well-being, but 
rather to improve their position relative to some comparison group (Stark 1984; Stark and 
Taylor 1989; Stark and Taylor 1991). 
A concurrent shift in migration research in the 1990’s moved to explain and better 
understand the social process of migration, arguing that migration is driven by and also 
has the capacity to influence networks, value systems, and the social landscape of 
migrant communities (Massey et al 1987; Massey et al 1994; Massey et al 1993; Massey 
et al 1998).   From this point of view, migration is a dynamic process in which webs of 
social ties strengthen networks, reduce migrant risk, and facilitate a process of cumulative 
causation in which migration becomes a self-sustaining process (Mines 1981; Stark and 
Levhari 1982; Massey 1987; Massey 1990; Massey et al 1998). Early U.S. research on 
migration as a social process generally centered on Mexican migration to the U.S., 
focused on the processes of network building, income redistribution and land 
consolidation which facilitated the exponential growth of migration patterns over time 
(Massey 1988).  Based on the Mexican experience, researchers showed that as more 
migrants from any given community move abroad for work, networks intensify; making 
migration a less risky possibility for friends and family members of migrants (Massey 
1990; Kandel and Massey 2002).  This process of cumulative causation—migration 
perpetuating further migration—enables a number of social and cultural shifts as 
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migration becomes a prominent feature within communities, often resulting in migration 
streams taking on life and meaning independent of the factors which began their 
proliferation (Massey 1987; Massey 1988; Massey 1990).  
 
Cultures of Migration 
In the context of Mexican migration to the U.S., Massey and his associates argued 
that in rural sending areas, enduring practices of migration alter social and cultural 
characteristics of rural sending areas, in substantive ways such that it is appropriate to 
consider the presence of a “culture of migration” (Massey et al 1993; Massey et al 1998; 
Kandel and Massey 2002). This concept has been used in a number of ways over diverse 
contexts to show how areas with strong out-migration patterns come to be defined, and to 
some degree, structured by those migrations (Ali 2007; Horvath 2008; Pieke et al 2004). 
Specifically, as migration grows in prevalence and historical duration within a 
community, it can influence and shift value systems in dramatic ways, becoming a 
“referential behavior repertoire,” orienting value systems and motivating new 
perspectives and choices (Horvath 2008: 773, Massey et al 1993).  
The concept of a culture of migration argues that widespread acts of migration 
can lead to choices that prioritize the act of migration in ways that cannot be explained 
simply by economic factors, individual rational actor motivations, or theories of 
household strategic response to risk.  A culture of migration, for example, might lead to 
migration being viewed as the ideal path towards stability or mobility within society, 
leading to a weakening of productive practices based in sending areas (e.g. Pieke et al 
2004).  It might also lead to migration being understood or practiced as a rite of passage, 
or symbolic marker that young people desire in order to mark their own transition to 
adulthood (Kandel and Massey 2002), or to take part in more individualized, “modern” 
life strategies (Horvath et al 2008).    
The first to formally define and test the concept of a culture of migration, Kandel 
& Massey (2002) describe cultures of migration as arising from the increased prevalence 
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of migration in communities, and strongly linked to the concept of cumulative causation 
(Massey 1990).  Noting that successful migrants were widely admired for their ability to 
increase consumption and also their access to capital improvements, Kandel and Massey 
posit that as migrations become less risky and more normative through cumulative 
causation, cultures of migration can arise.  They describe a culture of migration as 
occurring in the following way: 
 
As migratory behavior extends throughout a community, it increasingly enters the 
calculus of conscious choice and eventually becomes normative. Young people 
who grow up and come of age increasingly expect to migrate internationally in 
the course of their lives. For young men, especially, migration becomes a rite of 
passage, and those who do not attempt it are seen as lazy, unenterprising, and 
undesirable as potential mates. In communities where international labor becomes 
fully integrated into the local culture, young men seeking to become adults 
literally do not consider other options: they assume they will migrate in 
preparation for marriage and that they will go abroad frequently in the course of 
their lives as family needs and personal circumstances change (Kandel & Massey 
2005: 982). 
 
Formally testing the concept using survey data from Zacatecas, Mexico, the 
authors found that children and youth’s aspirations for migration were powerfully shaped 
by family involvement in migration, in ways consistent with the concept of a culture of 
migration. Specifically, the authors found that the higher involvement a young person’s 
family had in international migration, the more he or she expressed a desire to live and 
work in the U.S. Moreover, in communities where more families participated in wage 
labor, students were less motivated to seek additional schooling in Mexico. These 
aspirations for migration could often be self-fulfilling prophecies.  As the authors argue, 
young people who aspired to work in the U.S. were less likely to invest emotionally or 
economically in strategies that would promote socio-economic mobility within Mexico, 
such as schooling.  Therefore their aspirations affected choices that raise the odds of 
actual migration—which the authors argue ultimately passes the same value of migration 
on to subsequent generations.   
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 Several qualitative studies have refined and expanded upon this concept of a 
culture of migration in recent years. Ali (2007: 39) expanded Kandel & Massey’s 
definition, proposing defining cultures of migration as more broadly “those ideas, 
practices and cultural artifacts that reinforce the celebration of migration and migrants. 
This includes beliefs, desire, symbols, myths, education, celebrations of migration in 
various media, and material goods.” Using this definition Ali finds that cultures of 
migration may extend even beyond those who have relatives and family abroad. In other 
words, in places where migration becomes a more diffuse cultural norm, it may inspire 
the migrations of those even without close connections to migrant networks. 
Horvath (2008) further unpacks this concept by underscoring three substantively 
different understandings of the concept of a culture of migration: first, the emergence of 
new perspectives, ideas and values which impact decision making (e.g. Massey, Goldring 
and Durand 1994; Massey et al 1994; Kandel & Massey 2002); second, shifts to norms 
and ideologies which frame the interpretation and evaluation of stability and mobility in 
sending societies (e.g. Pieke et al 2004; Verdery 1994); and, third, the process by which 
migration gains symbolic functions in sending societies, whereby it shifts from being 
perceived as a possible or desirable alternative to being viewed as a necessary social act, 
perceived as a rite of passage or essential element in the transition to adulthood (e.g. 
Massey, Goldring and Durand 1994; Massey et al 1994).   
Compelling qualitative research across geographic contexts highlights the power 
and influence of each of the above understandings of a culture of migration, particularly 
on youth who are coming of age within such cultures (Ali 2007; Horvath 2008; 
Dannecker 2009; Connell 2008).  Cultures of migration have been shown to substantively 
impact migration aspirations (Ali 2007; Dannecker 2009; Connell 2008; Kalir 2005), 
status and marriage markets (Ali 2007; Xiang 2001; Kalir 2005),  and investment in local 
strategies of socio-economic mobility (Ali 2007; Connell 2008; Pieke et al 2004; Wiest 
1973). 
Horvath notes that cultures of migration can also be obligatory beyond their 
symbolic meaning as a rite of passage, but also due to the lack of meaningful alternatives 
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within the global labor market for youth coming of age: “they do not consider labour 
migration as an achievement or desirable condition; rather, they see it as the one way that 
they might avoid or mitigate the protracted condition they otherwise face with a floating 
socio-economic status in their home country” (Horvath 2008: 783). 
Though the concept of a culture of migration argues that decisions are framed, 
structured and legitimized in powerful ways, it is not a deterministic model. Rather, 
accepted social norms and values structure the perceived costs and benefits of migration.  
As migration patterns grow stronger, these are continually reshaped, reproduced, and 
validated by society at large in ways that ensure continued migration.   
Theoretical and empirical studies highlighting the importance of cultures of 
migration also do not necessary conflict with household and economic-based theories of 
migrant decision-making.  Rather they highlight that as migration patterns persist and 
grow through cumulative causation and network formation, migration takes on a life of 
its own so to speak, becoming a social force outside of-- and often much more powerful 
than-- the structural economic conditions which supported the creation of original flows.  
These forces can orient whole communities towards migration in strong ways, where 
instead of being considered and calculated in terms of economic benefits, migration holds 
a strong affective pull for individuals, based on its association with status, power, ritual, 
or perceived inevitability (Kalir 2005).  This, as Kalir  (2005) argues, can lead to abrupt, 
gut-level decisions to leave, often unexplained by economic theories.  In particular, in 
Kalir’s research in Ecuadorian migrant communities, where individuals are constantly 
confronted with wealth-related jealousy, frustration, or anger, they reported “deep 
feelings” that led them to quick migration decisions that simply “felt right.”  To highlight 
to the affective nature of migration decisions within communities where a culture of 
migration exists, Kalir refers to a widespread “migratory disposition,” which he argues 
leads individuals: 
 
“…to have their finger readily set on a metaphoric migration rifle. It is then often 
enough for a seemingly negligible event, which evokes an emotional (negative or 
positive) overflow, to make people pull the trigger. Thus, what might appear from 
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the outset as an abrupt and haste decision is actually only the top of the iceberg, a 
culmination of a lengthy process whereby the idea to migrate was knowingly, and 
often also involuntarily, entertained but never verbally articulated” (Kalir 2005: 
188). 
 
Theories Working Together 
Neoclassical theories, New Economics perspectives, and theories suggesting the 
importance of migration as a social process/cultures of migration each offer important 
insights into how migrants make decisions, recognizing the importance of national and 
international processes, national economic realities, local institutions, and social norms 
and culture.  Rather than viewing these theories in opposition to one another, they are 
best understood as complementing one another, together providing a more full analysis of 
the causes of migration within any given stream (Massey et al 1994).  In example, based 
on a synthesis of migration theories using the case of North America, Massey et al. 
(1994) show that each of these theories (and others, not discussed here) hold power in 
explaining aspects of migration streams, an argument for looking at theories as 
supporting and enhancing one another rather than as competing.  
These theories, taken together, also foreshadow some of the debates within the 
migration/development dialogue, some of which are taken up in this dissertation. For 
example, to what extent does migration allow for the diversification or capital 
improvement that NELM theories suggest households seek out?  How are families or 
sending communities affected when migrants have access to higher wages abroad?  How 
does a culture of migration influence the opportunities perceived and available for young 
people? A wealth of literature focuses on these questions- seeking to better understand 
the extent to which migration contributes to positive developments in migrant sending 
communities, and for migrants themselves.   
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MIGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
The migration-development nexus is complex, though it is understood that 
migration has both development related causes and impacts (Massey 1988; Massey et al 
1998). Clearly, migration can bring positive change to individuals, households, 
communities and nation-states, through the economic impact of higher wages and 
remittances sent home.  However migration can also displace valuable human capital, 
alter value systems, threaten community cohesion, discourage productive investment and 
bring other unintended consequences.  
In the next section of this chapter I briefly trace the general arguments in the 
migration and development dialogue, and explore the two specific areas of inquiry that 
are most commonly discussed in this literature: remittances and human capital. This 
simplifies what is a much more complex picture, as there is a wide body of literature 
discussing the cultural and social impacts of migration on households and communities, 
issues which are clearly important factors in understanding the general role migration has 
on well-being, community cohesion, gender roles, etc.  However because I am attempting 
to point out disconnects in the way migration is expected to contribute to development as 
it is understood from an economic perspective, I focus on the main themes that relate to 
these discourses.    
 
Macro –Theories: Development vs. Dependency 
Within the literature on migration and development, a wealth of empirical and 
theoretical research assesses the potential for migration to contribute to development. 
This research can be organized into two divergent perspectives; one which sees migration 
as a stable aid alternative and a successful “bottom-up” development strategy, and the 
other which views migration as primarily leading to only greater dependency, and 
unlikely to produce meaningful growth on its own.  A third perspective, which has 
attracted more attention recently, has attempted to nuance these debates, seeing the 
potential for migration to contribute to sustained growth as dependent on factors such as 
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the duration of migration, infrastructure and institutions at origin, and the regulation and 
government protection of migrants (Portes 2009; DeHaas 2010; Hatton and Williamson 
1994). These diverging perspectives are partially explained by varying, at times 
conflicting, definitions of development.  
The dependency tradition sees migration as an outgrowth of global inequalities 
inherent to the uneven process of capital development (Reichert 1981).  If migration is an 
articulation of a pattern of dependency between core capitalist countries and the rest of 
the world, then changes brought about by migration only increase the cycle of 
dependency in a global structure of imbalanced power (Sassen 1988; Zolberg et al 1989).  
Though these perspectives often agree that migration brings about significant short-term 
benefits at the household or individual level, yet focus on the inequality that both drives 
migration and often grows as a result of it (e.g. Riechert 1981; 1982).   
Pessimistic views highlighting structural imbalances and dependency 
characterized much migration research between 1970-1990 (DeHaas 2010). For example 
in an analysis of past studies of thirty-seven migrant communities in Mexico, Durand and 
Massey (1992 :25) found that researchers were surprisingly unanimous in “condemning 
international migration as a palliative that improves the material well-being of particular 
families without leading to sustained economic growth.”  Taylor et al (1996: 401) report 
that an ILO official interviewed in the 1990’s reaffirmed the widespread view that 
migration was incompatible with development goals, quoting the official as noting 
“migration and development – nobody believes that anymore.” This perspective argued 
that the economic benefits migration brings could only be short-term, while at the same 
time migration brought about significant negative impacts in terms of loss of human 
capital, through “brain drains” and by diverting interest from education or local 
production and entrepreneurship.  Framed by a viewpoint that defined development as 
necessarily a long-term process, this perspective validated that migration often could lead 
to short-term poverty reduction, but viewed the perceived long-term effects of lost 
productivity and human capital as problematic. 
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Yet recently there has been a resurgence of interest in the potential for migration 
to contribute to development (Newland 2007; DeHaas 2010), arguing that migration 
(primarily via remittances) can serve as an engine of development. The arguments for this 
perspective are closely associated with NELM ideas of migration as compensating for 
missing local capital and insurance markets.  Through remittances, migrants set in motion 
a development dynamic--loosening production and consumption constraints on 
households (Durand et al. 1996; Stark & Bloom 1985) and allowing for meaningful 
growth.  This has led to some arguing that remittances are “the new development 
mantra,” (Kapur 2004) hailing migrants as “heroes of development” for the cash they 
send back to home communities (Castles and Wise 2008). 
Much of this renewed optimism focuses on the promise of circular migration, and 
highlights the differential ability of cyclical/circular and permanent migration to promote 
development at home (Portes 2009; DeHaas 2010). Circular migration, which can allow 
for skill transfer, and encourages productive investment at home, is seen has having more 
developmental potential than permanent migration, which depopulates and leads to a loss 
of talent in sending areas (Portes 2009). Circular migration is also more likely to occur 
between neighboring countries, countries where borders are porous, and where transport 
between sending and receiving countries is relatively cheap. These are all more 
characteristic of South-South migration patterns than South-North patterns.   
However, the empirical evidence for the links between migration and 
development is still very weak (Newland 2007).  Indeed at both the national and the 
household level, there is conflicting evidence as to how much power remittances have to 
mitigate poverty or to bring sustained economic improvements to households and what 
role social remittances or increases in human capital can play in bringing positive 
developments to households, individuals and communities. Much of the controversy 
surround the potential for migration to lead to development in sending communities 
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focuses on two aspects of the migration process: the uses, and power of remittances, and 
impacts of migration on human capital at home.10 
Debating the Power of Remittances 
As noted earlier, much of the development and migration debate can be 
understood at the level of definition. At the individual and community level there is little 
argument that migration can be a crucial livelihood strategy for poor families, particularly 
where environment or economic realities make local alternatives precarious. Across the 
developing world, remittances are a significant source of income, according to one 
source, accounting for an estimated 30-40 percent of household income in developing 
countries (Adams 2011). The positive economic effects of remittances at the household 
level are clear across contexts (Adams and Page 2005; Adams 2011). In reviews of fifty 
studies of the impact of migration in the developing world Adams (2011) finds that all 
studies show evidence that remittances reduce immediate poverty. This occurs through a 
variety of mechanisms. By supplementing their earnings through non-farm labor, 
migration allows rural families to diversify income, meet immediate consumption needs 
and accumulate more capital (Taylor et al 1996). Remittances can also provide crucial 
access to the cash economy, and are often used to mitigate shocks such as poor harvests, 
medical emergencies, other short-term crises (Yang and Choi 2007). Because remittances 
are exchanged directly into the family budget and can be used for basic subsistence 
needs, they can have a much more direct impact on poverty reduction at the household 
level than international aid (Ghosh 2006). Moreover, scholars note that remittances are 
the most stable of resource inflows to the poor, making them an especially important 
safety net and form of insurance for the poor (Kapur 2004; Ratha 2005).  
The empirical argument questioning the significance of remittances in promoting 
development argues that while remittances are large in absolute value, at the household 
                                                 
10 An additional  important body of work focuses on issues of “brain drain” –the process by which the 
most educated individuals in a community migrate, thus depriving the community of vital human resources.  
However during the time of my research the most educated individuals in Chanleas Dai were not typically 
migrating. Thus it is not a topic I take up in this dissertation. 
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level they are spent primarily on consumption, not productive investment, thus limiting 
their long-term impact. There is little controversy about the fact that most remittances are 
spent on consumption, rather than productive investment. Reviews of remittance 
spending across geographic contexts indicate that at the household level the bulk of 
remittances are spent on consumption, housing, and the general costs of daily living, with 
a lesser amount going to contribute to the income-generating projects, or productive 
investments etc.  (Rempel and Lobdell 1978; Taylor et al 1996; Grasmuck and Pessar 
1991; Massey et al 1987; Mines and DeJanvry 1982; Reichert 1981; Stuart and Kearney 
1981; Wiest 1984). Moreover, research also shows in migrant sending communities the 
influx of remittances and increased access to cash has led many households in some 
communities to reduce or abandon altogether local production, reorganizing community 
production around migration (Ferran and Pessar 1991; Pieke et al 2004; Taylor and 
Adelman 1996).  This can leave migrant households more dependent on migration with 
less access to local alternatives than they had before (Ferran and Pessar 1991; Stoll 
2010). Together, these finding have led to the many pessimistic characterizations of 
international migration: as a “palliative” that improves family well-being in the short 
term but does not lead to economic growth (Durand and Massey 1992: 25), as a 
“dangerous dependence” (Stuart and Kearney 1981); and as an illness undermining 
development (Reichert 1981). Together these perspectives argue for a moderated view of 
migration as a motor for rural development, articulating that migration is capable of 
combating transient poverty, but not an ideal strategy for long-term economic growth 
(Kapur 2004).  
A significantly more optimistic view, which has become more dominant in the  
late 90’s and 2000’s, accepts that a large portion of remittances are spent on daily and 
conspicuous consumption and acknowledges that migration can at times deter from local 
production, but argues that regardless remittances still contribute significantly to 
development (Dinerman 1982; Delgado Wise and Ramirez Rodrigues 2001).  Research 
supporting this optimistic perspective shows that even when spent on consumption, 
remittances can have a strong multiplier effect within local communities (Durand Parrado 
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and Massey 1996).  Because consumption in sending area is typically in the form of local 
food products, locally produced goods, local construction materials, and local services 
will make up the majority of consumption (Durand et al 1996; Durand Parrado & Massey 
1996).  These dollars then can generate additional employment, production, and income 
at the local level.  In Mexico, the annual $2 billion remitted from the U.S. for example 
results in an estimated national income effect of nearly $6 billion (Durand, Parrado & 
Massey 1996).  In another estimate using Mexico-US data, Taylor (2004) estimated that  
$1 remitted into a household results directly in $1.85 of household income. Moreover, 
though a large portion of remittances coming into developing countries are typically 
spent on consumption, smaller but significant contributions also are used for the 
upgrading of farm equipment and production, capital investments, and income-generating 
small businesses.  Some research in Asia including China, Pakistan and Thailand 
suggests that remittances invested in farming improvements lead to increase agricultural 
output, and even farm modernization (Stahl 1986; Taylor, Rozelle and DeBrauw, 2003).  
Research in Africa points to similar conclusions, finding that over time, investment from 
remittances led to higher crop yields and accumulation of cattle (Lucas, 1987). Building 
on this body of work, optimistic perspectives argue that even when only a small portion 
of remittances are allocated to productive investment, these investments matter; perhaps 
significantly over time.   
One critical problem with these community studies in general is the lack of a 
theoretically useful and common yardstick to measure the effects of migration on 
economic growth or poverty reduction (Taylor et al 1996).  Village-based studies tend to 
focus on distinctions between remittances used for consumption versus those used in 
production, often employing a limited definition of productive investment which does not 
include spending on livestock, schooling, land etc.  Moreover, this discourse again 
highlights the central issue of definitions.  Studies also often discuss development as a 
static, agreed-upon concept, when there is in fact a great deal of debate on what 
indicators and standards and concepts best define “development”.  The use of remittances 
for home improvement, for example, is often categorized as conspicuous consumption, 
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and not the kind of investment which is associated with sustainable development.  Yet 
arguably the safety, security, and sense of well-being a nicer home can provide for 
families is in fact a constituent piece of both relative and absolute poverty, and 
development (Cohen and Conway 1998; DeHaas 2005).  
 
Debates on Human Capital 
A second critical way that migration can impact sending communities in terms of 
consequences for development is through its impact on human capital, broadly defined 
here as educational and professional skills. In addition to the direct immediate economic 
benefits derived from remittances, the developmentalist camp argues the experiences of 
migrants abroad can be understood as investments in human capital, both for migrants 
and their families sending communities (McKenzie 2007). For example migrants might 
gain skills abroad which would be put to productive use at home or lead to better health 
and hygiene knowledge for migrants and their families.  These in turn can lead to greater 
productivity and human capital by leading to better health outcomes (Ghosh 2006).  
Moreover migrants might, via remittances, be able to invest in the education of younger 
generations, leading to greater future earning power of the children of migrant families.  
A competing hypothesis focuses on the fact that migration is both a symptom and a cause 
of underdevelopment, as it takes away human capital, encourages a lack of production in 
sending areas, and allows governments to escape their responsibilities by relying on 
migrant remittances (Delgado-Wise and Covarrubias 2007).  
The empirical evidence shows mixed results, and appears to be highly context 
dependent. In some areas, studies show a strong positive connection between migrant 
households (or remittance receipt) and the investment in or attainment of education for 
migrant children (Wahba 2000; Yang 2004; Duryea et al 2005; Cox-Edwards and Ureta 
2003).  However studies also indicate that children with migrant parents tend to perform 
worse in school (Battistella and Conaco 1996), have lower enrolment (Jampaklay 2006), 
or have lower aspirations for higher education (Kandel and Kao 2000), pointing out that 
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remittances may in fact have a dual role, both contributing to the education of children 
left behind as well as working as a motivator for the persistence of migration patterns.  
Thus, migration may contribute to the development of human capital in young 
generations while at the same time contributing to young people’s ease of access and 
interest in migrating.  In Mexico recent research indicates that remittances from migrants 
to the U.S. often provide financial benefits to allow Mexican children to continue school 
and perform well, but also highlights that high levels of U.S. migration are associated 
with lower aspirations to attend university or higher education (Kandel and Kao 2000). 
By showing an example of an alternative route to economic mobility and connecting 
children to information and social networks which would facilitate their migration, 
parents might unwittingly increase children’s likelihoods of migrating in the future by 
choosing migration as an alternative to the Mexican labor market.   
 
Conclusions 
With a vast wealth of empirical research to draw from, perhaps the most complete 
summary is that different patterns of migration, the goals migrants seek out, and the 
context of sending areas are critical in explaining and predicting the differential potential 
for migration to contribute to development (De Haas 2010). As Gubert (2005) notes, 
remittances and migration can be an important welfare safety net, alleviating transitory 
poverty, but often do not “create the right conditions for genuine development” 
(emphasis added) and significantly transform the structural causes of poverty. Part of the 
reason for this is that it is often the same push factors causing migration (lacking local 
capital markets, few investment opportunities, poor governance, a lack of political 
stability and poor infrastructure) that inhibit remittances from facilitating substantial 
long-term development (Castles and Wise 2008). As Castles and Wise argue, the 
migration/development optimism is based in “the idea is that some of the most expoited 
workers in the world can make up for the failure of mainstream development policies” 
(Castles and Wise 2008:7), when these failures are very often the reason for migration 
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itself. This view, which highlights that migration will likely serve to reinforce pre-
existing development potentials but not easily shift them, points to the importance of 
understanding pre-existing development potentials and the variety of structural and 
personal reasons that individuals undertake migration. 
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CHAPTER 3: CAMBODIAN MIGRATION TO THAILAND 
 
While a detailed history of Cambodia is beyond the scope of this dissertation, it is 
difficult to begin any analysis of the social landscape of Cambodia without first referring 
the powerful and often gruesome history which has structured present-day social 
conditions.  After very briefly treating the history of Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge regime 
and its legacy, this chapter aims to contextualize Cambodian/Thai relations and provide 
an overview of current patterns and dynamics of Cambodian migration to Thailand. 
 
An Iconic History 
The two icons that most often frame images of Cambodia are the ancient temples 
of Angkor Wat and the modern killing fields of the Khmer Rouge regime.  Indicators of 
the height of Khmer imperial strength and the depth of Cambodian tragedy, both occupy 
an important place in contemporary Cambodian society and help situate modern realities 
for those unfamiliar with the country.   
The Angkorian complex, constructed over time between the 9th and 15th 
centuries, is a wonder of the modern world. Angkor Wat, the most famous of the 
Angkorian temples is iconic not only for the millions of tourists who enter the country 
each year to view it, but also for Cambodians as a symbol of national heritage. The 
temples are an indicator of the glory days of the Khmer Empire, which once ruled over 
significant parts of Southern Indochina including portions of modern day Thailand and 
Vietnam, and facilitated the transmission of ideas, people, and institutions between the 
Mekong region.11 The temple complex is still vitally important today, both as a source of 
                                                 
11 As early as the 9th century there are inscriptions suggesting that Cambodia controlled, at least briefly, 
parts of northeastern Thailand.  Between the 13th and 19th centuries, there were consistent entanglements 
between the two countries, with the western provinces of Cambodia (including Siem Reap) exchanging 
hands several times between the Khmer and Siamese empire. As historian David Chandler (2008: 93) 
writes: “People, ideas, texts and institutions migrated west from Angkor to Ayudhua, where they were 
modified and eventually re-exported into Cambodia to survive as part of its genuine decline from the 18th 
century onward.  The migration would have prisoners of war, including entire families, swept off to the 
west after successive Thai invasions of Angkor.”   
 51 
pride and of economic promise.12 Over the past decade tourism, primarily organized 
around the Angkorian temples, has been a strong driver of Cambodia’s economic growth 
Today over 2.5 million visitors a year pass through the temples, with tourism responsible 
for bringing 1.7 billion dollars into the economy in 2010 (MoT 2010). 
The Khmer Rouge regime of Choueng Elk’s killing fields,13 in contrast, is 
responsible for much of the continued chronic poverty and poor infrastructure of the 
country. After coming to power in 1975, the Khmer Rouge set in motion the most 
extreme communist experiment in modern history, emptying the capital city of nearly 
two million people within a matter of days, and effectively ridding the country of private 
property, western medicine, cash-based transactions, and education (Short 2004). 
Historians call the resulting regime “the first ‘slave state’ of modern times” (Short 
2004:291). 
 
“Pol [Pot] enslaved the Cambodian people literally, by incarcerating them within 
a social and political structure, a ‘prison without walls’, as refugees would later 
call it, where they were required to execute without payment whatever work was 
assigned to them for as long as the cadres ordered it, failing which they risked 
punishment ranging from the withholding of rations to death.  Food and clothing 
were, in theory, provided by the state.  But there were no wages….Within time as 
the system grew more rigid, even barter was discouraged.  Like true slaves, the 
inhabitants of Pol’s Cambodia were deprived of all control over their own 
destinies—unable to decide what to eat, when to sleep, where to live or even 
whom to marry.”  (Short 2004: 291) 
 
Estimates widely vary, but likely between 1.7-1.8 million Cambodians died 
during the Khmer Rouge’s years of power (1975-1979) through execution, malnutrition, 
overwork, and disease, an estimated 30% of the population at that time (Heuveline 1998). 
                                                 
12 As David Chandler (2008) points out, Cambodia is the only country to have a national ruins on its flag, 
one of many indications that Chandler uses to argue that due to their tumultuous recent past, Cambodians 
identify more closely with their distant heritage than their contemporary history. 
13 Choeung Ek, located 17 kilometers south of Phnom Penh is one of many mass graves and former 
execution sites where the Khmer Rouge killed political prisoners and others during their 4 year rule.  The 
image of the Killing Fields was made famous in the 1984 Oscar award winning film bearing its name, 
which was based on the true story of Dith Pran and Sidney Schanberg. 
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The effects of the destruction to infrastructure, human capital, trust and social relations, 
and political structures would last for decades.14 In 1979 the Vietnamese invaded and 
subsequently occupied the country, withdrawing their troops over a decade later only 
after Soviet support for Vietnam ended. Following the 1991 Paris Peace Accords which 
ended the two decades of unrest, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) entered the country to organize free and fair elections and oversee a ceasefire 
between warring parties within the country.  Despite UNTAC presence, the early 90’s 
were characterized by continued violence. Khmer Rouge guerilla fighters continued a 
degree of resistance until the late 90’s, particularly in the northwestern regions of the 
country near the Thai border.   
Discussed in the countryside as the “three years eight months and twenty days,” 
the Khmer Rouge’s short hold on power crippled the infrastructure and human capital of 
the country in lasting ways.  Today, schools and the education system in general are still 
struggling to rebuild their infrastructure, population of teachers, curriculums, and 
legitimacy.  Hospitals and clinics are chronically short of medically trained professionals, 
particularly in rural areas, and a generalized atmosphere of social distrust and a culture of 
blame instilled by the years of Khmer Rouge rule foster distrust and corruption at all 
levels of government.   
 
Khmer/Thai Connections 
Over the past five years, perhaps the most publicly discussed connections between 
Cambodia and Thailand in the Cambodian media are political; references to the tenuous, 
ambivalent, at times openly hostile relationship, of words, threats, and occasional gunfire 
between the two countries.15 Despite this, the neighboring states share a thriving cross-
                                                 
14 See Walque 2004 for an example of the lasting impacts of Khmer Rouge related to education and 
mortality. 
15 One such highly publicized incident between the two countries involve a border dispute over the rights 
to Preah Vihear temple, a long-standing disagreement that intensified in 2008 and led to thousands of 
soldiers being placed on either side of the border. Violence further escalated in early 2011 leading to 
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border economy, a religion, a great number of cultural practices16 and strong links as 
millions of dollars in goods and thousands of people daily cross the porous border 
between the two neighbors (Murshid and Sokphally 2005).   
The contemporary economic relationship between Thailand and Cambodia 
became formalized and strengthened after the adoption of a “battlefields into 
marketplaces” policy of the new Thai government in the 1980’s under General Chatichai 
Choonhavan (Richburg 1991; Murshid and Sokphally 2005).  After this point formal 
agreements were signed and new border checkpoints were opened, opening Khmer 
markets to imported Thai products and allowing a freer flow of goods, services, and 
people between the two countries (DAN 2005). Economically Cambodia and Thailand 
are highly integrated.  In 2003, the two countries traded upwards of 700 million dollars 
annually, not including the significant informal trade of the cross-border economy (DAN 
2005).  Thailand is a major source of imports for Cambodia, and provided 18.1% of 
imports in 2006, second only to Hong Kong (Ballard et al 2008).  Thailand is also the 
third largest foreign investor in Cambodia, with over 102 million dollars in foreign 
investment in 2006 alone (Ballard et al 2008).   
The beginning of the modern stream of Cambodian migration to Thailand can be 
traced back to the early 90’s, largely a consequence of economic growth and 
demographic changes in Thailand alongside growing push factors in Cambodia.  Through 
the 1990’s as sustained growth and decreasing birthrates in Thailand created a need for 
                                                                                                                                                 
injuries and death on both sides.  Political tensions between the two countries are have also led to 
diplomatic strains. In November 2009, following Cambodia’s controversial appointment of Thailand’s 
ousted Prime Minister Thaskin Shinawatra as an economic advisor to the country and subsequent refusal to 
extradite him to Thailand for wanted crimes, both countries took steps to limit political and economic 
relations.  The governments recalled their respective ambassadors and stepped back from MOU’s related to 
maritime boundary disputes and road development projects.  With heated insults on both sides, Cambodia’s 
Prime Minister ordered the cancellation of all Thai grants and loans, publicly stating “anyone who dares to 
ask for assistance from Thailand without my permission should resign. We may be poor, but we would 
rather shed our blood than let you look down on us” (Sokha & O’Toole 2009 :1).   
16 Many of the cultural links between the two countries begin as early as the 9th century, growing over 
time as the Thai and Khmer kingdoms came into continued contact with one another.  Historian David 
Chandler (2008: 96) notes the ways in which the two cultures grew together as over time:  “brought into 
contact with each other through wars, immigration, and a shared religion, the newly established Thai and 
Khmer kingdoms blended with each other and developed differently from their separate forebearers.”  
 54 
imported low-skilled labor, rural Cambodians were responding to a growing youth 
population with few local labor opportunities and significant wage discrepancies between 
the two neighbors (Caouette et al 2006; Sciortino and Punpuing 2009).  These factors, 
described in more detail below, have led to generally increasing rates of migration to 
Thailand since the mid 90’s and 2000’s (Revenga et al 2006; Maltoni 2010; Chem et al 
2011).  Though many of these demographic and economic shifts began much earlier, 
instability and violence in Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge period and subsequent 
Vietnamese occupation inhibited widespread labor migration from Cambodia until the 
early 90’s when UNTAC entered the country.
17
 
 
Migrant Demand in Thailand 
In the late 20
th
 century, Thailand experienced rapid and significant economic 
growth, spurred by export-oriented industrialization (Hussey 1993).  With annual growth 
rates upwards of 6-7%, Thailand was one of the fastest growing economies in the 1980’s, 
becoming a mini-tiger
18
 by following the same type of export-led growth that had been so 
successful in neighboring Singapore, Taiwan, and Hong Kong (Hussey 1993). In tandem 
with this economic growth, Thais became more educated and increasingly sought out 
jobs in higher skilled sectors of the economy (Guest and Jones 1996).  During this time 
Thailand also experienced a rapid demographic transition, with rising life expectancy and 
decreasing fertility rates as a result of both urbanization and the increased promotion of 
family planning (Guest and Jones 1996; Hutaserani and Roumasset 1991).  With an 
expanding economy but declining birthrate and low-growth among the working age 
population, Thailand began facing unskilled labor shortages in the 1980’s (Manning 
                                                 
17 After the signing of the Paris Peace Accords in 1991, the United Nations Transitional Authority in 
Cambodia (UNTAC) took over general administrative authority over the country, building infrastructure 
for democratic elections and beginning a move towards relative stability.  For a more detailed history of 
Cambodia during the Khmer Rouge and UNTAC years see Chandler 2008; Widyono 2008, and Becker 
1998. 
18 A reference to the “Asian tiger” economies of Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan in the 
1960’s-80’s. 
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2002; Caouette et al 2006).  Thai companies began to recognize a strong need for labor in 
low-skill sectors such as agriculture, construction, fishing and domestic work (Caouette 
et al 2006; Sciortono and Punpuing 2009).  While these sectors, in particular agriculture, 
had driven the export-led growth of Thailand, the number of Thai’s interested in working 
in these jobs began to decline, with many more interested in urban, high-skilled and more 
highly paid employment (Caouette et al 2006; Sciortono and Punpuing 2009).    
 
Local Push Factors 
Push factors within Cambodia are also crucial in explaining the growth of 
Cambodia migration to Thailand (Godfrey et al. 2001; Maltoni 2006; Fitzgerald and So 
2007; Chan 2009). A country of 14.5 million in 2010, Cambodia is one of the poorest 
countries in Southeast Asia, even after experiencing dramatic economic growth over the 
past decade.  In 2004, Thailand’s per capita GNP was twelve times higher than that of 
Cambodia (Huguet and Punpuing 2005), and over 36% of Cambodia’s population lived 
below the poverty line, then approximately 1,800 riels (or 45 cents) per day  (CSES 
2004).  Due to the disastrous effects of starvation, poverty, and forced labor during the 
Khmer rouge years and post-war baby-boom, Cambodia has a starkly skewed 
demographic profile.  Over one-third of the population was under 15 years old in 2009 
(CIA 2009) and as a result Cambodia has one of the fastest growing populations in the 
world (Ballard et al 2008).  This growing youth population has created enormous 
pressure to create productive employment opportunities for young labor force entrants 
(Acharya 2003).  According to UN statistics, the young working age population (age 15-
39) between 2000-2010 was growing by 3% per year in Cambodia, in contrast to a near 
zero growth of the same age group in Thailand (Huguet and Punpuing 2005; Sciortino 
and Punpuing 2009).  Although Cambodia’s economy has had consistent expansion over 
the past decades, growth is largely concentrated in Phnom Penh in garment factories, 
tourism and construction investments.  Thus employment, particularly in areas more 
distant and disconnected from the capital, has not kept pace with population growth.    
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 This demographic profile has put increased pressure on rural areas, where 
subsistence farming is a primary livelihood strategy.  In most rural areas, during the post-
war era, land was divided evenly among rural residents, based on family size.  However, 
as families have expanded and divided over the past three decades, many households now 
hold insufficient agricultural land to produce enough rice to feed a family. Increasingly, 
newly formed households are land-poor or landless (CSES 2004; CSES 2009).  
According to the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey (CSES) in 2004, landlessness 
among rural households was estimated at 20%, and judged to be increasing at the rate of 
approximately 2 percentage points per year, with this trend more pronounced among 
female-headed households (CSES 2004).  Most rural households, unable to irrigate their 
land for lack of access to water, are able to plant rice and harvest only once a year, 
making it difficult to meet family needs with available land, and even harder to divide 
plots in ways that would support the needs of new families.  Over the past decade, 
environmental pressures have also played a role in spurring out-migration from rural 
areas.  Combinations of floods and droughts in the Tonle Sap area over the past decade 
have significantly affected village-based livelihood strategies, leading families to look 
towards wage-labor wherever they can find it in order to supplement agriculture (Maltoni 
2006; Godfrey et al 2001; MoE and UNDP 2011).  These push and pull factors, 
combined with a relatively porous border and permissive policies, have led to the growth 
of both managed and irregular migration from Cambodia to Thailand. 
  
State Policies on Migration 
Though Thai industries began employing migrant labor in the 1970s, there was no 
clear policy or government-recognized program allowing for migrant labor until 1992, 
when private sector pressures encouraged the government to adopt an immigration policy 
for unskilled foreign workers (Sciortino and Punpuing 2009; Revenga et al 2006; Martin 
2007). Until that time, Thailand’s policies generally prohibited the entry and employment 
of unskilled foreign workers, with a handful of exceptions to this general ban under 
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Article 17 of the Immigration Act of 1979 (Martin 2007).  These exceptions eventually 
formed the basis for Thailand’s migrant worker policy, instituted in 1992 when 
employers in nine provinces bordering Myanmar were allowed to register employed 
migrants (Martin 2007).  From that point forward, the Thai government began actively 
promoting initiatives to curb, control and find information on the number of migrant 
workers within its borders, through registration and later, amnesty programs (Sciortino 
and Punpuing 2009; Revenga et al 2006).
19  
Though registration was initially limited by 
province and sector, driven by employer demands and pressure, worker registration 
programs later opened to all provinces and sectors (Martin 2007).   
Opening up to foreign workers was significantly easier and cheaper than 
outsourcing production or paying the higher wages needed to attract Thai nationals.  
Migrant labor was readily available, as neighboring Myanmar, Laos, and Cambodia each 
had steady streams of displaced or rural populations interested in work across the border.   
For migrant labor, employers could pay between 15% and 30% lower wages (Pholphirul 
et al 2010), while also allowing the kind of lean production that employers increasingly 
sought. With migrant workers, employers could easily expand or contract their workforce 
quickly, based on immediate needs. In 2000, an estimated 10% of Thailand’s labor force 
of 34 million were migrants (Caouette et al 2006). In specific sectors, such as agriculture 
and marine-fisheries, the trend from Thai to migrant-dominated work was even more 
pronounced (Caouette et al 2006).   
Though relatively simple, the registration process for foreign workers was costly 
and initially relied on employers to begin the process. In 2001 registration fees were 
3,250 baht per worker, which included a work permit and a photo ID.  Employers were 
also required to pay a deposit which was forfeited if the migrant disappeared.  For a six-
month extension, migrants could pay an additional 1,200 baht.  In most cases, employers 
                                                 
19 On the Cambodian side, while the government neither facilitates nor overtly discourages 
irregular migration to Thailand, in practice it is very much tolerant of out-migration as a valve for excess 
labor (Revenga et al 2006), and is actively seeking out new destinations for migrant workers (Morris 2007). 
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deducted the cost of registration from workers’ fees, typically around the sum of one 
month’s wages (Martin 2007).  In 2003 the government approved a new resolution aimed 
at regularizing undocumented migration.  As part of this program employers were asked 
to report the number of migrants they required to fill necessary jobs to the Ministry of 
Labor.  Nearly 250,000 employers responded with requests totaling 1.5 million migrants, 
with the bulk of the requests in agriculture, fisheries, construction and domestic services.  
In an attempt to begin responding to these needs, in July and August 2004 the 
government offered free amnesty registration, aimed at better understanding the number 
of total migrants in Thailand.  Nearly 1.3 million migrants registered for 1 year permits 
with the MOI at that time (Martin 2007; Vasuprasat 2008). The most comprehensive 
registration effort in Thai history, an estimated 85% of migrants were believed to have 
registered.  However, not all later completed the regularization process by applying for or 
receiving work permits, and many let their registration and work permits lapse after the 
initial first year (Martin 2007).  
Despite the security and benefits of registration, migrants often choose to remain 
unregistered for lack of clear information, desire for mobility, and to avoid the hefty fees 
of the registration process, which include the costs of medical checkups, the permit itself 
and potential bribes or payoffs to employers along the way (Martin 2007; Revenga et al 
2006).  These costs could total between 3,800-7,300 Baht (Sciortino and Punpuing 2009).  
Most importantly, work permits tied the migrant to his or her employer.  If a registered 
migrant wanted to leave their job, was fired, or changed locations for any reason he or 
she would become irregular again and would be no longer protected by the document 
(Vasuprasat 2008; Martin 2007).   
Because of these limitations, even with continued efforts to regularize migrants 
and offer accessible registration, the majority of migrants in Thailand are irregular 
(Kusakabe and Pearson 2010; Martin 2007; See Table 3.1).  Martin (2007) estimated that 
in 2006 there were 1.8 million migrants in Thailand, of which only 26 % were registered.  
Alternative figures put the number between 2 and 2.5 million (Kusakabe and Pearson 
2010).  The bulk of these migrants come from Myanmar, though Cambodians form a 
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sizable minority, an estimated 13-20% of total migrants, most of them irregular. While 
the ratio of registered to unregistered migrants varies significantly, based on registration 
campaigns and new policies, there is a general trend of growing migration since the early 
90’s.   
 
Table 3.1:  Number of Foreign Workers in Thailand, by Registration 1995-2005 
Year Registered Non-Registered Total Percent Registered 
1996 293,652 406,348 700,000 42% 
1997 293,652 424,037 717,689 41% 
1998 90,911 870,556 961,467 9% 
1999 99,974 886,915 986,889 10% 
2000 99,956 563,820 663,776 15% 
2001 568,249 281,751 850,000 67% 
2002 409,339 558,910 968,249 42% 
2003 288,780 711,220 1,000,000 29% 
2004 849,552 149,848 999,400 85% 
2004 705,293 807,294 1,512,587 47% 
2006 668,576 1,104,773 1,773,349 38% 
2007 460,014 1,339,986 1,800,000 26% 
Source: Martin 2007 
 
Information from the Thai Ministry of Labor suggests that being registered is 
correlated with higher migrant wages, with salaries on average 30-50% higher for 
registered workers. Paitoonpong et al (2008) also found that the benefits from migration 
were clearly impacted by regularized status, with regular migrants having greater returns 
from migration. Registered migrants also tend to have better working conditions, were 
afforded access to health care and were allowed to enroll their children in Thai public 
schools for free (Revenga et al 2006).   
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The Scope of Khmer Migration to Thailand 
While migration is notoriously difficult to measure and account for with any 
accuracy, an analysis of data from that Thai Ministry of Labor, Ministry of Interior, 
police deportation reports, Cambodian national data, and independent surveys offers a 
general picture of the prevalence and growing trend of Khmer migration to Thailand 
since the late 1990’s.   
Both Cambodia and Thailand attempt to measure migration through various 
agencies and surveys.  On the sending side, the Cambodian Census (GRCC 1998; 2008) 
asks questions related to internal and international migration, and the Cambodia Socio-
Economic Survey (CSES 2004; 2007; 2009) also asks migration related questions.  On 
the Thai side, the Ministry of Interior and Ministry of Labor’s migrant registration 
database provides some information on migrants registered by district and sector, though 
offers little in terms of individual characteristics and counts only those who are formally 
registered.  Other Thai surveys, such as the 2000 Census of Housing and Population, 
2003 Agricultural Census, Socio-Economic Survey also include questions on migration  
(Revenga et al 2006).  However as the vast majority of migration to Thailand from 
Cambodia is informal (Revenga et al 2006; Maltoni 2010), each of these national surveys 
likely undercounts the real migrant population. 
Various international and non-government organizations have also studied 
patterns of Cambodian migration to Thailand using qualitative methodologies and 
household surveys.  Primarily conducted by the International Labour Organization, 
International Organization for Migration and the Cambodia Development Research 
Institute these studies provide insights into patterns of remittance spending, migration 
trends, and migrant work, which give some context to migrant experiences.  As they are 
regularly referenced in the remainder of this chapter, some basic information on the 
studies is given in Table 3.2.  These small-scale surveys offer an in-depth analysis of 
characteristics of migrants and their decision-making processes, yet are often 
representative of only one sector or portion of a much more generalized and diverse 
migration pattern.  Even the most extensive of the surveys mentioned above (Maltoni 
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2010), which involves research in two migrant sending communities and two migrant 
communities in Thailand, is limited by the scale and scope of its sample.  The sample of 
migrants, concentrated in Trat and Rakyorng but mainly focused in Trat consists of 80% 
migrants in the fishing sector, which we know from Thai sources comprise an estimated 
15% of actual migrants.  Moreover migrants in this sector are qualitatively quite different 
from migrants in other sectors.  Thus while the data below which highlights experiences 
based on small-scale surveys is insightful, it should not be taken as representative of all 
migrant experiences. The same caveats, of course apply to the case study that follows in 
this dissertation, which is not meant to be a representative portrait of a migrant sending 
community. 
 
Table 3.2: Recent Studies of Cambodian Migration to Thailand20 
Year 
Conducted 
Org. Study Design Reference/Authors 
2007 ILO Interviews with 356 migrants (Burmese, 
Laotian and Cambodians) aged 16-34 
working in manufacturing, construction, 
domestic and fishing sectors in Thailand.  
All respondents had been working 
continuously in Thailand for over two years 
and were remitting money home. 
Jampaklay and 
Kittisuksathit 2009 
2009 ILO Interviews with 200 remittance-recipient 
households in Banteay Meanchey, 
Battambang, Pursat, Koh Kong and Kampot 
provinces. Focus group discussions on the 
impact of remittances at the household and 
community level  
Deelen and 
Vasuprasat 2010 
                                                 
20 Other relevant research on Cambodian migration to Thailand worth noting focuses on migrants rights, 
exploitation and other forms of abuse (Robertson 2010), the economic contribution of migrant works in 
Thailand (Martin 2007), and inter-state cooperation for the management of migration (Vasuprasat 2008).  
Significant research has also been conducted on other migrant groups from the Greater Mekong region in 
Thailand (i.e. Pearson et al 2006).  Less recently, Maltoni (2006a) conducted a study of migrant households 
in Prey Veng province. Other sources referenced in this chapter are primarily review or synthesis studies, 
mainly relying on official statistics, prior household surveys, and official interviews (Caouette et al 2006; 
Sciortino and Punpuing 2009; Revenga et al 2006) 
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2007 CDRI Interviews with 507 households in six 
villages with a high incidence of migration, 
and focus group discussions in the same 
areas with return migrants. 
Hing et al 2011; 
Chan 2009 
2009 IOM Interviews with 210 migrant interviews in 
Trat and Rakyorng Provinces (primarily 
migrants working in the fishing sector) and 
interviews with 302 migrant-sending 
household members in the Cambodian 
provinces of Kampong Cham and Prey 
Veng . 
Maltoni 2010 
Cambodians in Thailand 
The majority of migrants in Thailand come from the Greater Mekong Sub-region, 
primarily Burma, Cambodia, Laos, with Cambodians representing approximately 10-13% 
of registered migrants. 
 
Table 3.3: Registered Cambodian Migrants in Thailand  1998-2005 
Year Cambodian Total 
Total for all 
Nationalities 
% of Total, 
Cambodian 
  Male Female       
1998  8,418   1,074   9,492   99,974  9% 
2000  6,898   1,023   7,921   99,656  8% 
2001  43,216   14,340   57,556   568,249  10% 
2002  28,149   8,669   36,818   408,339  9% 
2003  13,976   5,699   19,675   288,780  7% 
2004  73,352   31,437   104,789   814,247  13% 
2005*   182,007  13% 
Sources:  Caouette et al 2006; *Maltoni 2006 
 
While Table 3.3 above shows estimates for regular migrants, valid data on the 
scope of irregular migration is more limited. At minimum, international organizations 
estimate that there at least as many irregular migrants as registered migrants from 
Cambodia living in Thailand during most periods.  Documented deportations for illegal 
status show some confirmation of this.  In 2006 Thai immigration police documented 
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arrests of 196,798 Cambodian irregular migrants (Vasuprasat 2008), a significantly 
higher figure than the number of legally registered migrant workers the prior year.  
Simply adding the number of Cambodian registered workers in Thailand in 2005 reported 
by the Ministry of Labour to the number of irregular migrants arrested by police in that 
same year gives a conservative estimate of more than 280,000 Cambodians in Thailand in 
2005. This which amounts to 2% of the Cambodian population at that time, and suggests 
that IOM estimates
21
 of at least 250,000 Cambodians in Thailand in 2008 may be 
underestimates, since all estimates of migration assume the numbers of Cambodians in  
Thailand have grown over the past decade (Hing et al 2011; Maltoni 2010).  
Statistics from Cambodian surveys suggest a significantly lower estimate of 
migrants abroad.  Data from the IPUMS sample of the 2008 Census indicates that less 
than one percent (.73%) of Cambodians at that time reported a previous residence abroad. 
The CSES in 2009, a nationally representative household survey based on the Census 
sampling frame finds a similar percentage (.72%) of all household members reported in 
the survey were currently abroad. The majority (60%) of those abroad in 2009 were 
currently in Thailand. Generalizing these trends to the overall population and using 
estimates of average family size and population from the 2008 Census allows for an 
extrapolated estimate of 104,400 current migrants in the whole population, a significantly 
lower number than Thai estimates suggest.
22 
 There are several reasons why this might be 
the case.  Households might be hesitant to disclose migrant household members, or no 
longer consider longer classify (especially permanent) migrants as current household 
members.  These surveys will also necessarily miss households who have migrated as a 
family unit. 
 
                                                 
21 In Maltoni 2010, noted in Chapter 1 
22 Authors analysis using IPUMS and CSES data obtained from the Ministry of Planning 
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The Character of Cambodian Migration to Thailand 
Data from Thailand give little information about the individual characteristics of 
migrants.  However qualitative research within sending communities offers some 
indication of the general make-up of the migrant population.  In sending areas, migrant 
groups can be found across the socio-economic spectrum, with rich, middle class and 
poor families all migrating (Chan 2009; Hing et al 2011).  The vast majority of migration 
to Thailand is irregular (Chan 2009; Hing et al 2011; Maltoni 2010). Although Cambodia 
does have an MOU with Thailand that would allow for legal migration, the requirements  
for legally going as to work total over 700 US Dollars, and would take 3-6 months to 
process (Chan 2009; Hing et al 2011). Both the waiting period and the high costs 
involved make undocumented migration a far more compelling option for would-be 
migrants. 
Research indicates that most migrants are within the working age population 
(Maltoni 2010).  In the IOM’s household sample the average age of migrant workers 
from households was 27 years old.  Among migrants interviewed, the average was 
slightly higher, at 30.  However, a significant minority of migrants are children and youth 
under the age of eighteen (Pearson et al 2006, Maltoni 2010).  Thailand’s Ministry of 
Interior estimates that over six percent of irregular workers are children under the age of 
fifteen (Pholphirul et al 2010), and both qualitative and quantitative data suggest that 
many Cambodian migrants have first migration experiences before the age of eighteen 
(Pearson et al 2006, Maltoni 2010, ILO 2005).  That youth make up a significant 
proportion of migrants reflects the demographic differences between Thailand and its 
neighbors, as well as the stronger pulls for migration among youth for a number of 
reasons (discussed in more detail in Chapter 8). 
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Table 3.4: Characteristics of Cambodians in Thailand compared to Non-Migrants in 
Cambodia, 2000 
 Cambodians in Thailand Non-Migrants in Cambodia 
Sex   
Male 48.7% 48.6% 
Female 51.3% 51.4% 
Sex Ratio 94.8 94.4 
   
Age   
15-24 19.2% 22.8% 
25-59 46.0% 34.8% 
60-69 3.6% 3.7% 
70+ 3.4% 2.5% 
Source: Revenga et al 2006 
 
Based on information from the 2000 Thailand Population and Housing Census, 
men and women migrated in relatively similar numbers (Revenga et al 2006).  Fifty-one 
percent of Cambodian migrants in Thailand in 2000 were female, a number comparable 
to the percentage of female Cambodian non-migrants in Cambodia at that time (See 
Table 3.4). 
More recent statistics from Thailand and qualitative evidence suggest that male 
migrants outnumber female migrants in most communities, as well as among official 
statistics of registered migrants (Sciortino and Punpuing 2009; Chan 2009; Hing et al 
2011). However women still make up a sizeable portion of the migrant population, 
comprising 38% of registered Cambodian migrants in Thailand in 2007 (Sciortoni and 
Punpuing 2009) and between 30 and 55% of migrants in household surveys (Chan 2009; 
Hing et al 2011; Deelen and Vasuprasat 2010). 
Case studies document the unfavorable working conditions of migrants.  Khmer 
migrants, whether registered or not, typically find work in fisheries, construction and 
agriculture, with a sizeable minority working as domestic workers or in fish processing 
(Sciortino and Punpuing 2009; Caouette et al 2006). Compared to their Thai counterparts, 
migrants are more likely to work longer hours at lower wages, and be found in the least 
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attractive jobs (Revenga et al 2006).  Registered migrants, however, tend to have wages 
that are closer to their Thai counterparts, with significant differences in reported wages 
between registered and unregistered migrants (Chantavanich et al 2006) Qualitative 
studies report that migrants daily income averages between 150 and 200 Baht, which is in 
line with Thai minimum wages (Maltoni 2010).   
Cambodians are largely concentrated in the eastern half of the country, and in the 
central/Bangkok area, and the vast majority are circular migrants, going for periods of 
time ranging from a few months to several years and returning annually or semi-annually 
for festivals, celebrations or harvest (Sciortino and Punpuing 2009; Maltoni 2006). Some 
surveys have found that the average duration of migrants stay in Thailand is relatively 
long, with the majority living in Thailand more than three years, (Huguet and Punpuing 
2005).  However most studies highlight intentions for permanent migration are rare 
(Maltoni 2010).  In ILO’s sample, 90% of Cambodians interviewed planned to return 
home, though many intended on migration continually for a long period of time 
(Jampaklay and Kittisuksathit 2009). Surveys among return migrants report that most 
returnees plan to migrate again soon or very soon (Caouette et al 2006). This is often true 
even for those who considered their migration a failure (Caouette et al 2006).  As Maltoni 
(2010) points out however, the desire for, or ability to, engage in circular migration may 
shift over time if government policies make border crossings more difficult.  Moreover, 
as migration patterns move through stages of transnationalism in which transnational 
communities consolidate and solidify, the circular nature of migration may shift (e.g. 
Portes 2008). 
Migrants typically use a meekjal, or middleman, to facilitate transportation across 
the border and often job placement.  However for a minority of migrants with stronger 
networks, experience crossing the border, knowledge of roads and routes, and established 
jobs, it is possible to cross alone.  The average sum paid by households to meekjal in 
Maltoni’s 2009 survey was 112 USD23. Among respondents in migrant households 39% 
                                                 
23 Baht amount not reported, but typically paid in Baht 
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said that migrants from their household had borrowed the meekjal fees from 
moneylenders.  A further 22% noted brokers or villagers provided funds, which likely 
means interest-based loans from friends or village-based informal lenders. Less than a 
quarter paid the full cost alone. In CRDI’s 2007 study, focus group participants in some 
areas believed that all migrants borrowed to finance the costs of migration. In that 
particular community, 74% of migrants borrowed to pay meekjal fees, while in the rest of 
the migrant villages selected the percent of households borrowing averaged just over 50% 
(Chan 2009). 
Remittances 
Given that remittances are argued to be the primary means by which migration 
can benefit migrants and their families, it is unsurprising that the bulk of research on 
Cambodian migration patterns to Thailand focuses on remittance sending and use 
(Jampaklay and Kittisuksathit 2009; Maltoni 2010; Deelen and Vasuprasat 2011). The 
scope of remittances on a national level is significant. World Bank development 
indicators from 2009 show $337 million in remittances coming into Cambodia, 
representing 3.23% of GDP in that year (World Bank 2011). Since the vast majority of 
remittances are transmitted informally (Maltoni 2010; Jampaklay and Kittisuksathit 
2009) these numbers likely significantly underestimate the true value of migrant 
remittances in the Cambodian economy.   
At the household level, surveys and qualitative studies highlight the importance of 
remittances within migrant households, but also raise questions for how remittances are 
contributing to the well-being of migrant households.  A World Bank study of migrant-
sending households in Prey Veng province in 2006 found that remittances were very 
important or important for 91% of households who received money from abroad (Maltoni 
2006a).  However less than one-third of migrant households received remittances. 
Researchers attributed this to the necessary repayment of meekjal debts (facilitated by the 
migrants), the high costs of living in Thailand, and the tendency for male migrants to 
spend a significant portion of their salaries on entertainment or establishing second 
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families in Thailand (Maltoni 2006a). ILO studies confirm the importance of remittances 
for receiving families, noting that remittances increased average household incomes 
significantly among migrant households (Deelen and Vasuprasat 2010). 
Evidence across surveys note that remittances were most commonly used to cover 
basic needs and daily living expenses (Maltoni 2010; Maltoni 2006a; Deelen and 
Vasuprasat 2010; Chan 2009). Health expenditures and paying off loans and loan-interest 
were consistently of secondary importance across contexts (Maltoni 2010; Deelen and 
Vasuprasat 2010; Maltoni 2006a; Chan 2009). Less commonly, remittances were 
reportedly used for investments in education or investment in assets (Maltoni 2006a; 
Maltoni 2010; Deelen and Vasuprasat 2010; Chan 2009).  In CDRI’s survey across 
migrant sending communities, they found that less than 20% of remittances were used for 
any kind of productive use, with the bulk of these for annual fertilizer purchases, as 
opposed to more sustainable improvements, diversification, or asset purchase (Chan 
2009).   
Debt is particularly important as a remittance expense across all research to date 
in Cambodia, which I argue in Chapter 7 is an understudied but critically important factor 
for understanding migration experiences in the area. Across studies, research indicates 
that migrants often have to take out loans to pay middleman fees (Chan 2009, Maltoni 
2010; Hing et al 2011).  However debt can also spur migration.  Maltoni’s work in Prey 
Veng (2006a) highlights that debts are often associated both the use of remittances and 
also the decisions to migrate. In his sample, illness and disease was often the key factor 
leading households to go into debt and then encouraging migration in order to pay these 
debts. Similarly, in both Maltoni’s (2010) findings and in CDRI’s study, debt repayment 
was the most significant remittance expenditure after food and general consumption, 
though it’s unclear to what extent debt repayments are explicitly for meekjal fees, and to 
what extent these might be longer-standing debts (Chan 2009) 
Most migrants remit informally, often using an informal yet highly developed 
system of brokers and telephone messaging (Chan 2009; Maltoni 2010).  In Maltoni’s 
study, 93% of migrants who sent remittances reported using the phone system, which 
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according to migrants costs up to 25% of the total of the remittance.  Other samples 
report lower remittance fees, but also high percentages of migrants relying on informal 
systems of remittance transfer (Jampaklay and Kittisuksathit 2009; Deelen and 
Vasuprasat 2010).    
Qualitative surveys with migrants and households also underscore the disconnect 
between migrants and migrant households in terms of needs, remittance use, and 
experiences of migrants.  Maltoni (2010) argues that there is a wide gap between 
migrants’ understandings of their migration and households’ understanding of the same, 
particularly related to how remittances are used and migrant/household needs.  Maltoni 
found that migrants tend to underestimate the impact of health and debt interest on how 
remittances are used and consequently state differing needs in terms of what services they 
would benefit from, with households valuing investment and microfinance 
training/information much more than migrants. 
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CHAPTER 4: SITUATING CHANLEAS DAI 
 
“In the water, crocodiles; on land, tigers”
24
 
-Khmer Proverb 
 
Siem Reap Province, the heart of the Angkorian empires and today a tourist 
attraction for over 2.5 million visitors a year, can literally be translated in name as “Siam 
Defeated,” highlighting the area’s long and tumultuous history with its larger and more 
developed neighbor, Thailand.25 Arguably, Siem Reap has stronger connections with and 
orientations to Thailand than it does to the capital of Phnom Penh, a result of both 
history, geography, and an uneven national development policy that has struggled to 
adequately develop infrastructure in rural and remote areas throughout the country. In 
order to situate the lives of individuals in Chanleas Dai and provide a background for the 
arguments that follow, this chapter explores the context of Chanleas Dai  both 
specifically and relative to the rest of Cambodia, then traces the history of rural 
livelihoods within the commune to show how migration has become a prevalent 
livelihood strategy. Finally, it describes the general migration experiences of individuals 
who migrate to Thailand.  Maps and photos to visually situate the area can be found in 
Appendix B (photos) and C (maps). 
 
Proximity and Remoteness 
In 2004 on my first visit to Siem Reap, the old Angkorian capital still felt 
relatively remote. With only a handful of paved roads and few western restaurants or 
                                                 
24 This can be roughly translated to the English expression “between a rock and a hard place.” 
25 Siam, referring to the Kingdom of Thailand.  Interestingly, there is some debate about how to interpret 
Siem Reap, (Siam flattened, or defeated), which could refer to either a Khmer or a Thai victory.  Historians 
I spoke with note that because the name refers to an unidentified battle, of which there were many during 
the Angkorian period, there is no accepted or proven reference.  Generally Cambodians I spoke with 
referred to the name as indicative of an ancient Khmer victory, but noted that Thai’s would say the 
opposite.  In general published work on Cambodia, one can find the reference to a Khmer victory (Ray 
2000) or a Thai victory (Ovesen and Trankell 2010:42). 
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bars, the town mainly attracted adventurous backpackers eager to take advantage of the 
cheap prices and laid back attitude of Southeast Asia. Infrastructure even in central Siem 
Reap was poor, with frequent power outages, wildly expensive intermittent internet 
connections, and a small, dingy airport.  This quickly changed as the country experienced 
annual economic growth at an average of 11% between 2004 and 2007, in part driven by 
expansion in the tourism sector (Reyes et al 2009). 26  With the growing importance of 
foreign tourism largely centered on the temples of Angkor Wat, Siem Reap quickly 
blossomed into a sparkling city of modernity and western culture. Today, perfectly paved 
roads, large tour buses, and a “pub street” dedicated to drinking and dancing highlight the 
economic boom that tourism has brought to Siem Reap.  The airport now has free 
wireless internet (not to mention a Dairy Queen), and the markets in town are covered, 
well lit, and clean. The multitudes of child and amputee beggars, and persistent moto 
drivers that I recalled from 2004 have been replaced by registered tuk-tuk drivers with 
vests signifying their official status, and well-spoken child vendors selling books, 
postcards, and roses throughout restaurants. Today, tourists coming only to Siem Reap 
town and the Angkor temples might well wonder what the Cambodian poverty story is all 
about. Yet while tourism has brought jobs, and much needed infrastructure to the city, 
weak links to rural areas mean that most of the international wealth remains in a small 
geographic area, where it has minimal impact on rural poverty in areas further from Siem 
Reap town  (Fitzgerald and So 2007). Even within the town itself, many of the changes in 
the visibility of poverty are simply changes in visibility, not changes in poverty, a result 
of a series of police and Ministry enforcements and displacements which have resulted in 
vulnerable populations increasingly being pushed out of tourist areas (e.g. Vong 2007; 
Thik 2012).   
Only 65 kilometers away from the towers of Angkor Wat, Chanleas Dai 
Commune is a stark contrast between the international wealth of Siem Reap and the rural 
poverty of the rest of the province. In fact, rural Siem Reap consistently ranks as one of 
                                                 
26 In 2000, the Ministry of Tourism reported less than 500,000 annual foreign visitors.  By 2010, this 
number had exceeded 2.5 million (MoT 2010) 
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the poorest, most underdeveloped areas of the country, despite its proximity to the heart 
of the Angkorian ruins. 27  Until 2009 Chanleas Dai and other areas west of the provincial 
capital were effectively cut off from easy access to rest of the country due to the neglect 
and disrepair of National Road 6, which leads from the Poipet/AranyaPratet border of 
Thailand to Siem Reap’s city center.  Travel writers called the road “something of a joke” 
noting the general poor quality and the frequency with which it can become impassable 
(Ray 2000). When I first visited Chanleas Dai in 2005, I was similarly struck by its 
inaccessibility and remoteness, largely due to these abysmal road conditions. At that 
time, National Road 6 was a wide red dirt road “paved” with rocks, sand and gravel. The 
combination was dusty and rough during the dry season, and muddy and dangerously 
slick during the rainy season. The road was nearly impassable during the annual 
monsoons, with motorbikes routinely toppling over in the dense mud and cars and trucks 
crawling at a snail’s pace to try and avoid getting stuck.  When they made misjudgments 
and ended up mired in sludge, traffic going both ways would stall until the driver and his 
passengers could dig and push their way out.   
While the rainy season was slow, the dry season was unpredictable and at times 
even more dangerous.  During the driest months of March and April wind would stir up 
dust from the road, making it impossible to see more than a few meters in front the car. 
These driving conditions only added to what was already a dangerous trip as unrelenting 
taxi drivers coming from the Poipet border sped across the rocks.  Taxi drivers, always 
conscious of the time they would have to find a fare to return home, moved recklessly 
down the roads, leaving passengers (without seatbelts) to manage the discomfort the 
bumps and holes created in Toyota Camrys stuffed full of people. 
 As undeveloped as the main highway was, until recently the 8 kilometers of road 
from Kralanh town to Chanleas Dai was worse, with several wooden bridges, and a low-
                                                 
27 Based on data from 1998 Siem Reap province ranked second only to Pailin in terms of both the extent 
and the severity of poverty (MoP and UNWFP 2002).  A UNDP multi-dimensional measure of the severity 
of poverty, the Human Poverty Index, in 2004 ranked Siem Reap third worst out of all provinces in terms 
of the extent of poverty (MoP and UNDP 2007).   
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lying route susceptible to floods and washouts.28  During the worst flooding of the rainy 
season, the road was impassable for several kilometers, providing an entrepreneurial 
opportunity for those with tractors or larger trucks capable of transporting people and 
motorbikes across the road-turned-lake.  Between the difficult journey and the relatively 
high price tag for travel, most residents of Chanleas Dai rarely, if ever make the trip to 
Siem Reap except for severe medical emergencies, and at times childbirth.29  While 
Angkor Wat is often described as the heartbeat of Cambodia, its national pride and 
heritage, many residents of Chanleas Dai have never seen the famous temple.   
 
Uneven Development 
The juxtaposition of Siem Reap Town and neighboring Chanleas Dai exemplify 
national trends of uneven development. Cambodia has experienced dramatic and 
sustained economic growth over the past decade, with GDP per capita more than 
doubling from USD 285 in 1997 to USD 593 in 2007 (Chem et al 2011) Recent rates of 
growth have been similarly impressive; 5.5% in 2010 and expected to reach 6% in 2011 
(Chem et al 2011).  However the bulk of this growth is driven by sectors with weak links 
to the rest of the Cambodia economy, primarily the garment sector, construction and 
tourism (Chem et al 2011; Ballard et al 2008).  In contrast, agriculture and the service 
sector have had slower and more erratic growth (Chem et al 2011;MoP and UNDP 2007). 
In particular, the agricultural sector has suffered from underinvestment, experiencing a 
steady declined in share of GDP since 1994 (Chem et al 2011) and registering negative 
growth rates at points throughout the decade (Ballard et al 2008). National rice 
productivity remains significantly lower than other countries in the region (MAFF 2010; 
Ballard et al 2008).  As a result, the economic benefits of growth have not been inclusive, 
                                                 
28 Over the period of time that I have been visiting Chanleas Dai, both of these roads have been slowly 
reconstructed and eventually paved.  National Road 6 was completed from Siem Reap to Kralanh by mid 
2009, and the road leading from Kralanh to Chanleas Dai had several bridge improvements between 2006 
and 2008 and then was paved in late 2010.  
29 Though transport from Kralanh to Siem Reap typically cost only 10,000 riel (2.5 USD), this was a large 
expense for most families. 
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and have extended to a relatively small proportion of the population, mainly in urban 
areas (Ballard et al 2008; Chem et al 2011). Meanwhile, the incidence of rural poverty 
has remained high, social safety nets remain week, and inequality has increased (Chem et 
al 2011). These trends are visually arresting in the differences between rural Chanleas 
Dai and Siem Reap town. 
National data highlight these same trends of marginality. Table 4.1, below, 
presents indicators from the Cambodian Census in 2008 and highlights the differences in 
several measures of marginality nationally, across Siem Reap, and in Kralanh District, 
where Chanleas Dai is located.30  Across all measures, Kralanh shows higher marginality 
than either national averages or averages across Siem Reap province. 
 
Table 4.1: Development Indicators of Cambodia, Siem Reap and Kralanh, 2008 
 Cambodia Siem Reap 
Province 
Kralanh 
District 
% of individuals with no schooling* 32.7 41.2 47.6 
% illiterate (adults) 21.8 28.8 38.0 
% with no toilet at home 64.8 72.2 87.6 
% with no electricity at home 72.2 76.2 88.1 
% with no radio at home 57.1 61.0 68.0 
% with no access to a telephone 59.5 60.3 76.3 
% of economically active population 
working in agriculture 
73.8 74.2 91.7 
Source: IPUMS sample of General Population Census of Cambodia 2008 
*measured among household members over age six 
 
Data specifically from Chanleas Dai (Table 4.2) offer additional indication of the 
socio-economic marginality of the area, highlighting the problems of food insecurity, 
poor health and hygiene, and challenges to education within the commune.  Many of 
these figures should be interpreted with caution however, as these official statistics are 
                                                 
30 Chanleas Dai is one of 10 communes within Kralanh District.  With one exception, all are designated as 
rural (GPCC 2008) 
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compiled from village reports that are notorious for inaccuracy.  Even population 
estimates vary widely from data I personally collected from village officials. The act of 
reporting inaccurate statistics, particularly to the government or NGOs, is widespread in 
Cambodia.31 Nevertheless, these figures offer the best commune-level data available, and 
offer some insight into general estimates of population, health, education, and food 
security among households in Chanleas Dai. 
 
Table 4.2: Chanleas Dai Commune Level Indicators, 2009 
Population Individuals 7,927 
 Households 1,472 
 Percent of households in severe poverty32 10.9 
 Percent of households in less severe poverty 16.6 
 Percent of households in poverty (severe or less severe) 27.6 
 Percent of families working in agriculture 97.9 
 Percent of families with household member in a public or 
private sector job 
0.6 
 Percent of families living in a home with a thatch roof 22.6 
 Percent of families living in a home with a zinc roof 63.4 
 Percent of families living in a home with a tiled roof 14.0 
 Percent of houses with electricity 0.0 
 Percent of homes with TV 51.6 
 Percentage of female participation in civil society33 0.2 
Education   
 Boys aged 6-11 not in school 12.1 
 Girls aged 6-11 not in school 17.0 
 Boys aged 12-14 not in school 15.3 
 Girls aged 12-14 not in school 17.6 
                                                 
31 Historian Philip Short (2004:207-208) notes that this type of “transparent fiction” is common in 
Cambodian culture, in which where lies are deemed acceptable where truth would cause loss of face, 
conflict, a sacrifice of individual interest, or where an exact response is seemingly unimportant.  There are 
also incentives for certain kinds of mis-reporting. For example government school budgets are based on the 
number of students enrolled in each school.  At the primary level, schools receive a budget of  5,000 riel 
($1.25) from the central government per student enrolled, and this support is substantially higher at the 
secondary level.  Thus school directors have financial incentive to report the enrollment of all school aged 
children in their catchment area. 
32 All poverty measures listed are based on ID Poor Data. 
33 Defined as participation in in NGOs, CBOs, credit groups, women’s unions, and political parties  
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 Boys aged 15-17 not in school 38.9 
 Girls aged 15-17 not in school 42.4 
 Ratio of 6-11 year old children to number of teachers 30 
 Ratio of 12-14 year old children to teachers  66 
 Ratio of 6-11 year old children to primary school rooms  23 
 Ratio of 12-14 year old children to secondary school rooms 115 
 Adult Illiteracy (%) 24.7 
 Illiteracy among 15-24 year olds 13.5 
 Illiteracy among 25-45 year olds 27.0 
Health   
 % of households using unsafe water sources 81.8 
 % of households using a water filter 14.0 
 Ratio of latrines to individuals 220 
 % of births attended by a midwife 60.0 
Food Security   
 % of households who are landless  3.6 
 % of households who are landpoor (<1 hectare) 12.4 
 2008 wet-season yield harvest (tonnes/hectare)34 1.1 
 Kilograms of rice/person produced (harvested) in 2008 421 
 Estimated number of kilograms of rice consumed per person 
annually 35 
200 
 Average cattle/buffalo per family 2.8 
 Percent of households raising pigs 44.1 
 Percent of households raising chickens 74.6 
Source: NCDD 2009 
 
Local Livelihoods in Chanleas Dai 
 Once a forested area, most of Chanleas Dai Commune was logged in the late 
1980s, during the tumultuous years of Vietnamese occupation and civil war.   The clear 
cutting left the area with low soil quality, and fewer community resources.  Deforestation 
also meant the loss of the area’s namesake, the allegedly once ubiquitous Chanleas Dai 
tree. According to village elders, the commune was named after the tall tree which looked 
                                                 
34 Average wet-season rice yield in Siem Reap Province is significantly higher, just under 1.5 
tonnes/hectare, though this is still the lowest among all provinces (MoP and UNDP 2007) 
35 Author estimate based on 0.55 kilograms/rice per day (a figure drawn from conversations with World 
Food Program representatives, see also Murshid 1998 for information on average daily rice consumption) 
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like a hand with several thorns attached it.36  During the Pol Pot regime, the official area 
name was shortened to Chap Dai, meaning “to shake hands” which some elders argued 
was done as a meaningful play on words, as Pol Pot and opposition leaders allegedly 
shook hands once in Chanleas Dai Commune.37  After the Vietnamese Occupation ended, 
the area was renamed Chanleas Dai, as one village elder told me, “as a means of showing 
our hatred for the Pol Pot regime.” 
 During the Vietnamese occupation private land was reallocated within the 
commune by village chiefs, with families receiving one half hectare of land per 
individual in the family.  Though a few people noted that some of the most fertile land, 
and land closest to the road was given to family members of village officials, there was 
widespread consensus that land plots were given out relatively fairly based on family size 
at the time. This resonates with national studies that argue that when private land 
ownership was officially reintroduced in the late 80’s and formalized in 1989, it was done 
relatively egalitarian ways (Chan and Acharya 2002; Acharya 2003; So et al 2001).   
Land has been central to livelihood strategies until quite recently. Historically, 
most households have participated in a wide variety of livelihood strategies including rice 
farming, vegetable planting, scavenging, fishing, and internal migration for wage labor 
for periods of time.  Annual rice harvests during the rainy season are the most central 
household strategy, and with very few exceptions families relied on the yearly harvest for 
the bulk of their food for the year.  Excess rice could be traded or sold, and families who 
couldn’t make it through the year on their harvest would borrow from friends, family 
members or more recently, moneylenders to tide them over during the lean months.  Both 
historically and today, due to the lack of water in the area, households are able to plant 
only one harvest of rice per year, during the months of May through November.  During 
                                                 
36 Chanleas in this context can be best translated as thorn or burr, and dai means hand.  Many of the 
villages within Chanleas Dai shared names associated with historical myth. Dombrei Slap (Dead Elephant, 
or The Death of the Elephant) was purportedly named when a headless wild elephant was found dead near 
the town outskirts.  Kbal Dombrei (Head of the Elephant), where the head was found several days later was 
so named as well.  However often the mythologies behind these names were disputed. 
 
37 Other elders noted that this story was nonsense, more legend than truth.   
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other times of year families with access to some water often grow vegetables such as 
eggplant, pumpkins, watermelons, cucumbers, cabbage, morning glory, onions and 
carrots.  Others supplement income by making straw mats and baskets out of local 
romchek plants, which are then sold in Kralanh market.  While these strategies are still 
used, village-based strategies have shifted over the past decade, as migration has become 
a more predominate strategy for households in the area.    
 
Migration as a Livelihood Strategy 
With weak links to the economic centers of the country, and strong geographic 
and historic ties to Thailand, Chanleas Dai and the surrounding areas were oriented 
towards economic opportunities via Thailand as soon as there was relative stability in the 
area. Some village elders and limited qualitative research attributes the start of these 
connections to the presence of returned refugees who were repatriated back to Cambodia 
in the early 90’s, but had knowledge of and experience in Thailand.
38
  Others attributed 
the start of migration simply to the newfound political stability, which allowed for a 
sense of security and with it, a potential for mobility. During the Vietnamese occupation 
villages often had to leave their land and move to nearby towns when fighting broke out, 
and there was little consistency or security to life.  After 1991, things became relatively 
stable.  As one village elder noted:   
 
“[After 1991] it was the best period of time. We could earn a living, we could be 
happy.  We were able to do whatever we wanted to do.  We were proud of the 
government, we could lead prosperous lives. We could follow our hearts and 
make money doing many things. No one was forced to do anything. We easily 
earned enough to support our lives.” 
 
Others noted that the interest in migration was simply a matter of geography. 
Chanleas Dai sits at a compelling crossroads; an intersection where quite literally, all 
                                                 
38 Research supports that former refugees were key in the development of migration networks in the post 
Khmer-rouge years (Chan and So 1999) 
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roads lead to Thailand. The commune is cut in half by National Highway 68 which leads 
to a remote border crossing at Odor Meanchey, and is less than 10 kilometers from 
National Road 6, which leads directly to the Poipet/Arunyuprathet border.  With labor 
opportunities in Phnom Penh over seven hours away, and opportunities in Siem Reap 
only moderately closer than the border, Thailand was not only proximate, but also offered 
significantly higher wages. 
Regardless of how the connections began, village elders agree that in 1992 and 
1993 meekjal from the outside began to routinely come into the commune offering 
transport and job placements.  In the first years, migration was incredibly risky, and few 
individuals made the choice. The journey could take days or weeks, and there was little 
assurance of a safe or well-paid job upon arrival.  Mainly men, these first migrants 
reported horrific experiences of spending days or weeks in the mountains walking to their 
destination, only to find work in insecure and dangerous sectors, either carrying strong 
chemical fertilizers which burned their skin, or working on fishing boats where violence 
and exploitation was both commonplace and impossible to escape. Because meekjal were 
relatively unknown and few people had networks across the border, it was difficult to 
mediate either the physical or financial risks of migration.  
A wealth of research documents the way that migration patterns can exponentially 
grow as migration becomes less risky, and more common within communities (Massey 
1990; Massey et al 1998). Throughout the late 90’s and early 2000’s, several factors led 
to increased out-migration from Chanleas Dai. First, the risks of migration decreased as 
migrants could travel with community members with experiences and contacts, who 
could offer valuable advice and protection. Second, as migrants returned home with 
success and savings, made visible through homes, motorbikes, clothing and jewelry, they 
inspired migration among others who sought the same status and wealth.  Youth in 
particular looked to migration as a means of improving the status of themselves and their 
families. Finally, village livelihoods during the same period became increasingly 
precarious, with multiple consecutive years of flood and drought since 2000, and as a 
result, increasing indebtedness among households. As success stories multiplied, and 
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village-based strategies began to feel more insecure, more and more families and 
individuals looked to migration as a means of meeting basic needs, supplementing land-
poor households, ensuring greater food security, or gaining access to money to purchase 
as nicer homes, vehicles, gold, and livestock.  
By all accounts migration is a critical livelihood strategy today for most 
households in Chanleas Dai.  Typically when I would ask, village officials would tell me 
that “everyone goes”---quite literally that 100% of households have someone in Thailand.  
Though this was clearly not the case, migration is widespread, and a central feature of 
life.  The commune chief, though he doesn’t track migration, estimates that 60% of 
individuals registered as living in the area are currently in Thailand.  At a household 
level, his estimates were higher, suggesting that perhaps 80% of families have someone 
in Thailand.  In conversations with village officials and individuals, the latter was often 
repeated as a general estimate.
39
  
Despite spending a great deal of time in Chanleas Dai and knowing the reported 
statistics, it wasn’t until my third year working in the area that I saw and understood the 
extent of the exodus. That year I remained in the commune during the Khmer New Year 
holidays, a time when I had previously left the province. This was the most common time 
for migrants to return.  Within the space of days, what I knew as the community 
expanded to several times its size, with young people I’d never seen before congregating 
throughout the village.  An excerpt from my fieldnotes highlights the changing feel of the 
community: 
“This is the first time I’ve seen the village alive like this.  Young people are 
zipping around on motos, four or five of them sharing one Wave or Dream40  as 
they go towards nowhere smiling and laughing.  They are dressed to the nines, 
each day, an odd sight in a village where normally an inside out t-shirt and 
sarong, if that, make up the daily dress code.  The youth have spiked up hair, 
makeup, dresses and bright red pants.  They wear jewelry and show off flashy 
phones.  Many have earrings and tattoos, even the young boys.  They smoke 
                                                 
39 While high, these estimates aren’t out of line with estimates drawn from interviews and household 
surveys in neighboring areas (see Hing et al 2011).  
40 The names of popular motorbike models 
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cigarettes, play cards in groups and gamble, and drink rice wine from nine in the 
morning.  Usually walking down the paths I am alone, seeing a few women with 
children, or kids out of school.  Today, this is a place of action.  I didn’t realize 
how many people were missing until they all returned.”  
 
In the next section of this dissertation I move into greater detail interrogating migration 
motivations, constraints, and perceived alternatives.  Prior to doing so, the final section of 
this chapter describes the general reported experiences of migrants on their way to, and 
within Thailand.  A basic understanding of the experiences of migrants on their way to 
and within Thailand is critical, as it highlights the costs, dangers, and risks associated 
with movement across the border. 
 
The Forbidden Line: Crossing the Border 
 
“We can’t actually walk across the border.  For us, that’s the forbidden line.  The 
meekjal, they have passports, so they can walk through.  But not us, we are 
illegal.”  - Saly 
 
With the exception of middlemen I spoke with who held passports, no one in the 
area migrated through regular/legal channels. Thus, regardless of whether they 
participated in Thailand’s migrant worker registration program upon arrival at their place 
of work, their border crossings were considered illegal.  Most journeys to Thailand were 
facilitated through local meekjal, who arranged transportation across the border, paid 
bribes to Thai brokers or Thai/Khmer police officers where necessary, found work for 
migrants, and facilitated their transportation to their job sites. Meekjal not only acted as 
job agents, brokers, and transporters, but also acted as go-betweens for other needs 
migrants had once in Thailand.  Meekjal often facilitated the transfer of remittances, sent 
messages between migrant workers and families, answered questions about health, or 
legal registration in Thailand, and found new opportunities for workers who were cheated 
by unscrupulous bosses. Though some meekjal were reviled and distrusted, others were 
seen as helpful and wise guides. A former meekjal I spoke with, Nor, clearly considered 
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himself in the latter category, a wise guide and not a profit-seeking broker.
41 
 He stressed 
his responsibility to “his migrants”: 
 
“They were under my care.  I felt like it was my job, well, it was like if I were a 
teacher and they were students in my classroom.  At home, they could do 
whatever they wanted, but under my care I was responsible.  I had to find them 
jobs, of course, and I was responsible for their safety.  It was all guaranteed---if I 
didn’t find them a job, or if they ended up unemployed or caught by the police 
right when we got there or on the way---well I would have to pay their money 
back…..This happened a few times.  When migrants were arrested on the way 
there, or if they got there and wanted to leave right away I paid them back.” 
 
With migration so common and more middlemen knowledgeable of the routes 
across the border, Nor noted that he had to make sure he had a good reputation among the 
migrants who went with him.  He knew they would pass along the word of his reliability 
and ensure he had future migrant customers.   
 
“I gave them my phone number just in case they wanted to come home or send 
something to their relatives. Sometimes, if they worked in remote areas and they 
were sick they phoned me, so I would go to town and buy them medicines, or 
clothes, or whatever they needed and bring it to them.  If they were close to the 
city or if they had been several times they didn’t need anyone to do things like 
this, but for the ones in very remote areas, or the people who were nervous, they 
asked me for help with these small things.  They would just cover my gas and 
give me a little extra, maybe 50 baht or 100 baht…..I would also give them 
advice---I told them that it’s not like in Cambodia, where we can just take a 
mango, or something from the tree.  In Thailand, you can’t take anything.  Even 
though there is fruit all over where they work, I told them that if they were hungry 
they needed to ask their bosses to eat or take what they wanted.  I was afraid they 
would be arrested if they were caught stealing.” 
 
Migrations with meekjal were costly.  Nearly all migrants had to borrow for the 
costs of migration, often from family members where possible and otherwise from 
informal moneylenders.  The costs of migration ranged from 2,000-3,500 baht per person 
                                                 
41 Though I tried to speak with current meekjal both informally and formally several times, they 
consistently refused to speak with me. The closest I came was speaking with Nor, who had not been 
working as a meekjal for several years. 
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and migrants typically borrowed this entire sum, often borrowing a bit extra to cover 
immediate needs in Thailand. Yeut, a young man who had just watched his parents return 
to Thailand after a short visit home explained: 
 
“We borrowed 7,000 Baht for [my parents] migrations.  But I’m sure it’s spent 
already and they would have just arrived.   First they have to spend 700 or 800 
from the village to get to [the place where we cross], then 500 to the men who 
guard us.  They take 500 from each person, so that’s 1,000 total.  Then we pay 
1,000 to the middlemen who give us food and arrange a van for us.  Then 2,000 
for the van to Thailand.  Then the driver drops us off at a huge house----absolutely 
full of Khmers.  From there we call our relatives to come pick us up and take us to 
our workplace and sometimes we have to pay something to get to our place.  It’s 
expensive, you see!”   
 
Some migrants were able to navigate border crossing on their own, though this 
was a relatively new practice, possible only for those who knew their site of work and 
had reliable contacts across the border. Leaving alone was also more risky, as meekjal 
offered some protection (typically via bribes) from police pursuit, and a “money back 
guarantee.”  However going solo significantly lowered the cost of migration, and offered 
a more comfortable, albeit more dangerous option.  The alternative of migrating with 
meekjal meant one or more days of extreme discomfort, though somewhat more 
protection. Vanna’s story was typical of a description of the transportation across the 
border: 
“ We walked across the road in order to catch the truck.  This was the worst part--
they put us right on top of each other, just like they were loading pigs onto a 
truck.  Except the pigs would at least have a shelf.  Not us.  We lay down on each 
other, men and women together on top of one another without a second thought 
about how inappropriate it was.  The middlemen kicked us, and then covered us 
with a plastic tarp and told us to be silent.  It smelled, and there was no air so it 
was hard to breathe and the smell just got worse and worse.  Some people were 
heavy, so heavy it became excruciatingly painful.  When we finally arrived at the 
workplace the people who were on the bottom were unable to move---it was like 
their whole body had become unconscious.  We had to lift them out of the truck.”  
 
The horror stories of travel were repeated with striking similarity across migration 
experiences.  Even when migrants had positive, or neutral travel experiences with 
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meekjal, they highlighted the terror of the journey for others---and noted that for 
whatever reason they had simply been lucky this time around, perhaps being selected to 
sit in the bed of the truck, or allowed to be closest to the top of the pile of bodies in the 
truck.  More commonly, I heard stories of aching bodies, repulsive odors, and an array of 
inconvenient bodily responses (vomiting, gas, urinating, defecating) that were either 
uncontrollable, or uncontrolled by others.   
When meekjal were efficient and police absent, migrations were relatively fast.  
Migrants would leave Chanleas Dai one evening and arrive at their workplace by the next 
afternoon.  Most commonly trucks would take migrants to the border near Malay, a small 
outpost in southern Banteay Meanchey province. There, migrants would follow leaders 
across a small river and then through forest for more than 10 kilometers.  At a designated 
meeting spot on the Thai side of the border, trucks would await them to take them to their 
designated jobs in Thailand.  However it wasn’t uncommon for the journey to take 
significantly longer. As one young woman noted: 
 
“It was a terribly hard ordeal.  And there’s nothing about it that we can control-- 
that’s predictable.  If it rains it rains.  If it’s slippery it’s terribly hard.  I had to 
walk for what felt like forever. I slept in the forest and was bitten all over by 
mosquitoes. It wasn’t easy until I reached Thai soil. Some migrants spend 3,4, 
even 5 days to reach Thailand. If it’s just a day we are lucky!”   
 
Meekjal often worked together, with large groups of migrants moving together 
from the Cambodian side into Thailand.  In most seasons, the border crossing involved 
wading across a small river, fairly deep in the rainy season. Migrants described the 
journey as arduous:  
 
“If it is deep, the men help the women across the river, and the men usually help 
carry our luggage.  The meekjal guide us the whole way there, 2 in front, 1 in the 
middle and 2 in the back.  We walk and sit silently while they lead the way.  If 
they see police, we have to wait or move.  If it is ok, we can move forward.  All 
we can do is follow them.”  –Saly  
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“We had dinner as soon as we arrived [at the crossing point], and by 7pm we 
began walking.  There were people guarding us, but it was still terrifying.  We 
walked from 7pm to 4am—I didn’t pack things to drink or eat so I had no food 
and had to drink water from the river.  On the way there were some people 
carrying papayas and corn on the back of their bags.  I was so hungry I stole some 
papaya to eat.  I thought it was ok, because I was so hungry.  The path was muddy 
and slippery.  It wasn’t raining when we started to walk, but by the time we were 
a few hours in it was raining heavily.  I slipped in the mud several times.  And 
then there were moments where we had to run as fast as we could---when we 
passed the paved road.  There were so many people and everyone was running 
and pushing.  I thought I was going to be trampled.”  –Yeut  
 
Because their migrations were not documented legal crossings, individuals knew 
they could be caught by law enforcement or border patrols and sent back to Cambodia. 
This happened frequently.  As a result, running from police, hearing warning shots or 
police dogs, spending several days in transit and even being captured and put in jail were 
all scenarios migrants were prepared for.  Two young migrants’ descriptions exemplify 
common experiences:  
 
“I was chased three times during the time I worked there.  Each time, they failed 
to catch me.  I knew to run---to run as fast as I possibly could.   Once, I stepped 
on a thorn and fell onto the road.  I thought I would be caught but I was near a 
temple and a monk saw me running.  He signaled in the air with his hands and I 
saw what he meant---he was pointing at a tree nearby.  I climbed the banana tree 
and hid myself in it and no one could find me.” – Chiva  
 
“When we crossed the border the police saw us.  They saw us unloading from the 
truck and began to chase us.  Many of us were caught.  So they took us out and 
put us in the forest and tied us for a day without giving us food or water.  That 
night they released us, I’m still not sure why.  I think the meekjal arranged 
something.  Luckily, we were released and then the meekjal contacted our 
employers and we began working.”- Sinut 
 
Often, migrants were separated during the transport, particularly if police were 
present and migrants had to run through the forest.  As Chiva explained: 
 
“When I go  [to Thailand], it is important that I remember to write down my 
husband’s phone number or his boss’s information.  I always try to memorize it.  
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Last time, I was chased three times and each time my husband and I were 
separated from each other.  Once we were apart from each other for three days 
and nights.”  
 
I was surprised at how little preparation these migrations required.  Word of 
mouth largely facilitated meekjal services. During April and May, just after the Khmer 
New Year holidays, trucks left nearly daily, transporting back the hordes of migrants who 
had returned to celebrate the holidays and pay their annual visit home.  At other times, 
trucks left weekly or semi-weekly, either picking people up directly from central 
locations in the village or from the larger markets in towns nearby.  Migrants could call 
the meekjal themselves to arrange transportation on the next truck, or sometimes would 
simply show up when they heard trucks were leaving.   
Transportation and getting across the border was consistently the main difficulty 
migrants reported.  While transportation was a dangerous, risky, and often harrowing 
experience, once in Thailand most migrants had largely positive experiences.  Vean’s 
sentiments reflected many migrant voices:  “The only difficulty I had was the long walk 
on the road to Thailand.  But really, the rest wasn’t so difficult.  I was lucky to go there.” 
 
Working Abroad 
Once in Thailand those who know where they were headed, returning to old jobs 
simply told the meekjal where they need to be taken.  Those without jobs were taken to 
places that matched what they asked to do. While the majority of individuals from 
Chanleas Dai worked in pineapple or potato farms not far from the border, or 
construction work in Bangkok, there was tremendous diversity in experiences.  Migrants 
worked on potato, durian, orange, rambutan and pineapple farms, on rubber and sugar 
plantations, at fisheries and factories, selling noodles in or outside of factories, as 
domestic workers, on chicken and pig farms, in road construction, and on fishing boats.  
Those who spoke functional Thai had broader options, and were able to do more service 
oriented work selling in the market or on the street.  
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Because they found jobs through relatives and brokers, it wasn’t uncommon for 
migrants to be unaware of where they actually worked in Thailand, typically not knowing 
the name of their employer and sometimes not knowing the province they were working 
in either.  As Leat explained, they just followed the work, often not quite knowing where 
they were: 
 
“If they called Van’cha, we called it Van’cha. If they called it Van Keo, we also 
called it Van Keo. We moved all the time and we didn’t often know where we 
were.  I didn’t even know if I was in the west or the south, just that I was in 
Thailand.”  
 
When they did know their locations, most reported working in Rayong, Bangkok, 
or Chonburi.  Migrants typically were hired the day of their arrival, or within less than 24 
hours, and had significant choice in their work site.  Typically middleman would ask 
about preferences before the trip began, and offer specific information on working 
conditions and salaries in each of the options they had available.   
 
“The meekjal…asked me whether I wanted to work in someone’s home, in the 
farm or selling at the market. He asked what kind of job I wanted to get and I said 
I wanted to work in a home. So, when we arrived he found me a job in a home.”  
–Srey Li  
 
“We made decision before moving there. If you want to work for pineapple farms, 
they will find you pineapple bosses; if you want to work for construction sites, 
they will find you those bosses.”  –Saly  
 
Migrants made choices based on the information that friends, relatives and 
meekjal offered about working conditions in different sectors and areas. It was well-
known for example that construction paid better, but the costs for food were often higher 
and the work sites were more dangerous.  In contrast, agriculture was less well-paid but 
food and accommodation were sometimes covered by bosses.  Plus working in the 
agriculture sector near the border “felt” more like Cambodia, alternately a drawback or an 
advantage depending on what individuals were looking for.  Single youth often preferred 
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to be closer to the city, while families migrating together reported it was easier to work 
together near the border, particularly when they had to bring young children along. The 
working site decisions also dictated how much association migrants had with other 
Khmers. In pineapple farms, most of the workers and often the bosses were Khmer.  At 
rubber plantations, or construction sites, the composition was different, with Thai bosses 
and often Burmese or Laotian workers.  However migrants noted that prevalence of 
Khmers throughout their migration experiences.  As Nor told me “you could find 
Cambodians in every province. Even in the center of Bangkok.”  Similarly, Sopheap, 
who sold Chinese noodles along the streets in the outskirts of Bangkok, noted that she 
often felt like she was in Cambodia, just a different kind of Cambodia.  “There were 
many Khmers - thousands or tens of thousands of Khmers were living there. I met 
Khmers wherever I went.”  
 
Registration 
Though the Thai government has instituted strong registration campaigns aimed at 
both informing about and encouraging migrant registration since 2004, relatively few of 
migrants from Chanleas Dai had experiences with registration. In part, this reflects that 
the individuals I spoke with were often away for short periods of time, and work permit 
registration was most beneficial for long-term workers.  It is likely that longer-term 
migrants from the area, who perhaps return more rarely were more likely to have work 
permits, referred to as bat.  For the household members and former/current migrants I 
spoke with, the bat registration was perceived as overly costly, confusing, and most 
importantly, limiting.   
Migrants often had inconsistent information about what rights bat offered, what 
they cost, and how long they lasted.  However all migrants knew that bat limited your 
mobility.  By nature, the bat tied migrants to their workplaces, offering quasi-legal status 
and significant benefits in terms of security and benefits, but only as long as you were 
working for the employer you had registered with. Migrants felt this limited their 
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movement, and was thus a waste of money unless one had a very secure job with a good 
boss and plans to stay long-term.  Bat were also costly, with migrants paying between 
3,500-4,000 Baht for a year-long registration.42  It was therefore a significant investment 
in that particular job, a risky commitment in a situation where exploitation was common 
and mobility was valued.   
Moreover, registration decisions were ultimately in the hands of employers, not 
workers. According to migrants, many bosses discouraged or limited access to the 
registration process, telling their workers it was a waste of money, or assuring them that 
pay-offs to police would mean there was no risk to their position and registration wasn’t 
necessary. Bat were costly for employers as well, leading them to often justify their 
position against worker registration on the basis of potential worker flight.  Some 
employers required a particular length of employment before they would register workers 
for bat.  Others continually made promises to register their workers after they had gained 
trust, but never followed through. 
Among migrants, perceptions were that employers who wouldn’t pay for bat were 
stingy (they saved money) powerful (they could manipulate police and ensure protection 
outside of the legal system), or smart (they didn’t invest in workers who might leave 
anyways).  However some worksites, particularly factories, only employed migrants with 
a bat, alternately perceived as an inability to work outside the legal system, or indicative 
of a good working relationship with workers focused on retention.   
 
Jail and Police 
Where they weren’t registered, migrants typically had to pay out of pocket for of 
bribes to police for protection, often 500 baht per person per month, equivalent to two to 
three day’s wages.  This over time was significantly more costly than the costs of bat 
                                                 
42 Some migrants reported paying upwards of 8,000 baht, for bat registration.  However according to the 
Thai government policies the costs should be 3,800 baht for all the costs of registration. 
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registration, and also provided very little protection from police arrests or raids.  Despite 
requisite police payoffs it was not uncommon to be caught by police, jailed, and even 
deported. Arrests were so common that many people in the village knew the names of 
specific jails in Thailand where migrants often went.  However while getting caught by 
police was common, it was still significant, as there were often formal or informal fees 
taken from migrants who were caught.  Some migrants report bargaining with police 
about the fees for release, and others noted staying for days or weeks because of their 
inability to pay bribes.  Whether migrants were allowed to leave or deported depended 
not only on their ability to pay police but also on the power of their employers. Many 
people I spoke with had stories of being caught by police, and simply calling their 
employers or meekjal who arranged for their release.   
Regardless of whether they had to pay bribes, being caught could lead to 
significant vulnerability, particularly when migrants were caught early in their 
migrations, prior to repaying their transit debts.  Those deported had to pay the costs of 
transport back home, in addition to whatever police bribes they paid.  If they were still 
indebted for the costs of their migration they managed outstanding debts through the sale 
of assets such as livestock, or took out new loans to pay back interest on the first, and 
then migrated again. 
Some employers reportedly used police raids as threats or retribution, to keep 
migrants from reporting exploitation or protesting non-payment.  Several migrants had 
stories of being cheated out of funds due, and shared that when they asked to be paid and 
tried to pressure employers they were subsequently raided and arrested.  Others shared 
their beliefs that employers planned for police raids in advance, when projects were 
completed and they didn’t want to pay workers or continue the work contracts. 
While being caught was and frightening and costly, it rarely deterred further 
migrations.  An illustrative example, Sopheap, eighteen at the time, was arrested along 
with 300 other migrants on her way across the border. She told me that after being 
arrested and sent back to the village her whole family turned around and went right back.    
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“There were three hundred of us…arrested and made to walk in rows. We were 
also filmed on T.V. They caught us on the way to [the border crossing]. Five of us 
– my parents and siblings were all arrested. They sent us back to the village and 
then we just went right back.  I wasn’t tortured or mistreated. [The police] just 
explained us that it is illegal to come to Thailand this way and warned us that 
meekjal would abandon all of us in Thailand.” They told us that most middlemen 
and employers would cheat us.  But they were wrong—we were paid whenever 
we worked.”  
 
The experience of Sopheap was reiterated across the village, with others noting 
that arrests were frightening and costly, but not significant deterrents to future migrations.  
Similar findings have been reported in other interview-based research with migrants in 
Thailand (e.g. Sciortino and Punpuing 2009).  To resist police detection, individuals had 
various strategies, being careful about how they dressed or styled their hair if they were 
in urban areas, choosing employers who were reputed to have good positions with the 
police, or looking for work in strategic locations far from police stations. 
  
Conclusions 
  Given the tremendous hardship of the migration experience, the insecurity of 
work abroad, exploitation reported, the costs to paying police officers, the experiences of 
deportation, and the separations from family, it is easy paint a one-sided picture of 
migration as an undesirable last resort, or a distress response to economic need. However 
the way that migrants frame their decision-making process, and the perceived alternatives 
they have at home highlights a much more complex story, one where factors beyond 
economic need matter a great deal in framing and sustaining migration choices.   
The following chapters investigate some of these factors; including debt, the 
availability of microcredit, status, household obligation, risk, and stability. In the process, 
I explore strategies, sorrows, disappointment, enthusiasm, and dreams of Khmer men and 
women who look across the Thai border for their livelihoods and their futures, who see 
the village life as inherently problematic who structure their lives around further 
migrations. 
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CHAPTER 5:  RISK, REWARD, AND RESOURCES: SEEING THE VILLAGE 
AS VIABLE 
 
“Riding a buffalo across mud is easier than swimming.” 
-Khmer Proverb 
 
Sak and Satra’s Story 
Sak married young, just barely sixteen and one of the first among her friends. A 
decade later, she now has a family and a life that spans two countries. Her husband Satra 
has been migrating to Thailand since 2000, leaving for the first time not long after their 
wedding. Though neither of them keep count, Satra estimates that he has crossed the 
border somewhere between five and ten times. Several years ago, Sak became curious 
and anxious to work abroad herself. Their first son was old enough to be taken care of by 
relatives, so she decided to leave and work with Satra across the border.  After only six 
months her mother became ill, not only unable to care for their son, but also in need of 
someone to attend to her. Sak returned, and hasn’t been back to Thailand since, in part 
because she has another small child now and no one at home to care for the children if 
she leaves.  
I spoke with the couple together, while Satra was home on a short visit. They 
explained their migration choices in a way typical of Chanleas Dai migrants—a mixed 
articulation of need and desire for improvement. As Sak noted, it was a choice, but one 
constrained by lack of options. “If we stay here,” Sak noted “we don’t have work to do.” 
She clarified that by “work” she meant something specific: stable, secure, and adequately 
profitable.  There was no short supply of work that was monotonous, labor intensive, 
necessary and not profitable in Chanleas Dai: tending the fields, cooking meals, cleaning 
the house, clearing the land, taking the cows out, and caring for family members. There 
was also work that could be profitable, but was highly risky: raising pigs, crop 
diversification, lending money out to others. Sak and Satra expressed a desire for 
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something else—the kind of consistency, low-risk, and high-reward that came with wage 
labor abroad.  
Sak and Satra aren’t desperate, or in any state of distress.  The couple is relatively 
well-off, holding 4 hectares of land between them, where most households in the village 
have less than two. By the standards of others, they would be described as mcheum, or 
average. Even when they aren’t able to harvest all of their land, they have enough to feed 
their family, to lead a basic life through rice farming and small supplemental strategies. 
Still, Sak tells me, they rely on migration because they want more than to just survive, 
but they don’t know what to do at home that would offer them any kind of secure 
additional income to supplement the harvest. Originally, Satra thought that through 
migration he could not only support the family but also earn money to start a business. 
However, now their strategy now rests on sustained cyclical migration. Sak explained 
that this plan is more a result of a perceived lack of choices than a choice itself. 
 
“I mean, I don’t know what kind of business I could run [and be successful]. If I 
grow watermelons, each day I can sell four or five.  But there’s no guarantee. Like 
in Thailand there are factories that guarantee—that will always accept the 
products.  Here, if we’re in the village and we have a group growing 
watermelons…for example we might have a hectare of watermelons.  But we 
don’t know where to sell them. If we try to sell in Kralanh, we’re competing with 
everyone else----they might have a motorbike full of watermelons, a van full, and 
I also have the same. When there’s so few people buying, how can we sell our 
products?”   
 
Sak and Satra still plant rice most years, though they have also rented their land 
out at times to others while they are away. Satra notes that the biggest difficulty, both for 
his family and for others in the village is the lack of water, and the corresponding 
insecurity of the rice harvest.  “We invest a lot in our rice.”  Satra isn’t just speaking 
about time---the couple spends about 1,200,000 riel (300 USD) each year on fertilizer, 
sometimes more.  It is always a risky investment.  Last year, they didn’t have enough 
water, and could harvest only a small percentage of the rice they’d planted. Satra isn’t 
optimistic about this year either. “This year, I don’t know what it will be. I am waiting to 
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see water. If water is regular…….If water is not regular, all villagers will go [to 
Thailand].” While he makes this statement, the reality is that Satra and Sak don’t base 
their migrations on the rice yield.  Like most of his neighbors, Satra has been away 
consistently, whether good or poor harvest. Thus the couple’s household migrations are 
strongly related to their generalized understanding environmental distress, but not 
predicted by specific incidences of it.  
Sak would prefer that they both live in the village, but repeats often that they just 
don’t know what kind of opportunities they have at home to make any kind of secure 
income. They have made modest attempts to find something more sustainable over the 
past decade. They initially used remittances for pig farming, but were unsuccessful. 
Later, they saved Satra’s earnings from Thailand to buy a used motorbike, which was 
intended to allow Satra to take cucumbers to markets in neighboring Siem Reap and Pouk 
districts.  He tried this for several months, but with the extra money on gas, and the lack 
of sales, he wasn’t sure that he had made a profit. Though they had a successful 
cucumber harvest, they had difficulty selling enough cucumbers at a profitable price.  
Through these frustrations, Satra came to believe that factories were the only real solution 
to the environmental and economic marginality of the area. The strong desire for factories 
was pervasive throughout Chanleas Dai, despite the fact that there were no known 
investors or companies looking into the area.  In explaining his desire for factories to 
come to the area, Satra compared his experience planting and selling cucumbers to the 
farm-to-market networks he had seen in Thailand. He believed that if factories were 
opened they would not only offer jobs, but also guarantee a market for the produce of 
small-scale farmers. 
 
“In Thailand, they have factories to buy the products. They grow pineapples on 
hundreds of hectares.  Each boss has 400 or 500 hectares, sometimes 1,000 
hectares. We don’t see [the pineapples] sold in the markets, because we don’t 
know where they take the products to. Maybe Thailand sends those products to 
other countries, I don’t know.  But they buy them.  [Here], we don’t have a 
market to sell to….. If they create a factory, I will grow vegetable like cassava or 
corn. For example, if in Siem Reap they create a factory to process cassava, then 
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people will grow cassava. Then we wouldn’t have to go to work in other people’s 
countries. Going abroad is difficult, it’s not our ideal. But when we stay at home 
we just remain poor. If we grow vegetables here, it isn’t worth it.  The price is 
cheap and they are hard to sell…..” 
 
I asked Satra if he had capital, what he would do to improve his family’s 
situation.  He struggled to answer, thinking through things one at a time. “I’d create a 
business…but…. If we grow pigs, they die.  We could grow vegetables…but cows will 
eat them.  It is hard to think of what to do. I’d like a water pump to water a vegetable 
garden.”  He then quickly changed the topic of conversation, back to the idea of factories.  
“Why don’t they create factory in Cambodia so that there are more jobs available in 
Cambodia? I just wonder, what’s stopping them from building something? We have a 
road and we have everything! What we don’t have is factory.”  I asked what kinds of 
factories he could see in Kralanh and both he and Sak became animated, shouting out 
ideas.  “A Cassava factory. Cassava! Or corn!  Cassava or corn!   If there are factories, it 
can help us a lot.”  
   
Seeing the Village as Viable 
Sak and Satra are a typical migrant couple in many ways. They are motivated to 
invest in long-term options and to find more stable, secure and profitable paths for their 
family, yet frustrated at the lack of possibility they feel as a result of their attempts. The 
environmental insecurity of the area is a key part of their migration decisions, yet these 
choices are also clearly related to the economic marginality of the area and general lack 
of infrastructure. In response to what they perceive as limited and insecure alternatives 
for either mobility or stability at home, they increasingly rely on work abroad and have 
limited their reliance on livelihood strategies at home. Their experiences highlight two 
important points: first, that when making decisions potential migrants consider both their 
potential earnings and risks abroad and their potential earnings and risks at home; and 
second that there are strong local preferences for income-generating opportunities that are 
perceived as secure and stable.  
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Their example also highlights a critical disconnect in the literature on migration 
and development, and the lived experiences of individuals in Chanleas Dai.  As noted in 
Chapter 2, migration is believed to bring about poverty reduction or community 
development through its potential for small-scale investment, entrepreneurship, 
production etc.  Yet migrants and their families saw these types of ventures as both 
financially risky and difficult, given the recent environment distress, and the lack of 
accessible markets, infrastructure, and potential for profit.  In contrast, they saw the 
strongest potential for both individual improvement and community development through 
wage labor and secure employment.  As these weren’t possible in the village, they looked 
elsewhere.  
In remainder of this chapter I explore the meanings and perceptions of local 
investment (agriculture, entrepreneurship) among migrant and non-migrants in Chanleas 
Dai.  In focusing on the perceived potentials for failure, success, or mobility by staying 
home, I aim to shed light on the decision-making process rural households articulate as 
they make choices between staying home and leaving.  Specifically I highlight the 
widespread perceptions that village-based strategies are risky and have become more so 
in recent years, that village-based strategies provide little means for social mobility, and 
related to this, that village-based strategies have become low status as a result of the 
relatively low-earning power they offer.  I then contrast this with an example from the 
non-migrant minority, offering a counter-example of how non-migrants perceive and 
engage with village-based strategies.  As all of these arguments relate to environmental 
shifts over time in the commune, I begin the next section by exploring the real and 
perceived environmental shifts which have occurred over the past decade to make rural 
livelihoods feel increasingly precarious in Chanleas Dai. 
 
Environmental Change in Cambodia and Chanleas Dai 
Climate change has recently become a buzzword topic in the Cambodian 
development discourse, most visible in the UNDP-Cambodia’s annual Human 
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Development Report, which centered its 2011 issue around climate change and 
vulnerability. In part, this focus is the result of a growing recognition that rural 
vulnerability is strongly influenced by relatively small climate shifts, which are already 
occurring throughout Cambodia (Eastham et al 2008; MoE and UNDP 2011). 
Temperatures across the country have risen steadily over the past fifty years (MoE 2010), 
rainfall patterns have shifted (Eastham et al 2008), the incidence of floods has increased 
(Tong and Sry 2011) and the Cambodian public is increasingly cognizant of these shifts 
(MoE and BBC 2011).  
Though some parts of Cambodia are particularly prone to flood or drought, 
natural disasters are regular occurrences throughout the country.  According to data from 
the Cambodia Socio-Economic Survey in 2007, 62% of villages reported a natural 
disaster between 2001-2005 (Tong and Sry 2011). While the annual figures show no 
particular pattern in the experience of flood over this time (ranging between 7% and 
15%), between 2001 and 2005 the percent of villages reporting drought increased steadily 
from 11% in 2001 to 34% in 2005 (Tong and Sry 2011).  The Cambodian public is highly 
attuned to these trends (MoE and BBC 2011). In a BBC survey project with 2,401 adults 
respondents across all 24 provinces of Cambodia, 99% of respondents reported that in 
their lifetime temperatures have noticeably increased, 92% report less rain over their 
lifetime, and 85% note that seasons start and finish at different times than before. 
Moreover, 67% believe that compared to the past drought is more frequent now and 35% 
believe flooding is more frequent now.  Nearly three quarters (74%) of farmers noted that 
their work had been badly affected by these changes.   
Within Chanleas Dai, individuals are similarly aware of these environmental 
shifts, arguably more so than even in other agricultural parts of the country. The area 
surrounding Chanleas Dai is particularly prone to both flood and drought (MoP and 
UNDP 2007). In the words of one local official, this makes it one of the more “unlucky” 
places to reside in the country, placing area farmers in a particularly precarious 
relationship with the environment. Residents of Chanleas Dai widely share the 
perceptions of climate change found in the Ministry of Environment and BBC national 
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study. Though flooding and drought have always been part of the environmental cycles in 
the area, environmental shocks have been the rule, rather than the exception over the past 
decade.  
Though individuals pointed to different specific years when things became 
noticeably worse, all attributed the shift to the mid-2000’s. Before that time commune 
officials describe village life as “stable,” noting that people had enough to eat, and 
typically had successful harvests.  In the past decade, however the environment had 
begun to “fail the people” more regularly, with most farmers getting half or less of what 
their fields would typically yield in a good year.  This often led households to borrow 
from moneylenders or microfinance institutions, which in turn spurred migration, as there 
are few reliable means of paying down debt and interest, except for wage-labor or the 
sale of assets.   
A brief history of recent environmental shocks is illustrative. In July 2000 early 
heavy rains and monsoons inundated Cambodia, initially affecting the eastern part of the 
country and then worsening and spreading to the Tonle Sap area including Kralanh.  The 
floods were described by aid organizations as the most devastating natural disaster to hit 
the country in decades, and Chanleas Dai officials noted this as a turning point, the first 
of many consecutive years of disaster. In 2002 the area was hit again with initial droughts 
and later flooding that damaged the National Road as well as harvests significantly.  
Between 2003 and 2006 most years farmers experienced limited rice output due to 
insufficient rainfall. In 2007 there was a severe drought, and the Kralanh area was again 
critically affected. In October of that year, the eldest son of Prime Minister Hun Sen 
came to Kralanh to offer condolences, survey the damage and offer emergency relief.  
Finally in 2009 disastrous flooding affected thousands of hectares of rice paddy 
throughout the Tonle Sap region. Kralanh, which sits on a flood plain, was inundated, 
with many families losing their entire harvest. These shocks have been particularly 
problematic because of their consecutive nature, meaning households have little ability to 
recover from one annual shock before experiencing another.   
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As a result of these consecutive shocks, residents of Chanleas Dai widely assert 
that the environment has become more unforgiving over time and they expect it to remain 
so.  
Risk: “We are all Depending on the Sky” 
The growth of migration as a primary livelihood strategy is clearly linked to increased 
environmental insecurity, and articulated by both individuals and local officials as a 
coping response. As one commune official noted, migration has increased as a direct 
result of environmental stress:  
 
“Everything here---we are all depending on the sky. If there is rain, we will 
survive and if there is no rain, we meet with difficulties.  Here it is not like in 
[neighboring] Pouk district, where people have irrigation systems to support their 
farms. There, when people can’t harvest in the rainy season, they can still plant 
rice in the dry season as a substitute. We can’t do the same thing. Even though 
farmers in our village also get help from NGOs and international organizations for 
crop cultivation and training, it does not help because of drought. This is the 
reason for our poverty…It leads people to leave their homeland to go to Thailand, 
to find a job that will allow their family to improve.”  
 
When I asked about what kinds of things people could do in the village to make a 
living, expressions of exasperation were common: “nothing can be done in the village”, 
“here we just waste our time”, “why would we stay here”, and in reference to children 
“there’s nothing for them to do here until they are old enough to go to Thailand.” 
Although these statements were related to the economic vulnerability, geographic 
remoteness, and lack of infrastructure in the area, pessimism centered around the 
environment. There was a general sense that households were at the mercy of nature, 
which could be unpredictable and cruel, and had been both in the last decade.  Even 
households who hadn’t directly experienced shocks themselves noted floods, drought, 
and a lack of rain as causes for their migration.  
The generalized pessimism around village-based livelihoods spilled over into 
explanations of the insecurity associated with animal husbandry and livestock as well. 
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That animals “simply died”, and did so inexplicably more often in recent years, was often 
repeated to me.  Though there was no evidence to suggest that disease was more of a 
problem than in years past, many people told me that raising chickens, pigs, ducks, and 
even cows was more risky these days. In part, I took these perceptions to be related as 
much to changing conditions in the village as they were related to awareness of more 
industrialized and developed techniques in Thailand, as these more modern techniques 
were often referenced by those who held pessimistic views about raising animals. Across 
the border there was more training, more medicine, and more strict hygiene practices that 
supported healthier animals, differences which were often noted by the migrants who had 
worked in those sectors.  Those who told me that raising animals was more difficult now 
often juxtaposed the potential here with that in Thailand.  For example two elder men, 
one a former migrant, tried to explain to me why animals died more often now.  They 
argued that in the village animals were always sick---even when they were vaccinated--
because of the lack of standards and hygiene in the area. They supported this perspective 
with reference to Thailand, where they raise their animals differently, then went into 
detail describing the tradition of veterinary medicine, the general awareness of animal 
husbandry, and the strict hygiene practices. In contrast, the lack of standards and 
education meant that in the village pigs, cows, even chickens often fell sick and died.  
The men argued that “even if we try, we can’t earn anything” from those strategies.  
Perhaps the two the most common phrases I heard from respondents talking about 
village based potential strategies, or simply staying put, were “ot mien ai twer”, there is 
nothing to do (here), and “men rok ban”, we can’t make a living (here).  The next 
sentences would nearly always be a reference to factories, jobs or the need for secure 
wage labor opportunities in the village. This underscored the fact that local perceptions of 
what was possible no longer centered on expanded land-based strategies, but rather on the 
potential for wage labor.  Migrants and non-migrants shared similar perspectives: 
 
“No one wants to just stay at home and do nothing…It is time wasting living in 
the village when we can harvest rice only once a year. If we are in Thailand we 
could earn 100,000 baht instead of just sitting here.  Poverty leads us to migrate. 
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The places in Cambodia where there are factories, they don’t need to do things 
like this.  If there were factories here in the village, we wouldn’t go to work 
there.”–Leakena, a non-migrant 
 
“I will stop going there when I have enough to eat. Here I don’t make a single 
baht, I just spend and spend.  I don’t know what to do in the village. I don’t know 
what to do here, what to look for. If there were a way for me to stay here in the 
village, I’d do that.  But I don’t know any way to do that.” –Alin, a former 
migrant 
 
“No one wants to work far away from home, but there is no job available here in 
country, in this province. Everyone wants to work in the village here, where we 
can stay with our children. If there was work for us to do, we would come back.” 
- Salong, a former migrant 
 
“There isn’t any work for them locally, so we cannot persuade them to stay. We 
do not have any solutions for this problem [of migration]. If they go, at least they 
can earn 10,000 riel (2.5 USD) a day. If they stay, they earn nothing. They only 
have work to do during one season. [If they stayed] what would they sell?  There 
are many things we can do [to make a living] but they are not possible here. 
Therefore, they turn in the other direction.”  - Local school director, a non migrant 
 
The quotes above reiterate the understanding that Sak and Satra have of what is 
possible at home.  Like several of those above, many of my respondents told me they 
would stay in Cambodia if they “had anything to do” or “could just make ends meet.” Yet 
these aspirations were specific and overshadowed a more complicated desire for less 
financially risky, more profitable work: for regular stable jobs, and not piecemeal 
livelihoods. When it came down to the details of how people could make ends meet, or 
what “something to do” actually meant, what people expressed they wanted was the jobs 
they had in Thailand, in Cambodia: an opportunity to make money, with relative 
assurance, at home.  
Importantly, migration was not only seen as a coping strategy for landless, land-
poor, or indebted households. It was also understood as a primary livelihood strategy for 
households with far more resources, who still saw the relative risk in agriculture as 
substantively higher than in migration.  One of the area village chiefs exemplified this 
attitude. Although his family held ten hectares of rice paddy, they only planted on two in 
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2010, after “wasting" 20,000 baht on fertilizer for a crop that was devastated in floods the 
year prior. This shift wasn’t for lack of income, as the family had plenty of remittances 
coming in from family members abroad in Thailand.  Rather, it was a choice informed by 
several years of seeing the risk and reward of investing in rice farming. In our 
conversation he described migration choices through the analogy of a lottery---if people 
went to Thailand, they risked being exploitation and deported, which could mean coming 
home with nothing. However they could come also home with several thousand Thai 
baht, and many did. In contrast, those who stayed home were virtually guaranteed 
nothing. What was at stake, in his mind, was only the possibility of something more, and 
the potential to have more control over one’s chances.  “What we earn in Thailand 
depends on us,” he argued, not on the rain.   
In contrast with local livelihood strategies, migration was perceived as relatively 
low-risk by most of my respondents, surprisingly even those who had been cheated by 
employers, seen extreme forms of violence against fellow migrant workers, seen drug and 
alcohol abuse, and been caught and deported by police, who often took whatever savings 
they found on migrants as an informal fee for their illegal status before sending them 
home.  Though migration had inherent risks, explored more in the preceding chapter, they 
were manageable, expected, and there were forms of resilience that could be learned to 
mitigate them. Most importantly, risks didn’t interfere with a long-term ability to earn. 
During my time in Chanleas Dai I didn’t speak with anyone who had a difficult time 
finding work in Thailand upon arrival. Typically they would be able to start working 
within 1-2 days of arriving, and if they desired to move to a different job or sector, this 
was relatively navigable as well.  As one migrant highlighted: “[the middlemen,] they 
send us right away to work. We don’t have to be worried about finding a job.”  
Mobility: “Here I Only Enough to Survive” 
 
“If we work here, we don’t earn much money. We earn only enough to survive; we 
couldn’t afford to build a house or other things.”  -Sarom 
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In addition to the inherent risk of village-based strategies, they were also 
perceived as limited in their ability to provide for social mobility. Even the most lucrative 
of ventures was likely to only offer small profits in addition to covering costs.  Village 
based strategies were perceived as successful if they made a small bit of money, and 
failures if they lost funds or resulted in indebtedness, but never were they seen as 
providing the kinds of large influxes of wealth that actually improved shifted or improved 
status.  A noodle stand, improved rice yield, a tractor, a cart, or water pump might lead to 
some increased cash flow, but these were unpredictable and always minimal.  In contrast, 
migration enabled social mobility, and was the only articulated possible path of moving 
from less to more wealthy over time.    
Research across a diverse number of geographic and economic contexts highlights 
how migration often leads to visible disparities in wealth within sending areas, leading to 
conspicuous consumption in which keeping up with neighbors, relatives, or community 
members can be both a primary use of remittances and also a driver for migration itself 
(Lipton 1980; Reichert 1982; Stark and Taylor 1991; Stark 1984; Stark and Taylor 1989).   
The importance of relative deprivation as a driving cause for migration is one key 
mechanism by which NELM theories suggest migration becomes a self-sustaining 
process (Stark and Taylor 1991; Stark and Taylor 1989).  Similarly, in Chanleas Dai as 
some migrants have found success and cash abroad, households have begun to sense and 
respond to different wealth levels within the village. Most of my respondents 
acknowledged that there was a process of “Keeping up with the Joneses” occurring both 
within and across villages, largely a result of changes that began after a handful of 
successful migrations. As one young man noted: “In the past there were only small 
homes in the village.  There were no big houses like this at all.  About one or two years 
after people started migrating more, they began building bigger homes.” 
Where feeling, looking, or being poor once characterized nearly all households, 
with increasing migrant success most people now perceived large differences in wealth 
between households.   As a result, poverty, once shared by nearly everyone, has taken on 
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a deeper level of embarrassment and shame. 43 Many households with migrants explained 
their decisions about migration in the context of relative deprivation and shame.  After 
first explaining their movements in terms of what was lacking in the village, many former 
migrants also pointed to the types of things they could do with money earned abroad: As 
one young woman noted, “it just feels so wrong to sit down and do nothing.  We see the 
people near us, our neighbors are rich.  They have gold to wear, they have cows. We see 
what they have and we want to have the same too.” There was a particular awareness 
about one’s status as manifest through one’s home, though motorbikes, gold, and clothing 
were also important expressions of wealth.  Former, current, and future migrants often 
discussed their migration motivations in terms of what migration would purchase for 
them or their family: 
 
“I am still in debt, but there is only a little bit to go.  I would like to build a house 
as soon as my debt is paid, since now my children are older.  I want to be honored 
and respected, like the others [who have bigger homes]. With this small house, 
my children can’t sleep well as it is filled with sacks of rice.” -Sinath 
 
“I can earn enough to eat, but I don’t only want to have food to eat.  I also want to 
improve---to be like other people who have wealth. If we want to develop, to 
improve our lives, and we stay here…it’s not really possible.  There’s no wealth 
here.  –Vey  
 
“Most people want to have a big house, so people will think that we are from 
middle class families, people with enough, or maybe even wealthy. 
[Wealth]…that is power! If you are from a middle class family, families with 
wealth will respect you and you have more friends as well.”  -Channy 
 
A Hard-working Spirit: “Why are you staying here?” 
That migration was a means to mobility, and the best option to improve one’s life 
was articulated by former and current migrants, those who stayed at home, and even by 
                                                 
43 Chan and Acharya (2002) note that until recently, in most of rural Cambodia, disparities of wealth were 
small, with few understood as very poor or very rich.  In contrast, they note that recently individuals have 
begun to perceive and articulate clear distinctions between the wealthy and the poor within rural 
communities. 
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those who had “failed,” returning home with little or nothing. This understanding was 
typically juxtaposed or explained in relation to the perceived alternative: doing nothing.  
In other words, even when migration didn’t actually lead to wealth or mobility, it was an 
effort to attain, either for oneself or for one’s family.  Because it was viewed as active, in 
comparison to “lazy” or “passive” life in the village, it was also generally positively 
judged. While those who stayed behind were certainly not passive about their livelihoods, 
there was still a general sense that they were letting opportunities pass them by, taking 
what comes without seeking out more. 
 Vanna, a former migrant who left his job as a teacher to work abroad noted that 
there is strong social pressure to be working to actively improve one’s standing. “For 
example, if you have a smaller house, people would suggest that you go work in Thailand 
in order to build a bigger one….they would ask—‘why you are staying here?’ and ‘why 
you don’t go there to work, then you’d have a place to live and be better off.’”  
Migrations were a means of showing a “hard-working spirit”, “not being lazy”, and thus 
obtaining status, both through one’s willingness and effort, and hopefully through the real 
economic gains from wages abroad. 
Literature that analyzes cultures of migration in other contexts notes that 
migration can be substantively important in terms of how societies assess individuals 
(Horvath 2008).  Migration, and its resulting successes or failures to bring about changes 
in living standards is outwardly visible, and can gain symbolic function in society, 
soliciting reactions and judgments from neighbors and broader society (Massey et al 
1994).  These judgments are highly context dependent, but often glorify migrants as 
heroes of community or national development, raising the status of returned migrants in 
the eyes of their communities. In qualitative work among Ecuadorian migrants to Israel, 
Kalir (2005: 181) notes the “multilevel process of positive recognition and glorification 
of migration” in Ecuador, whereby migrants are transformed into role models, enjoying 
the support and envy of their peers.”  Migration may also become valued socially not 
because of its economic contribution to households or the state, but through its status as 
wage labor, often considered more modern and desirable than subsistence agriculture 
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(Kandel and Massey 2002). Horvath’s 2008 case study of rural Romanian youth 
highlights how the composition of social status has shifted from valuing land to valuing 
wage labour as migration as become more prominent.  Horvath argues that prior to 
widespread out-migration from Romania, property and land productivity were 
“constitutive dimensions” of identity and a strong source of local prestige and status 
(Verdery 1994). Yet with more of the population away for significant periods of time and 
a general preference for less labor intensive economic practices (i.e. migration) farming 
has become both attractive and less of a symbol of local prestige and power (Horvath 
2008). 
In Chanleas Dai, that status of migrants and migration choices has become 
similarly elevated over other traditional forms of status. Particularly for youth, (discussed 
more in Chapter 9) wage labor is strongly preferred over the type of piecemeal work and 
land-based livelihoods that prior generations relied upon.  Moreover, because of its 
inability to promote the kind of social mobility that households seek, staying in the 
village is often discussed as a relatively low status option. This is indicated by the way 
people speak about migration and its alternatives, their perceptions about choices to 
remain in the village, and perhaps also most clearly, the choice to migrate over other 
what had formerly been considered high status jobs.  
 
Status: “If he were great, he’d have a gold necklace” 
Phally has been a teacher at a local primary school for over a decade.  He laughs 
easily and teachers with enthusiasm, one of the few teachers I met who reads storybooks 
in his classroom with intonation and voices. A self-described joyful person, Phally speaks 
quickly and passionately about how migration has changed his community, and as a 
result, his life, even as a non-migrant.  Status, he tells me, used to be about power in the 
village, measured either through one’s position of authority or through the amount of land 
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one’s family held.  As a teacher, even though he is only a contract teacher,44 Phally felt 
that he used to hold an elevated position in the village, as teachers were relatively 
respected both by students and families. These days, he had the sense that even as a 
teacher he is looked down on, a result of his low salary. Now, status is no longer about 
power within the village, but rather earning power---how much money you can bring in. 
Not everyone perceives that as true, he knows, but it’s particularly the case for the 
younger generations that he is trying to teach.  His students make fun of him for his 
choice to remain in the village, teaching everyday but receiving only a low government 
salary, far less than what they could, and often will, make abroad.   
 
“They look down on me – some say things like ‘you work as a teacher for a year 
and we can just work for a month [and make the same amount of money]’.  These 
days, some students listen to me with respect, but the others say ‘don’t listen to 
him. If he was great, he would have a gold necklace and bracelet.’ I tell them not 
to judge by gold because knowledge is invaluable treasure. It can’t be stolen by 
thieves and the more time I spend [pursuing knowledge], the more I improve 
myself. I keep following that proverb.”  
 
 Nonetheless, the issue clearly bothers Phally. Not only does this type of 
disrespect (whether perceived or real) inhibit his teaching, it also evokes emotional 
responses: disappointment, anger, and at times even admittedly jealousy. Phally is 
determined to continue teaching, but he is not the only teacher to feel this way, and some 
have responded by leaving their roles as educators. During my time in Chanleas Dai 
several former teachers in the area had left their positions at schools to migrate, with 
more than one doing so in the middle of the school year.  
While it is true that teachers could potentially make more money in Thailand, 
these choices were not only economic, but also related to desires and aspirations for 
status. Vanna, a former contract teacher who left his job to go to Thailand, noted that 
                                                 
44 Contract teachers, kru ketch sanyia, are government appointed teachers who are not permanent civil 
servants as they have not completed the government training program for teachers.  In rural and remote 
areas, contract teachers remain an integral part of the education system.  In Chanleas Dai commune, every 
school has multiple contract teachers, and some primary schools had only contract-appointed teachers. 
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while he was interested in earning money abroad, much of what encouraged his migration 
was pressure from his peers. Because it was rare in his village to continue education past 
sixth grade at that time, Vanna was one of the only ones in his circle of friends who 
hadn’t migrated in his early teens. He constantly heard stories from his friends, and 
watched them come back with high-tech phones, money to buy a motorbike, and new 
hairstyles and clothing. Their stories resonated with him, particularly when the 
government held his salary for several months during the school year, a common 
occurrence. After working for an entire year as a contract teacher, he hadn’t even made as 
much as his friends could reportedly earn in one month.  Though his parents did not 
condone migration, Vanna could not resist the draw that he had seen so many of his peers 
follow. When I asked him about his choice to migrate, Vanna noted that status and the 
perceptions of others were just as much a compelling issue as the potential economic 
benefit: 
 
“Here, we don’t think why go to Thailand, we think ‘why wouldn’t you go?’  
People think that migration to Thailand is cool… I did too. There are lots of 
reasons.  [One reason is] because they have dark skin if they live in the village. As 
long as they live and work there [in Thailand] they can use lotions that make their 
skin whiter and more beautiful. Once they return to the village, people will say 
‘those children are beautiful and have whiter skins or stylish hair.’” 
 
Vanna’s experience of leaving a relatively high status and waged job to migrate 
underscores the arguments of the preceding section; it’s not only that individuals want to 
be able to make ends meet, and “would do anything in the village.”  Rather, preferences 
for migration are strong even when individuals have steady livelihoods at home. Except 
for the most well-paid NGO jobs (which paid more than the average Thai wages), 
migration competed with nearly every village-based strategy, job, or benefit “Anything” 
wasn’t sufficient unless it was  both secure and comparable in pay to work abroad. Thus 
civil servants on low government salaries such as contract teachers, village and commune 
officials, and police officers still migrated, as did those who benefited from NGO 
programs such as model farmers, scholarship recipients, and women’s group leaders.  
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Family Strategies: One of my hands carries my grandson 
The perceptions of the village as an unproductive, low-profit space are amplified 
by the continued act of migration. Often households gave up some of the former 
productive practices they did in the village as a result of household migration, in a cycle 
that made village-based production problematic as household migration became 
increasingly important.45  These shifts were often unplanned and unintentional, most 
commonly occurring when older generations were charged with the care of grandchildren 
whose parents were abroad.  With the added responsibility of childcare, older generations 
typically found themselves without the time they once had to make mats, plant vegetable 
gardens, or sell homemade sweets.  As grandparent caretakers of young children 
described: 
 
“In the past I could grow vegetables, but now I can’t as we have to carry water 
from far away, and if I do that, there is no one to take care of him….It’s hard!   
Sometimes I can’t even drink water when I am thirsty. If I am thirsty, I have to 
carry him along. One of my hands carries him while another has to drink water.”  
–Savy 
 
 “Before, we grew watermelons each season, after the rice harvest.  Now [looking 
after my grandchildren] I don’t have time to do it at all as those things need to be 
taken care of and fertilized. I am busy with the children, so I couldn’t do anything 
at all.” –Lout 
 
Even without the added care of looking after grandchildren, many people told me 
they felt strained or were unable to do the same kinds of supplementary activities they 
had done in the past without the help from children, spouses, or extended family 
members. Most traditional strategies relied on having multiple household members 
working.  Someone would harvest or plant, another would take cows out to graze, while 
someone else stayed home and cooked and took care of the smallest children, or tended to 
vegetable gardens.  Older generations often complained that there was little they could do 
themselves, with younger generations gone. At times, this meant planting less, or if there 
                                                 
45 Indicative of this kind of shift, surveys of rural livelihoods and migration show that migrant households 
tend to cultivate less rice than their non-migrant household counterparts, net other factors (Chan 2009) 
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was cash to spare hiring day laborers. Although remittances typically made up for the 
changes in production, moving away from village-based strategies made them that much 
less present, reinforced, and visible to younger generations.  
 
Counter-Examples 
While there is clearly truth in the insecurity and low profit margin of village-
based strategies, several counter examples highlighted the possibilities of the village, 
often overshadowed by migration. Both in informal conversations and in interviews, I 
often asked people in Chanleas Dai about non-migrants, and also, separately about those 
perceived as wealthy in the village. The most common responses, which connected the 
two, argued that those who didn’t migrate were afforded this option because they already 
had enough. As one former migrant told me “some people don’t go to Thailand.  They are 
the people who don’t want for anything.  They have enough: a car, motorbike, pigs, their 
own business.”  The commonly expressed belief that the wealthy didn’t migrate because 
of their wealth was something I was skeptical of in the context of Chanleas Dai. Both 
macro-level historical perspectives and local interviews with village elders suggested that 
in general, the disparities in wealth within the commune were relatively recent shifts. 
Thus it didn’t seem that the trajectory of migration patterns over the past ten years could 
be explained by differences in wealth, as a decade ago these differences were just 
beginning to emerge.  
During the Khmer Rouge regime, land was collectivized, often brutally and 
whatever assets, land or wealth households had were given to “angka”, the faceless, 
nameless ruling body of the Khmer Rouge (Short 2004). Following the Vietnamese 
occupation land began to be informally privatized again, though this privatization was 
only institutionalized in 1989. Even at that time few rural households had any private or 
personal assets to speak of, a result of the extreme form of communism and 
collectivization that characterized rural life under Pol Pot. Historian Philip Short 
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highlights the extremes of this collectivization during the Khmer Rouge period, which 
stopped short at nothing to ensure communal control over all resources.  
 
“No longer could they get by with the produce of their fruit trees and the 
vegetable plots beside their houses because now, like everything else, these were 
communally owned.  Their carts and oxen were seized.  So were private grain 
stocks, fish-nets, bicycles and anything else which might set the individual apart 
from the mass.  In many villages, the larger homes…were dismantled to provide 
wood for the new communal dining halls, and uniform, smaller huts, barely big 
enough to sleep in, built in their place.”  (Short 2004: 345) 
 
A village elder confirmed this as his reality during the Pol Pot years, describing a 
complete lack of freedom and personal property:  
 
“We were assigned to do their tasks. We couldn’t do anything else. We didn’t 
dare to place even a plate or spoon in our house. We had only our body. Pol Pot 
collected all our belongings….. I ate with a spoon and plate, but soon after meals, 
everything was collected. They cooked us rice and we ate at the communal house. 
If you gave a birth to a child, you were given a few plates and spoons but those 
were also collected afterward.”  
 
 Thus village elders noted that after the Pol Pot regime officially ended in 1979, 
and through UNTAC’s entry in 1991, all households had similar minimal ownership over 
assets, and land that was redistributed on the basis of family size. Very few people had 
any education or training to speak of.  Put simply, everyone was desperately poor, having 
suffered the same atrocities, abuse and insecurity. Thus the distinctions between wealthy 
and poor during my fieldwork were arguably a result of demographics, decisions, work 
and luck over the past twenty years, with disparities in wealth primarily arising over the 
past decade.  Given the recency of perceived inequalities, and the fact that migration and 
income inequalities had risen over the same period of time, I was curious how the 
wealthy defined their success, how migration played a role, and what alternative 
livelihoods they employed where it didn’t. After meeting with so many people who felt 
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they couldn’t make ends meet without crossing the border, I began seeking out those who 
had.  
Romdoh’s Story: Small Drops 
Romdoh’s family was one of the wealthiest in one of my study villages, by the 
views of several people in the area.  I met him late in the afternoon and spoke with him as 
his children were boiling water and washing dishes nearby underneath their modest 
wooden house. Though his house wasn’t particularly high, and there was no concrete 
floor or beautifully tiled roof as I’d seen elsewhere, he was clearly was an example of 
having krop (enough).  All of his children were currently studying in upper secondary 
school, a significant expense, and Romdoh’s family had a rice mill, more than ten 
hectares of land, and two different converted koyans (tractors).  
In many ways, Romdoh’s experiences and perceptions were similar to other 
wealthy (typically non-migrant) families I spoke with.  These families were believed to 
not migrate because they were wealthy. Because they had more ability to support 
themselves, they didn’t need to leave or send children away.  However while others 
considered him wealthy, Romdoh saw his family as poor, just as poor as others, and 
surrounded by the same difficulty, risk, and hardship if not more.  
 
“We have so much work-- unlike others who only have one profession [as a 
migrant laborer].  They have it easier…. Some families they don’t want their 
whole family to be surrounded by problems like my family’s situation. For me, I 
could never find one quick and easy solution, or way. I’ve always been poor.”  
 
Though others had indicated to me that Romdoh’s family was a non-migrant 
household that wanted for nothing, Romdoh had both migrated and borrowed in the past, 
neither of which were expected of “wealthy” families. Yet his experiences with each 
process were quite different than the norm. His first and only trip abroad was in 1992 just 
before the elections, when there were still Khmer refugees throughout Thailand and 
migration was both risky and relatively uncommon.  Unlike most of the migrants I spoke 
with who had early migration experiences, he didn’t borrow from others for the meekjal 
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costs associated with migration but rather used saved profits from pig farming and 
migrated free of debt. He found a job carrying something he was told was fertilizer, at a 
shipyard where he was paid based on the number of bags he carried. He soon found the 
job to be too hazardous.  “I would put the fertilizer on the top of my head, but then my 
hair would become curly and my head became very hot. It was a new type of fertilizer 
and it was hot like burning coal.” Romdoh was discouraged not only by the work, but 
also by how much everything cost.  Like many migrants with task-based pay would tell 
me, the harder he worked to make money, the hungrier he was, and therefore the more he 
ate and spent. “I wanted to earn money and send the money home, but the thing was, it 
couldn’t happen….It was very tiring. Even though I could earn a lot of money, I also 
spent a lot.  The harder I worked, the more I earned, but also the more I spent.”  
Interested in finding a less difficult job, Romdoh left his initial employer after only two 
months and was caught by police as he attempted to find a new workplace.  He was jailed 
for 14 days, which he considers a turning point in his thinking about migration.   
 
“When I was in jail, there was a guard who spoke Khmer and asked me, ‘You 
came to my country to work, do you have farming lands in your country?' and I 
said 'Yes, I do.'  Then he asked me, 'how many hectares of rice fields do you 
have?'  I said 'I only have 3 hectares.'  The guard said, ‘if you already have 3 
hectares of rice fields, you don't need to go to work in another country. You will 
get hurt, cheated. If you stay in your country and plant vegetables and fruit, you 
will survive. You don't have to come here.'  And then I realized it was true so I 
stopped going there for good. I started thinking I should manage my life by 
myself. He told me not to go there; just be here [in Cambodia] and farm and plant 
vegetables…So I started thinking like this.”   
 
Romdoh never imagined that his family would be wealthy---“we didn’t have big 
ambitions,” he noted.  But as they kept working they began to be more and more 
productive.  Romdoh’s strategy was to buy up land whenever he had the funds.  Over the 
past 15 years, he notes that many people have wanted to sell their land, either because 
they needed money to repay debts or because they began to solely rely on migration as a 
strategy.  Though he started with only one hectare of rice fields as a young man, today his 
family has over ten hectares of productive land.  “We bought them gradually. We didn't 
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plan it. We only bought…like when we had enough money to buy one hectare, we bought 
it. Sometimes, people only sold a half hectare of land; we also bought it.”  
In addition to his fields, Romdoh’s family employs a wide variety of livelihood 
strategies.  He owns a tractor for carrying soil, which he rents out whenever people need 
or ask.  Sometimes they rent it out 50-100 times in a month, others not at all.  He also has 
cows, pigs, chickens that he sometimes sells. The family owns a rice mill, where he keeps 
the extruded rice husks leftover from when people come to use it, and uses those husks to 
feed the chickens and pigs.  Romdoh knows that his livelihood strategy is different from 
the general strategies of his neighbors.   
 
“I am always working, doing this and that. For them (migrants), they only do one 
thing. When they want to sleep, they sleep. When they go to work, they work. For 
me, I have no free time.  But I’ve gotten used to it, now it’s just habit.  I don’t 
ever really have much energy, but I just do things little by little without stopping.” 
 
He never gets more than a few thousand baht of profit at a time from any of his 
enterprises.  But it adds up.  He contrasts this to the migrant perspective, which holds out 
hope for a large amount of money quickly.  He knows that they see this as secure, but he 
shared that he felt more secure making a little bit of extra cash through many different 
avenues.  
“I only like to have small businesses….when I was studying, my teacher taught 
me the proverb  “small drops fill a container”. And I can see that after a while, it 
can happen. I don't want big things. I want small small things.” 
 
Romdoh does well with his small drops.  Things vary month to month, year to 
year and he never really keeps track of his income.  But typically he saves on average 
around 100,000 riel ($25) per month. That’s after he has spent on everything the family 
needs for the month, including school fees, food, transportation, etc.  Yet his strategies 
and his savings don’t insulate him from the insecurity of the environment. After a year 
where he lost most of his rice harvest, Romdoh found that he couldn’t make enough cash 
on the side to pay for his children’s school fees and the general needs of his family. To 
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smooth the household consumption he borrowed money from an area microfinance 
institution (MFI), then struggled to repay the loans using the same methods he had used 
in the past---anything and everything, bit by bit. 
 
“Only my wife and I knew about this. The kids never knew how we were in debt 
with anybody because as parents, if we let them know such things they might 
become break down in their study, they might feel obligated to help somehow. So 
we never let them know it, even after we paid the debt, we never let anybody 
know until I just told you in this interview. Even in this village, only the village 
leaders knew about it.46 Other than that, no one knows.” 
 
Romdoh went onto explain how in the area children often felt responsible for the 
debts of their parents, feeling unspoken pressure to quit school or work to help contribute 
when the family was in need or indebted. 
 
“Sometimes, for some children, especially here when they knew their parents are 
in a little trouble, they also quit studying. There are some people like that, like our 
neighbors… if parents are sick, or if they are in debt, then the kids quit studying 
and go to work to help the parents. For me, when I was in debt, I didn’t let my 
kids know about that. I only let the people who needed to sign the papers know 
about that and then I solved the problem by myself.” 
 
Romdoh is careful about encouraging his children’s education and so far none of 
his children have ever approached him about going to Thailand.  He assumes they have 
some desire to go, or get pressure, but so far they haven’t asked him to leave. “People 
gossip about it,” he told me “the fact that my kids are in school still.  They say ‘what do 
they study for, when you can go to Thailand and earn so much.’  I don’t really care. They 
say what they want to say. It’s their story. My story is that if my kids study, they have 
opportunities.”  Like most families I spoke with, Romdoh doesn’t strategize with his kids 
about their future plans or job prospects, about whether they want to go to university or 
not. When I asked Romdoh what they planned to do when they finished 12
th
 grade, he 
responded:  
                                                 
46 Village officials are typically required to be a signatory on loans from microfinance institutions. 
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“I don’t know. I never asked them. What they think they want to do is their own 
choices. Even if they want to continue to study after finishing grade 12, I still 
won’t say anything. I won’t stop them…No one told me anything yet because 
they haven’t reached anything yet. It’s like we are swimming in the ocean and we 
haven’t reached the shore yet. So we haven’t said anything yet.”  
 
 However Romdoh explicitly noted that he doesn’t want his children to migrate. To him, 
the life of a migrant was easier, though less stable and wise.   
 
“It’s just that… It’s not like I don’t want them to do business and work, but I want 
them to know the way we start from small things. Going to Thailand people can 
earn a lot of money like 10,000-20,000 baht. We can’t earn that kind of money 
unless we go to Thailand. But there, even if we can earn, there’s nothing left [for 
us here], so it’s all for what? I don’t want that. I want them to earn little by little 
so that they know how hard it is to earn money. I want them to know that.” 
 
At the end of our interview, Romdoh surprised me, by profusely thanking me for 
the opportunity to share.  Not only was he glad to share the ideas, and reconsider his life 
in context, he also felt grateful to have an opportunity to share his past with his children, 
who had been milling around the house while we spoke.  He was glad to finally tell them 
that he had borrowed money to support their family, and wanted them to know that he hid 
that fact to ensure they wouldn’t feel pressure to drop out of school.  As he said this, he 
spoke intentionally and slowly, looking at me, but addressing his children who at that 
point in the interview were cooking a few meters away.  I found it to be an incredibly 
powerful moment, not only validating that sometimes research can be beneficial to 
respondents, but also highlighting the lack of a culture of sharing within families in this 
context.  Prior to this conversation I’d been desperately trying (and failing) to have in-
depth conversations about parental pressure for migration with youth and parents.  This 
conversation highlighted that many of the expectations put on parents and youth were 
unspoken, through models and norms which may not even represent attitudes and beliefs 
of the family members involved.  Romdoh’s perception that simply openly being in debt 
would encourage his children to quit school, despite his strong personal support for their 
education pointed to the power of unspoken norms and expectations in directing decision-
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making, blurring the line between external and internalized pressures.  This will be taken 
up more directly in Chapter 8. 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that most individuals in Chanleas Dai perceive local 
livelihood strategies as high-risk, low-profit, and low-status, perceptions that are further 
amplified as out-migration increases.  Rather than understanding migration as a short-
term coping strategy, or a long-term investment strategy, most people value and seek out 
migration because it allows for the retreat from undesirable, less profitable, and risky 
local investment. Thus rather than being used to mediate the risk of investing at home, 
migration is primarily understood as an opportunity to replace investment at home. These 
strategies are not specific responses to any one environmental shock, but are rather they 
are tied to a growing belief that the environment (both natural and economic) is 
unreliable. This belief is coupled with a growing desire for social mobility, and higher 
status through wealth. However the counter-example offered highlights that some 
individuals, and often wealthier households, have been successful using local strategies 
not only to make ends meet but also to attain profit, land and assets.  This complicates the 
oft-cited local understanding that “nothing is possible in the village” and suggests that at 
least in the case of moderate or wealthier households, the preferences of individuals for 
how they make ends meet is also relevant to how migration is valorized over local 
alternatives.  
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CHAPTER 6: HOME AS DEVELOPMENT 
 
“A bird in your hand is much better than ten birds in the tree”  
-Khmer Proverb 
 
Sambath is a man who rarely sits still.  We spoke several times and during each 
interaction his hands remained busy while he spoke; working on a motorbike, organizing 
notebooks, or fixing some piece of machinery.  He lives with his sister in a concrete 
house near the center of the commune, where I initially met the two early in the rainy 
season, on the first day that the skies opened up into a monsoon downpour that lasted for 
hours.  Intending only to set up an interview, we ended up chatting extensively, as they 
refused to let me leave during the worst of the downpour.  
The siblings run an informal money transfer business that helps migrants remit 
back to family members at home.  They started in 1999, when Sambath was himself a 
migrant in Thailand and realized both the need for, and potential profit of such an 
enterprise. Initially starting small, over the past ten years they have developed an 
extensive money transfer network.  Migrants in Thailand are given his phone number by 
area meekjal or family members, and call when they want to send money home, 
specifying an amount and a recipient in the area.  Sambath responds with a specific bank 
account number, one easiest to access given where those individuals are. Then, either the 
migrant caller or his/her their boss will take the money and make a deposit into the 
account.  Sambath has relatives who regularly check the amounts in the Thai banks on his 
behalf and transmit information back to him via phone or text.  As soon as the deposit is 
confirmed in the Thai accounts, Sambath contacts the specific family members and they 
come to collect them the remittance, minus a generous deduction for his own services.  
For each 10,000 baht transferred, Sambath takes 350 baht as a fee for service. My face 
must have betrayed a surprise at the cost of such a transfer, as he quickly told me that a 
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3.5% fee is significantly less than others in the area, affirming that he isn’t simply a profit 
seeker.47  
Sambath keeps meticulous records of everything in small ledger books noting the 
amounts of money in each account, transfer amounts, and recipients. He is careful, telling 
me that corruption or speculation of dishonesty could bury his business, and he needs 
proof of every transaction to ensure a continued strong reputation, particularly since other 
people have started to copy his model. He showed me the books, neatly recorded with 
each transfer, though he never keeps records past the last month or so.  Each month he 
and his sister handle a minimum of 500,000 baht (approx.15,000 USD) in remittances 
though some of that money goes to households farther from Chanleas Dai as well. Most 
days they have two or three transfers, nearly always topping one hundred transfers in a 
month. On average, remittances are 6,000-10,000 baht, which is about what the average 
migrant can save over a period of two to four months. Prior to Pcheum Ben and Khmer 
New Year holidays, when migrants send larger gifts for annual celebrations, the amounts 
are significantly higher. In just two days last year before Pcheum Ben, Sambath received 
200,000 baht (approx. 6,000 USD) In the past, business was even better, with upwards of 
1 million baht (approx. 30,000 USD) moving through their small house. Now, as other 
money transfer businesses have sprung up doing the same, they receive only half of what 
they used to get.  Still, they remain both busy and profitable.  Sambath’s sister tells me 
that they are so busy that it’s hard sometimes to eat or go to the bathroom.  They want to 
makes sure they can pick up whenever the phone rings.  
 
Remittances, Migration and Development 
The fact that upwards of 15,000 USD per month flows into the area surrounding 
Chanleas Dai makes it a unique rural space. Though it is still characterized by 
marginality, low levels of infrastructure, environmental distress, and a history of 
                                                 
47 Other qualitative studies suggest that migrants pay upwards of 4-5% for similar telephone services in 
other areas (Chan 2009) 
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generalized poverty, it also has a significant and growing source of wealth, one 
uncommon in rural Cambodia.  As discussed in Chapter 2, remittances are a central focus 
of the migration and development literature. Remittance, in particular the extent to which 
remittances are used for productive investments, are the chief means by which scholars 
suggest that migration can promote long-term economic growth. As a result, empirical 
research often attempts to discern how particular migrant communities are using 
remittances, in particular the degree to which remittances are invested in productive 
enterprises or livelihood strategies. This dominant focus on how remittances are used in 
migrant communities however obscures a similarly essential question—that is why they 
are being used in such ways.  For example while a vast amount of research focuses on the 
degree to which migrant households are using remittances for “productive investments” 
(versus used for consumption or other expenditures), less attention is often paid to why 
and how households are making spending choices with respect to newly accessible 
capital. 
 As this chapter describes, in Chanleas Dai the bulk of households use remittances 
for daily consumption, home construction, debt-repayment, and the purchase of other 
durable goods (motorbikes, cell phones etc.). These expenditures, which are desired, 
valued, and often necessary, are a key part of migrants’ positive view of their experiences 
abroad. However both current and former migrants also regularly noted that their 
migrations did not lead to any increased security or ability to sustainably improve 
livelihoods in the village.  That is, nothing changed in their ability (or inability, as was 
most often the case) to make ends meet at home.  While this fact didn’t inhitibt migrants 
from viewing their migrations as positive, they did point out that the dependence they had 
on migration to bring about financial gains, stability, and mobility was problematic.   
Here, development scholars and migrants share both an ideal of what 
development goals should be, and also a recognition of the real challenges to reaching 
that goal. Each articulate that development, at its best, is long term, and involves 
improving what is local. Migrants, in their words, want to be able “to do anything that’s 
profitable” at home, and argue that if they could make a decent living, doing just about 
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anything locally, they would.  This idea, of course is exactly what is ideal in the 
migration and development discourse---migrants who earn, remit, and invest their wages 
back into village-based production. In the eyes of those in Chanleas Dai, it is clear why 
this ideal isn’t becoming a reality.  Where individuals aren’t investing in sustainable 
productive livelihood strategies at home it’s either because they can’t, because it’s 
financially risky, or because it is so low-profit that the investment opportunity is not a 
meaningful alternative.  
In this chapter and in parts of the chapter that follows I explore decision-making 
around remittance spending, in particular the use of migrant remittances for home 
construction. I focus on home construction for two reasons, first because it is centrally 
significant as a goal among nearly all migrant households. Home construction and home 
renovation is a primary use of remittances, and also a goal often motivating individual 
migrations.  Thus homes are a central part of the migration story in Chanleas Dai. 
Second, I focus on home construction because it is an important example of the 
disconnects I have suggested earlier.In this chapter I argue that an analysis of decision-
making around expenditures on home highlights and offers a way to understand two main 
disconnects in the field of migration, one related to definitions and the other related to 
investment potential.  
First, the priority placed on home construction highlights that local 
understandings of development are often quite different from those articulated by 
scholars and practitioners.  Although there is some debate on the extent to which homes 
are considered “productive investments,” (Conway and Cohen 1998), much research 
characterizes investments in housing upgrades as unproductive, or consumption (e.g. 
Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; Reichert 1981).  Where housing is viewed as a positive use 
of remittances, it is seen as such for only its potential to create multiplier effects on the 
local economy (i.e. Taylor 1999; Taylor et al 1996). This dominant perspective, which 
De Haas (2005) suggests is one of the main “myths” about migration and development, 
argues that it is problematic that remittances are spent mainly on houses, and other 
consumer goods while investment in productive, income-generating activities is rare.  An 
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opposing view, which I explore in greater detail in this chapter, is that housing and 
consumption are important improvements in well-being, characteristic of “development” 
as they can expand freedom of choice and the actual capabilities of individuals (DeHaas 
2005; Conway and Cohen 1998).   
Second, I argue that the use of remittances on home construction and other 
consumption goods also highlights a disconnect in the migration and development 
literature---the often unstated assumption that in remote and rural migrant communities 
there are always real and viable investment alternatives to increased consumption.  In 
contrast, I argue that given the structural locational of Chanleas Dai, its history of 
environment distress, and the weak links between the area and city centers, households 
perceive few wise locations to invest significant sums of money other than housing.  This 
builds on the argument made in the previous chapter by highlighting the low-profit, and 
environmental insecurity associated with the kinds of “productive” investments that 
scholars often associate with allowing migration to contribute to development: land, 
agriculture inputs, and small-scale entrepreneurship.  
In offering a more nuanced view of household decision-making for home 
construction, an investment typically perceived as “problematic” for allowing migration 
to lead to sustainable development, this type of analysis to allows for an expanded 
understanding of migration and development, moving from a narrow on factors which 
best promote development to a wider view of the context which influences and frames 
these choices.  
Sopheap’s Story 
I first met Sopheap, a twenty-three-year-old former migrant, while interviewing 
her grandmother, Sinoun.  Sinoun is a village elder and one of the people I was directed 
to in order to learn about the history of Chanleas Dai.  After tracing some of the historical 
shifts within the village, the topic turned towards migration and Sinoun mentioned that 
her granddaughter, who used to live with her and was sitting nearby, had recently 
migrated as well.  In fact, all of her children and grandchildren have migrated there at one 
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point or another.  Sopheap soon joined our conversation, and after introducing ourselves I 
realized I knew her family quite well, having worked in the past with her sister on a 
PEPY project. Sopheap looked nearly identical to her sister, with wide cheekbones and 
strong angular face.  
Like many others I spoke with, Sopheap first framed her migration in terms of an 
opportunity for employment. However secondarily she related it to the ability to purchase 
a home. “I’ve been in Thailand for four years,” she told me.  “Over there, there are plenty 
of jobs, and it’s much more developed, compared to Cambodia.  It’s easy to work and get 
money to build a house.”  When I asked what she meant she described how her migration 
had allowed her to purchase a home for her husband and their child, separate from her 
extended family.  Prior to having her own home, Sopheap, her husband and their young 
daughter had stayed with Sinoun. Their new house was second-hand, so to speak, 
purchased from a neighbor who was constructing a new home and was selling their old 
house.  Sopheap bought the thatch building for 40,000 baht, roughly 1,200 USD.  As we 
spoke she pointed it out to me--- a large but simple frame, stilted high nearby.  They paid 
for part of the home with savings, but also had to borrow money.  Beneath Sopheap’s 
home are stacks piled high of wooden planks.  When I asked about the wood, she told me 
that it is for her sister, who is in Thailand and has been saving money and purchasing 
materials for the new house she will construct once she has enough.   
Sopheap first migrated when she was just barely eighteen, dropping out of school 
and leaving for Thailand towards the end of her seventh grade year. Because she started 
school late, Sopheap was old for her grade, but as she was both poor and academically 
gifted, she was offered a government scholarship to attend lower secondary school.  The 
scholarship began to support school fees in seventh grade, and would be expended 
through the completion of secondary school, barring poor performance.  Despite the cash 
incentives the scholarship offered (sixty dollars, three times a year), it was not enough to 
incentivize Sopheap to continue her studies.  Her parents had been back and forth to 
Thailand several times, and at the time she made her decision to drop out, her parents had 
been away consistently for two years working.  After deciding to quit school, Sopheap 
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joined the rest of them and her siblings in Thailand. Only her youngest sister, who was 
continuing her primary education at that point, stayed in the village with their 
grandmother.  When asked why she went to Thailand, Sopheap shared that her main 
desire was to earn money for a home.  In part, this was influenced by her appreciation for 
her grandmother’s recently constructed home---a concrete house with a finely finished 
wooden deck costing 200,0000 Baht (approx. 6,000 USD). Sopheap’s grandmother had 
sold one and a half hectares of land, and used remittances from her children and 
grandchildren abroad to finance the construction, and it was an inspiration for Sopheap of 
what was possible.   
When we met, Sopheap had moved back to take care of her ailing mother, who 
had problems with her legs and recently returned home for medical treatment which 
ended in surgery.  With no savings and already indebted for the costs of her home and her 
migration, Sopheap had to borrow extensively for her mother’s treatments. The family is 
still deeply indebted, relying on remittances from Sopheap’s husband, still in Thailand, to 
help pay off debts for both the house and her mother’s health.  Sopheap has loans from 
several microfinance organizations and individuals in the area, and has debts in riel, baht 
and dollars.  In total, she still owes about 2,000 dollars, 100,000 baht, (approx. 3,000 
USD) and a few hundred thousand riel, though she’s not exactly sure (200,000 riel is 50 
USD).48 Her interest payments alone come to more than 100 dollars per month, which 
means that sometimes she borrows other people’s money at the end of the month in order 
to make interest payments.  Because of these debts, she says, she can’t do anything but 
use remittances to pay interest rates.  “I can’t do anything with money these days.  I just 
have to pay down the debt whenever I get anything.  There’s never enough to do anything 
else.”  She laughs, but with a seriousness as she tells me how she sometimes borrows 
from one place to pay for the other.  Often, she uses her new home for collateral.   
Sopheap’s husband will probably come back for a visit during Khmer New Year, 
though right now all that is keeping them from even greater indebtedness are his regular 
                                                 
48 Both microfinance organizations and moneylenders typically will offer loans in Baht, Dollars or Riel, 
according to the preference of the borrower.  Repayments must then be given in the same currency. 
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remittances. “It’s hard to be away from my husband, with one of us out of the country. 
He calls me almost every day, (with a laugh) usually at night.  He wants to talk to me, to 
talk to our child, his parents.”  She believes that once he comes back she will return with 
him, though she hasn’t figured out the logistics of her daughter’s care while she’s away. 
With her mother sick, no one can take care of her daughter if she is away, so she is 
contemplating taking the girl. Neither option is ideal, but she doesn’t see staying as an 
option either.   Their debts are out of control, and there simply aren’t options for well-
paid jobs locally. 
 
“Wealthy people [in the village] don’t migrate because they have jobs to do…..for 
me, once I finish collecting rice I have to go to Thailand to work.  I have a low 
level of education now, once you have a low level of education, no one will 
employ you….. I’d rather work here [in the village] if I have the choice, if there 
were jobs available.   I would do anything, but there’s nothing here.” 
 
Goals and Spending 
Sopheap’s story highlights themes from the preceding chapter: the village is 
perceived as offering “nothing” in terms of opportunities, and instead of considering 
small-scale livelihood options, there is an emphasis on the desire for a job and regular 
employment. Her story also exemplifies important themes related to spending and 
remittances: first, that migration is often explicitly related to purchasing goals; second, 
that microcredit loans and the sale of land often supplement migrant remittances to 
finance the purchase of goods; and third, that debt can both spur migration and ensure its 
continuation, a theme addressed more explicitly in the next two chapters.  Sopheap’s 
story also highlights that education, even when supported and understood as important, 
often doesn’t compete against the draw of migration, a topic that will be discussed more 
in Chapter 8. 
The ways that individuals use remittances are closely linked to how they articulate 
the reasons for, or goals of their migration, and also a response to the opportunities they 
have for investment and mobility.  As noted in Chapter 2, for some households, migration 
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is an acute response to distress: indebtedness, sickness of a family member, natural 
disaster or some combination of these factors.  For such families, migration provides a 
necessary means of making ends meet from day to day, paying back debts, and typically 
little else.  However for a significant number of individuals, like Sopheap, either initially 
or at some point later migration is explicitly undertaken to allow for social mobility, 
which is perceived as impossible, risky, or difficult to attain through work in the village.  
In the words of several respondents, in the village, maroah ban (one can survive) but 
achieve little more.  For these families, the goals of migration are migration are often 
related to mobility, and focused around homes, motorbikes, or other items. 
In Chanleas Dai, often loans are taken in advance to pay for these 
goods/improvements, and then migration is undertaken by one or more family members 
to support loan repayment, which I define here through the concept of migra-loans, or 
loans taken in the village for the purchase of durable goods or home construction/repair 
with the explicit intention of being paid back via remittances from household members 
away.  Beyond debt-repayment and household consumption, the most widespread and 
significant use of remittances is in home construction (or the repayment of debt for home 
construction), where even the most impoverished families (by their own definitions) will 
prioritize remittance and migra-loan use for home improvement at the expense of 
education/training, retaining land, or entrepreneurial/agricultural investment.49 Like 
Sopheap’s family, many migrant households who finance home expenditures through 
debt end up tying themselves into migration patterns, the only way to earn cash with 
which to pay down loans.  In the next section of this chapter I discuss the meanings of 
home-building for migrants and their families, using this as an example by which we can 
better understand decision-making around remittance use, borrowing, and their links to a 
culture of migration.  In the following chapter I return to the concept of migra-loans and 
                                                 
49 That home construction is one of the primary uses of remittances has been documented by several 
qualitative studies in migrant communities around the world.  A wealth of research in migrant communities 
highlights the same finding, showing that home building is one of the primary uses of remittance income as 
migration patterns begin, and often are explicitly motivating reasons for motivators (Massey et al 1998, 
Lopez 2010) 
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describe how migration and credit are understood and used in tandem and the 
implications this has for the debates of migration and development. 
 
Building Home 
Most of the villages of Chanleas Dai are constructed with homes in close 
proximity to one another.  Though there is some variation, in general homes are close 
together and concentrated, with rice paddies along the perimeter of villages and roads 
cutting centrally through the smattering of homes. Cow excrement, palm leaves, extruded 
rice husks and plastic litter the roads, which are a mix of sand, red clay and rocky rubble.  
Bicycles and motorbikes kick up dust from the road, and the greenest of trees are covered 
in a fine brown soot for most of the dry season.  Paddy fields surround the village, bright 
green during the monsoon months, and a barren straw color from December to May.   
Along the road are houses, where an extended family might house two or three 
generations.  Most homes in the area follow the Khmer traditional style, which valorizes 
height.  The ideal house looks like it is standing on stilts, with strong wooden beams 
raising the house several meters in the air. The highest might be raised four or five 
meters, with most at around two meters from the ground. This protects the home from 
potential flooding during the annual monsoon but also allows for shade, a place for 
animals to be kept, and a maximization of land space. The even more ideal raised home 
would have a concrete first floor, a place to stay cool in the months of unbearable heat. 
Because most families can’t afford materials for concrete and bricks to build this 
type of two-story home, they typically begin with the second story first, constructing a 
tall raised one room structure that allows more room for family members to congregate 
below while also allowing for the possibility that one day they might have enough money 
saved to put walls to the downstairs level, creating a more “proper” and elegant home. 
Though nearly all raised, the homes vary greatly (see Appendix B).  The most costly are 
built with concrete and brick on bottom and dark wood on top, with tiled roofs, wooden 
shutters and pie-crust trimmings atop the roof.  Painted with trimmings of deep blues and 
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reds, they mirror the colors of the Cambodian flag.  Some lack the concrete bottom, and 
instead have low wooden tables on the open bottom floor where they can welcome 
visitors and share meals.  Families without the means for homes like these have more 
simple wooden structures, still raised but perhaps less high, with zinc roofing.  The 
poorest have homes made from broken slates of wood mixed with thatch and straw, walls 
which are partially complete or non-existent.  Roofs are typically made from dried leaves 
of the romchek plant, a thick-spined bush that can be dried and woven into housing 
material.   
 In the past ten years the homes of Chanleas Dai have changed significantly, going 
from largely straw, thatch and older wood to larger and higher wooden and concrete 
homes.  These changes are primarily linked to migration, though a few families, 
particularly those with salaried jobs, have been able to build newer and nicer homes 
through local efforts.50  Individuals regard taller, stronger, and larger homes as being 
critical for safety and security, making it possible to sleep well, to protect one’s family 
from rain, wind and heat, to be able to securely store family possessions. Homes also 
provided a level of comfort, an area for social congregation, and a place for family meals.  
Beyond these obvious functions, improvements to homes were also regarded as important 
for the safety of children and older generations.   
 However homes were also referenced as important through their representation of 
wealth and status, as proof of successful migrations which bring pride to family 
members, and as general indicators of kaapiwatd: development, or progress. Tall, 
wooden or concrete homes are the important indicators of social status, wealth, 
modernity, and development in the area, and thus a priority for migrants and their 
families. Largely a result of the growth of migrant remittances and more available cash, 
the move towards for a nicer and larger home is certainly the most visually arresting 
trend in the past decade. It was also repeatedly described as the defining measure of how 
the area had developed or improved over time. 
                                                 
50 For example teachers, school or other local officials, or those with family members who work with non-
profit organizations. 
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Home as Development 
Homes are central to individual understandings of what development is in 
Chanleas Dai.  When I asked village officials what they wanted for their community, or 
to describe what “development” is, they could nearly recite the United Nations 
Millennium Development Goals, and one actually did. Development as a prospective 
goal for the community was described by officials with reference to health, education, 
food security, and infrastructure.  This was also somewhat true throughout the village, 
though a stronger focus for most people was the association of development with 
infrastructure and jobs (rather than health and education).   
However when I asked anyone how had the community developed, changed, or 
progressed over time, both officials and non-officials referred to changes in homes. 
Whether I was speaking about the village in general, or an individual household situation, 
homes were a primary landmark by which status, development, or progress was 
measured. A young woman’s response to my question about whether migrants are better 
off after going to Thailand reflects this understanding.  “Yes, they’re better off.  In the 
past there were only small houses in the village, but now things have gradually changed.”  
Consistently, my questions about change over time, development, progress, getting 
better, or improvement were answered with reference to homes.  This was curious to me, 
as often these responses would be within weeks of other important developments: road 
improvement, a school opening, improvements to the health center, agriculture programs, 
latrine construction etc. Over the time that I had been visiting Chanleas Dai I had 
personally witnessed dramatic improvements at a community level: a funded low-cost 
health center, the construction of five schools including a new lower secondary school, 
improvements to the pagoda, a paved national road, bridge improvements, and many 
other visible indications of change. Yet perceptions of how the village had changed over 
time centered almost exclusively through the description of housing.  
Development was characterized as evident through housing improvements, even 
when it came at the expense of land sale.  In speaking with a 74 year old village elder, I 
asked about migration and if migration usually led to households being better off.  “Yes, 
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of course. They often build big houses with their savings or land sale,” speaking of the 
dozens of individuals who supplemented their remittances with the sale of rice fields in 
order to finance the construction of new homes. Though he later pointed out that 
sometimes people who sold their land faced worse conditions, as they had no safety nets, 
his first understanding of development as being tied to home improvement (and not land 
loss or gain)  highlighted a generalized attitude towards home improvement as indicative 
of progress.  
Beyond a sign of family progress or development, homes also symbolized status 
and objective wealth.  The importance that families gave to wealth and status could 
hardly be overestimated.  Though individuals often fought to be designated as “poor” by 
government and non-profit partners in order to receive benefits, to be actually seen as 
poor by others was strongly associated with shame. Despite the fact that individuals 
explained their poverty as out of their control (a result of illness, spendthrift or lazy 
spouses, corruption, being cheated, etc.) extreme poverty was regardless tied to strong 
emotions and shame.   
My conversation with Saly, a thirty-nine year old mother and former migrant, is 
particularly illustrative of the shame often associated with poverty, and how building a 
nicer home can be a means of minimizing shame and internalized perceptions of poverty. 
Saly explained her recent house construction as a gift to her children.   “This way they 
can concentrate at school on their studies, without having to worry about children teasing 
them or bothering them because they are poor and their house isn’t so nice.”  Though 
Saly and her husband both enjoyed part-time salaried jobs, very rare and desirable within 
the village, she was still overwhelmingly concerned with how her status and wealth, 
expressed in the form of her house, might affect her status and the status of her children.  
In speaking about the situation of her family prior to her work abroad, Saly began crying 
profusely, her eyes reddening as soon as I asked what her family situation was like in 
2007 before she migrated to Thailand.  “We were so very poor, it was terrible, and they 
all looked down on us.  We were so very poor.  Our house was so small.”  For Saly, a 
nicer home allowed her to hold her head high in the village, to feel like her children were 
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taken care of and supported, and to improve the well-being of her family, albeit in ways 
that aren’t entirely quantifiable.   
This sentiment was reiterated often by others. Homes were important investments 
to strive for, as the indicator of status that mattered most not only for others but for one’s 
sense of self-worth.  In the words of  Vanna: 
 
“If they have money, but they don’t have a house, they will feel like they are 
poor. If they have a house or a nice place to stay, even if they don’t have food to 
eat, they feel like they will be able to find ways to work or make a living. So, a 
house is the fundamental need.” 
 
While some researchers have  viewed the construction of large and costly homes 
as frivolous, or examples of conspicuous consumption, there is some support for the fact 
that these investments may not only be economically wise (a suggestion discussed in 
more detail momentarily), but also that they may generate “moral capital” that is useful in 
other important ways for survival and mobility in the village.  For example in a study of 
rural poverty in America, Jennifer Sherman argues that the among rural poor, particularly 
those in small, tight-knit communities where there is less diversity, social norms tend to 
be more rigid, making it important for the poor to make choices that are not only 
optimizing their financial position, but also optimizing their “moral” position (Sherman 
2006).  Through coping behaviors that are seen as having more “moral worth,” 
individuals can accomplish distinctions between themselves even without significant 
economic capital (Bourdieu 1991). This moral worth is not only related to an individual’s 
reputation, it has repercussions in terms of being offered access to jobs, social networks, 
or charity and assistance.   In Sherman’s research, families whose coping strategies that 
were not “morally adequate according to local norms” (893) suffered not only diminished 
self-esteem but also censure at the community level that further affected their chances at 
escaping poverty.  In Chanleas Dai the “fundamental need” of an appropriate home, 
while it rarely factors into mainstream development discourses, is the primary indicator 
of individual status and community development.  Through homes, individuals feel they 
escape being looked down on for being poor, being judged, and being gossiped about in 
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negative ways.  The impacts of home construction, provide real changes in well-being, 
that give back on a daily basis not only to individuals but also the their current and future 
families. 
Homes also have other important moral and financial functions. First, homes can 
provide financial security. In an area where theft is still a threat, and savings accounts 
uncommon, homes are a real means of financial security.  They can be used for collateral 
on future loans, can be passed on through generations, and wooden slats can be taken 
down and sold and then reconstructed in part if need be.  Second, homes provide physical 
security and greater comfort. Cambodian rural environments can be incredibly harsh.  In 
the dry season temperatures regularly rise above 40 degrees Celsius, and where there is 
wind nearly everything is covered in a fine layer of dirt. In the rainy season monsoons are 
routine, with heavy winds that come with little warning.  A comfortable home can be a 
way of mediating the everyday, consistent, and powerful discomfort brought about by the 
natural environment.    
 Finally, homes are a way to express care, concern, and responsibility for both 
children and older generations. Some individuals specifically expressed home 
construction as a means of easing migration cycles, particularly the separation between 
parents and children. A nicer home could house children and older generations 
comfortably, allowing migrants go back to Thailand with more confidence as to the well-
being of the family they are leaving behind.  One young mother confided in me that she 
was nervous going back to Thailand and leaving her young six-month-old daughter with 
her mother in-law.  That anxiety was one reason she was glad that they had improved 
their house while she was back.  With a safe house that had better walls and less 
dangerous wooden slats, she felt like she was being a more responsible mother when she 
left for Thailand.  
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Home: An Investment in Migration 
Migrants and their families also argued that their decisions to invest in nicer 
homes were related to the lack of similarly beneficial alternatives.  Land, for example 
was something that many migrant households could have purchased with remittances, yet 
rarely did.  Similarly, migrant households rarely purchased tractors, paid for high school 
education fees of children, or started small businesses with money earned abroad.  As the 
previous chapter argues, most people in Chanleas Dai believed that these ventures were 
high-risk, low-profit, and therefore not wise investments.  These beliefs were well-
founded, based on recent experiences of environmental distress, and the general 
marginality and remoteness of the area.  
The distinction between investments in home versus other alternatives was 
underscored by the way that individuals spoke about the feasibility, and costs involved in 
pricey homes versus other substantial investments.  Whereas I was generally told that 
households could earn, over time through migration, enough money to finance an 
expensive home (on average 100,000 baht, or $3,000 USD), in contrast tractors, rice 
mills, enough chickens or pigs to start a farm, land, and other productive investments 
were described as unmanageable.  In actuality, homes were actually similarly priced to, 
or more expensive than most of these investments, but they weren’t articulated as such. A 
village chief, whose opinions were representative of several responses I had to such 
questions, shook his head when I asked if was common to purchase tractors, land, or rice 
mills with remittances. “We can’t.  It’s too expensive. What [migrants] earn isn’t enough 
to buy a tractor.”  He estimated that a tractor cost around 2,000 USD, a price repeated to 
me several times, and significantly lower than the cost of the typical home.  Similarly, 
land was seen as “impossible to buy now” at the price of 60,000 baht per hectare, far less 
than the average home.  Although homes were recognized as expensive, they were 
described as manageable expenditures, through asset or land sale, migration, loans or 
some combination.  
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In reality, homes, tractors, rice mills and other large purchases were all possible 
through migration, some were just regarded as preferable investments, justifying the 
costs. Homes were valued, and offered immediate, long-lasting and known rewards.  
Though expensive, they were sound investments in providing for the security, happiness 
and safety of non-migrant family members, in a strategy that sees migration as a primary 
way of life. Assuming that the current cycle of dependency on remittances from Thailand 
would continue, most families articulated that homes were what they thought would be 
useful and wise investments: a place for those who couldn’t go to be comfortable and 
well-respected. Thus in addition to its use for safety and security, and its meaning as a 
consumer good and symbol of wealth, I argue that the prevalence of home construction in 
Chanleas Dai is related to the structural and environmental position of the area.  In a 
situation where agriculture-based ventures are financially risky, and where small 
businesses have consistently struggled (and often failed), households rightly perceive few 
alternative ways to improve their lives.  
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has explored meanings and decision-making around the uses of 
remittances for home construction in Chanleas Dai.  By focusing how meanings of homes 
are tied to local understandings of status, development, progress, and security, I argue 
that spending on housing reflects two realities things.  First, this type of spending reflects 
a particular understanding of development; one focused on raising everyday standards of 
living, not feeling (or being seen as) living in poverty, having things that are tangible and 
financially secure, and recognizing the importance of the care of family members. 
Second, remittances used primarily for housing reflects the lack of perceived alternative 
ways that money could be used in similarly valued and profitable ways, which is directly 
related to the broader structural position of Chanleas Dai. The environmental distress and 
economic marginality of the area, described in the previous chapter, are key in shaping 
both the real and the perceived choices of migrant households.  Given the recurrence of 
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floods and droughts, low productivity of agricultural ventures, distance from markets, 
lack of insurance, poor roads, lack of electricity, and difficulty accessing water, most 
people perceived only a small chance of success with the other ventures they might invest 
in with large sums of money. 
This “lack of better options”, which was a central factor shaping both migration 
choices and the uses of remittances, again in part explains why neoliberal theories of how 
migration can promote development do not manifest in reality.  Theories of migration 
and development, which are often context free, suggest that with additional capital 
migrants can become small-scale entrepreneurs, invest in productive ventures, and in 
doing so sustainably increase their ability to make a living over time.  This neoliberal 
idea of migration as a form of self-help, where wealth begets wealth, however assumes 
that all local economies are similarly situated to take advantage of wages earned abroad.  
This clearly is not the case.  Marginalized rural and remote areas, many of which have 
immense environmental challenges, are often places where investment is generally 
unattractive, and low-profit.  Migration alone, even where it is successful, is unlikely to 
shift these environments. This relates to an earlier stated point; that the impacts migration 
has are clearly related to its causes.  In Chanleas Dai, where the causes of migration are 
primarily to cope with relatively few possibilities to make a living at home, it makes 
sense that migrants households aren’t spending hard-won remittances to invest in the 
kinds of livelihoods that failed them in the first place. 
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CHAPTER 7: MIGRA LOANS: BORROWING ACROSS BORDERS 
 
“The tiger depends on the forest; the forest depends on the tiger." 
-Khmer Proverb 
 
While individuals privileged home building over other types of investments, even 
successful migrations didn’t always allow for immediate home construction, as these 
investments were costly. Therefore instead of postponing their purchase or saving over 
time, migrant households desiring home improvement often sold assets and/or borrowed 
to finance the difference.  As Vanna explained: 
 
Like I said, in the village, a house is considered to be the most important thing. So 
if a family can afford only half of the full price of the house [after migrating], 
they will borrow to finance the rest.  Another problem is house competition. For 
example let’s say two families migrate to Thailand at the same time. One of them 
returns to the village and builds a house. The other didn’t save enough and can’t 
afford a house, so they will be jealous. But they can get their house built without 
having enough money - they just borrow however much they are missing. Once 
the house is built, they go back to work in Thailand to pay for the loan. Part of the 
reason...well there is a belief in the countryside that is superstitious, not really 
scientific, but some people believe in it. People in the village say that if there is a 
bigger house near your house it is a problem.  It’s like a spell or a curse.  Some 
people who have small homes will think that they are unhealthy, because the 
bigger homes have put a curse on them to remain poor.  
 
The superstition surrounding “house competition” wasn’t commonly articulated to 
me, and even as he told me about the idea Vanna was dismissive about its importance.  
But home construction as a driver for migration, and as the primary indicator of 
successful migration was often repeated by both migrants and non-migrants.  Moreover, 
the experience Vanna described of home purchasing, migration, and borrowing was one 
of the most common themes throughout my interviews. Similar to Sopheap’s case, homes 
and other durable goods were often financed through some combination of migrant 
remittances/savings, asset/land sale, and loans. These loans, which I refer to as migra-
loans were planned explicitly to be paid back through migration and taken out from 
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formal microfinance (MFI) providers and informal moneylenders regularly.  This chapter 
specifically explores the practices of taking migra-loans and the related individual 
perceptions around borrowing and newly available microcredit. Though on the surface 
borrowing may seem tangential to acts of migration, loans, debt, and microcredit are an 
influential aspect of the culture of migration that mediates decision-making in Chanleas 
Dai. This works in two related ways. As credit has become more accessible it has enabled 
migrations for a greater number of individuals, who can access lower-interest loans to 
finance migration. In tandem, the possibility of migration allows for low-risk use of 
credit. In other words, because work abroad was readily available individuals felt it 
would be easy to earn enough to repay loans. As a result, expanded access to credit 
allows for, drives, and often ensures the continuation migration in Chanleas Dai. 
The existence and prevalence of migra-loans for homes and other purchase was 
surprising to me when I first encountered the process in my fieldwork. My original 
interview guide didn’t ask about debt, borrowing, or credit, except regarding meekjal fees 
and how households afforded them.  After only a handful of interviews however, I 
realized that debt was a powerful factor in migration decisions. In fact, one of the most 
commonly articulated reasons for migration was being in debt. While often initial debts 
were taken out because of distress—either to treat illness or as a response to 
drought/flood, other kinds of debts were common as well. As I probed more in my 
interviews, I discovered that borrowing was also often explicitly tied to migration in a 
more intentional way—rather than needing to migrate because of indebtedness, 
households often borrowed for a desired improvement or item with the explicit 
understanding that migration (either theirs, or someone else’s in the household) would be 
used to pay back the loan. Some of these loans were from local moneylenders, others 
through microfinance institutions in nearby Kralanh.  Not only were remittances often 
directed exclusively to pay down debts, as in Sopheap’s case, but many family members 
also considered loans as advances on remittance payments. This was surprising to me as 
it didn’t seem to fit with either stated MFI goals or the relationship I assumed between 
credit and migration.   
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In this chapter I discuss how credit plays into migration decision-making, in ways 
that are theoretically interesting both because of the accepted theoretical relationship 
between migration and access to credit, and also given economic theories of how 
expanded credit is expected to enable poverty reduction through village-based 
entrepreneurship. After discussing briefly the recent expansion of credit in the area, I 
describe the ways credit is used and understood as part of migration strategies and goals, 
arguing that migra-loans are centrally related to the culture of migration in Chanleas Dai, 
Finally, I highlight how the credit-migration relationship in the area illustrates 
disconnects between the expectations of how both migration and microfinance can (or 
will) lead to development, and the realities of how these strategies are used.  
 
Credit: A Background 
 The suggestion that access to credit is key to developing rural areas has been 
articulated by development economists since the 1950’s (Pulley 1989). The arguments for 
access to credit as a key factor in promoting poverty reduction have gained increasing 
traction in the past two decades through the development of microfinance programs.  
Microcredit,51 which refers to small-scale loans typically targeted towards the poor, 
began on a large scale in the 1970’s in Bangladesh through the efforts of Muhammad 
Yunus and the now infamous Grameen Bank.  Quickly regarded as a successful home-
grown and sustainable solution to rural poverty, microfinance projects aimed at 
expanding access to credit and other banking services for the rural poor have gained 
tremendous traction across the developing world (Morduch 2000; Yunus 2003; Roy 
2010).  The arguments for the power of microcredit to enable sustained livelihood 
                                                 
51 Microfinance and microcredit are often used interchangeably, however they are substantively different.  
Microfinance encompasses a range of financial services targeted at the poor including services such as 
credit, savings, insurance, and money transfer. Microcredit refers specifically to loans, and is one type of 
service provided among microfinance institutions. Though there is no universal definition, microcredit 
typically differentiates itself from other types of loans through its adherence to one or more of the 
following criteria: a focused target on loan provision for the poor, low-interest rates (relative to informally 
available loans), or small loan amounts.  In reality, microfinance institutions vary dramatically in their 
adherence to these criteria.  Throughout this dissertation, I refer to microfinance when discussing the 
sector, and microcredit when specifically referencing loans from microfinance institutions. 
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improvement follows in a similar vein to the arguments supporting migration and 
remittances as a successful development strategy.  Both provide much-needed cash in the 
hands of the poor, with the potential (more explicit in the case of microcredit) to provide 
capital for productive investments, which might lead to sustainable improvements for 
households (Montgomery and Weiss 2005).  The key to microcredit success is 
understood through its ability not to finance low-interest durable goods or consumption 
needs, but rather to allow for the gradual accumulation of returns through self-
employment (Ahlin and Jiang 2008). Proponents of microcredit highlight the 
entrepreneurial solutions of loan groups and borrowers, many of whom invest in small 
businesses, livestock, or training which allows them to expand small businesses, save, 
and break a cycle of poverty (Yunus 1998; Yunus 2003). Credit has also been understood 
as mitigating risk, which allows both poorer and middle class households in developing 
countries greater income security, as greater access to credit allows households to absorb 
shocks in income without compensating by changing their consumption patterns 
(Eswaran and Kotwal 1990).   
Accepted theories of migration have historically placed migration and access to 
low-cost credit in an opposing relationship. New Economics of Labor Migration theories 
discussed in Chapter 2 point to a lack of available credit markets as one of the push 
factors propelling out-migration (Stark 1980; Stark 1982; Taylor et al 1996; Massey et al 
1998; Taylor et al 2003).  According to this theory, individual migration decisions are 
part of a household strategy aimed at diversifying incomes and reducing risk in response 
to undeveloped credit and insurance markets in home countries (Stark and Levhari 1982; 
Stark and Bloom 1985; Taylor et al 1996; Taylor 1999; Massey et al 1998, Taylor et al 
2003).  This can occur for example when credit is inaccessible for small farmers in rural 
areas to start new businesses or expand on livelihood strategies, they may then be driven 
to migrate in order to loosen cash constraints. According to NELM theories, where 
markets are imperfect or inaccessible, migration plays an important role in allowing 
households to reduce risk by diversify income sources via labor abroad (Stark and 
Levhari 1982; Stark and Bloom 1985; Taylor et al 1996; Taylor 1999; Massey et al 1998, 
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Taylor et al 2003). Thus NELM research suggests that if governments or communities are 
interested in reducing out-migration, they could do so by enabling greater access to credit 
(Taylor et al 1996; Taylor 2003; Massey, Durand, and Malone 2002; Rozelle, Taylor and 
DeBrauw 1999).   
Both theories of migration, and the general goals of microfinance would predict 
that as credit becomes more easily accessible, households should have greater power to 
make a living at home, lower risk, and thus less need to migrate. In Chanleas Dai, 
however, credit is not seen as allowing for expanded livelihoods at home. Rather, it is 
seen as supporting household strategies centered around migration.  Moreover, credit, 
rather than being understood as mitigating risk, is often perceived as both highly risky, 
and a cause, not an alleviator of poverty.52 
 
Credit in Chanleas Dai Prior to MFI Expansion 
Borrowing has been a part of household strategies for as long as village elders can 
remember, a constituent part of agrarian life to help families negotiate agricultural cycles.  
Both prior to and post Khmer Rouge, households would often borrow from friends, 
relatives, or wealthier families in the village without paying interest, on the basis of trust 
and shared ties.  A village elder described: 
 
“If we knew each other, and trusted each other we could borrow money.  Borrow, 
I mean, not lend with interest. For example, if you needed rice grains or seed, you 
could borrow 10 cans of rice and once you were able to repay, you just re-paid 10 
cans of rice. Today you can’t do that any longer. If you borrow 10 cans of rice, 
you are expected to re-pay 20 – 40 cans.”  
 
In the years following the Vietnamese occupation and then UNTAC entry in the 
country, lending with interest gradually became more common, due to the growing cash 
economy.  Moneylending as a practice grew through networks, as those who worked in 
                                                 
52 This understanding of credit, as exacerbating and not mediating risk, has been reported in other 
qualitative work in Cambodia (see Fitzgerald and So 2007, Tong et al 2011). 
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markets or as entrepreneurs and had access to cash began lending to those they knew.  As 
these loans were personally risky for lenders, interest rates were high, a minimum of 10% 
per month, and directly related to one’s status, perceived ability to repay, connection to 
the lender, and reputation in the area.  Thus the most desperate individuals had the 
highest interest rates, which even for a relatively networked and trusted borrower were 
exorbitant. 
Through the 1990’s and early 2000’s, households in Chanleas Dai relied on 
market-based moneylenders and informal loans mainly for consumption smoothing, 
illness, and small-scale agriculture inputs, borrowing from moneylenders only when they 
exhausted the networks of friends and relatives who might loan them money at more 
reasonable rates, or without interest. Though some migrants used informal loans to 
finance migration, this was relatively rare, both because migration was still relatively 
uncommon and also because of the high interest rates charged by moneylenders, still 
commonly between 10% and 20% per month in 2000.  Migration was not yet well-
established and still had a less known character, giving households less confidence in 
borrowing at such high rates for the migration of family members.  The early migrants I 
spoke with who had borrowed for migration reported being indebted for several years due 
to the usurious interest rates they initially committed to with informal lenders.   
 
MFI Entry and Increased Access 
Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) first came to the Chanleas Dai area in 2000, 
when ACLEDA opened the first MFI branch office in Kralanh, a town just 8 kilometers 
away from the commune center.53  In 2002 a second MFI followed, and by 2010 there 
were eight MFIs operating in the area with several others planning sub-branch offices. 
According to one branch manager, the Kralanh area is one of the more competitive MFI 
areas of the country. He noted that although many provincial towns have significantly 
more MFI operators, the population of the area is relatively small for the number of loan 
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operators, a fact he attributes to the proximity to two national highways, which means 
increased opportunities for business in the area.   
The growth of the microfinance sector in Kralanh and in Cambodia more 
generally has led to dramatic shifts in both informal and formal borrowing. Moneylenders 
and other sources of informal credit are still widely available and commonly used, but 
have been impacted by MFI competition, resulting in dramatically declining interest 
rates.54 Moreover, the growing presence of MFI’s, and their personal and ever-present 
marketing campaigns have successfully shifted perceptions of borrowing in ways that 
impact credit more generally.  Rather than being singularly defined as a shameful act of 
poverty, borrowing is increasingly understood in a more positive light as an active way of 
improving one’s life. This expansion and the resulting shifts, described in more detail 
below, have had importance for the way that households view and use credit, particularly 
with respect to migration. 
 
Interest Rates and the Changing Character of Loans 
Since MFI’s have entered the market in Kralanh, both MFI and moneylender 
interest rates have dropped substantially, reflecting national trends in MFI interest rates.   
Over the past decade MFI interest rates in Cambodia have dropped from a national 
average of 5% per month in 2000 to an average of 2.5% per month in 2009 (CMA 2009). 
In Kralanh, MFI interest rates over time have mirrored this general trend.  Today, the 
average MFI borrower in Chanleas Dai pays 3% monthly interest on loans, sometimes 
less. 
Similarly significant decreases have occurred in the informal loan sector, a result 
of both the increase in formal institutions offering loans, and a growing pool of 
moneylenders. By 2010, formal loans in Kralanh were only moderately lower than 
                                                 
54  In discussing the credit markets in the area I refer only to interest-based moneylending and MFI loans.  
These comprise the bulk of the credit market, and are also the types of credit which are linked to migration, 
which is the main interest in this dissertation.  For a more in-depth look at alternative sources of credit in 
rural Cambodia, all of which are also present to varying extents in Chanleas Dai, see Phlong 2009. 
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moneylender rates, which had reduced from averaging above 10% per month in 2000 to 
an average of 5% per month in 2009.  Some market-based moneylenders offered rates as 
low as 3% in 2010, the same rate offered by microfinance institutions.  
 MFI and moneylender loans still retain important differences in character.  MFIs 
are significantly more restrictive, lending for only specific purposes (notably, not 
migration or illness), requiring monthly interest payments beginning immediately after 
taking the loan, and requiring full payment over a specific period.  MFI loans also take 
several days at minimum to process and require collateral, assessments, and the signature 
of co-signers and a village authority.  In contrast, moneylenders offer immediate cash at 
any time of day or night, privacy, little or no collateral, no restrictions on loan use, and 
very flexible repayment schedules.  Because of these differences, MFI and informal loans 
are used differently and strategically to meet the differential needs of borrowers.  Those 
who have more collateral and have a more reliable stream of income are more likely to 
access MFI loans, whereas those with fewer assets or who desire more flexibility in 
repayment will seek out moneylenders.  Villagers access both MFI loans and informal 
credit regularly, and often have several loans out at any given time with multiple lenders 
in both the formal and informal sector.55 
 
Shifting Meanings of Borrowing 
 Alongside changes in interest rates, which have expanded the availability of credit 
and reduced fears of borrowing, there have also been the beginnings of substantive 
cultural shifts around borrowing as a result of MFI entry and expansion. In the past, 
borrowing has been seen as a shameful and embarrassing act, something hidden from 
friends, neighbors and even at times family members. As one respondent explained: “To 
borrow is to show that you need money, to confirm your poverty.”  Being perceived as 
poor incites shame, thus so does openly borrowing from others. In response, the informal 
                                                 
55 Other studies of indebtedness in Cambodia support that most rural households hold debts, often with 
multiple outstanding loans at one point in time (Chan and Acharya 2002) 
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lending sector has traditionally been exceedingly private, with loans made quickly, with 
no evaluation, co-signer, or village authority signatures necessary, and with a general 
sense of discretion.  
By contrast, MFI’s have actively challenged the connections between borrowing 
and poverty or shame. These cultural challenges have been necessary to some degree, as 
the MFI industry, bureaucratic and not based on personal connections, seeks to grow and 
expand their target areas. To do so they have had to minimize risk through processes of 
evaluation, assessment, and using groups and co-signers, each making the loan process 
more visible.  Prior to offering first loans MFI officers, well known in the village, come 
to evaluate homes and land, speak with village authorities, and help locate co-signers 
often in addition to spouses or village authorities. Post-loan, some loan officers also 
regularly come to check in with families or collect monthly interest payments in-person. 
MFI’s have also organized and promoted group loans, where multiple individuals come 
together to borrow, with joint liability for loans. Village chiefs and households who have 
taken loans in the past will even post stickers on their homes, or post brochures or 
advertisements for specific MFI institutions.  As a result MFI loans are visible and 
known, not only to local authorities but also to extended family, neighbors, and-- thanks 
to a never-ending cycle of village gossip---practically anyone who is interested.   
Moreover, MFIs have actively worked to facilitate a different view of borrowing, 
advocating for loans as not a signal of poverty, but rather a means of taking initiative to 
improve one’s life. In an illustrative example ACLEDA, the largest microfinance 
provider in Cambodia, has as its logo the hongbird, a mythic creature symbolic of 
prosperity (Clark 2006). Similarly focusing on the success possible through borrowing, 
the typical MFI literature, brochure, or sign will show a proud farmer, or smiling small 
business owners, images of success and achievement.  Making the connection between 
borrowing and prosperity (as opposed to poverty) is of course the central tenant of the 
MFI industry globally, that borrowing can be more than a last resort, but actually a 
strategy to improve lives.  
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Expanded Credit, Expected Implications 
 The entry of MFIs into the Chanleas Dai area has resulted in easier, cheaper, and 
more socially acceptable borrowing not only through MFI’s but also through informal 
moneylenders. Both moneylenders and MFI’s reported consistently expanding loan 
portfolios over the past decade, even though competition has increased.  A local village 
chief estimated that over 100 families, roughly half of those in his village, currently had 
outstanding MFI loans.56  “Everyone is borrowing. It’s quite consistent,” he shared.  
“They come every day for signatures.”  This estimation did not take into account 
informal loans, which required no signatures but were equally, if not more pervasive. 
 Given theories of New Economics of Labor Migration suggesting that access to 
credit is a fundamental cause of out-migration, we might expect that as access to credit in 
Chanleas Dai has increased it would turn individuals away from Thailand, allowing a 
new or increased ability to make ends meet at home through consumption smoothing or 
productive investment.  By all accounts, this has not happened. Though both MFIs and 
moneylenders report increasing borrowing, and lower interest rates, expanded access to 
credit has not turned most households away from their primary livelihood strategy- 
migration.  Instead, borrowing often works in tandem with migration and is widely 
understood in Chanleas Dai as a means of supplementing migration to improve 
livelihoods.  This relationship is deeply related to the strong culture of migration in the 
area. Through migrant success abroad, and the resulting widening disparities in wealth 
within the village, relative deprivation has become a motivator not only for migration, but 
also for borrowing as a supplement to migration strategies.  Moreover, many households 
note that low-interest loans have enabled migrations, not deterred them. 
 
Borrowing and Migration: Pathways and Possibilities 
Credit and migration are connected in Chanleas Dai in three distinct, though 
related ways. First, debt can initially compel the migration of household members. Most 
                                                 
56 As part of standard MFI practice, spouses, insurers, and the local village chief have to sign off on every 
loan 
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commonly the result of either illness or failed productive investments, many households 
reported experiences of being indebtedness to a point of distress, unable to repay loan 
principals or interest payments through local strategies. Because migration was regarded 
as relatively low-risk it was preferable to asset sale or legal intervention.57 Youth 
particularly noted family pressure to migrate as a result of indebtedness, often quitting 
school to migrate at young ages as a result of household debt. 
Second, migrants themselves or migrant household heads often had to borrow for 
the costs associated with migration.  Migration with a meekjal cost between 2,000 and 
3,000 baht (roughly 60-90 USD), depending on the destination and what services the 
meekjal offered (job placement, transport to job site, etc.). Though seemingly small, and 
significantly lower than the costs of migrations in decades prior, these costs often 
required borrowing, either from family members or from moneylenders.58 With more 
easily available and low cost financing, even the most destitute of individuals were 
typically able to borrow for the costs of migration. 
Third, households often took out loans with the explicit intention of repaying via 
their own migration or the migration of a family member.  These loans, which I term 
migra-loans, are distinct in that they are intentionally taken out for an expense that 
households do not expect to be able to repay through local strategies. Most commonly for 
homes, motorbikes, or similarly large purchases, borrowers understand these loans as an 
advance on the remittances they expect to obtain through their own or a family member’s 
migration. At times migra-loans were taken by the future migrant, but more often these 
were taken by household heads who either had family members already away and 
remitting, or expected to have family members leave very soon.  At times this type of 
loan was also used to either explicitly coerce or tacitly pressure family members 
                                                 
57 Debt as a push factor for migration has been reported elsewhere in Cambodia (Maltoni 2010), and also 
in other contexts (Mosse et al 2002; Thieme and Wyss 2005). 
58 The prevalence of migrant households borrowing to pay for transportation/broker costs has been 
identified in other household surveys of migration in Cambodia. In 2007 CDRI conducted a study of 507 
households in six villages with a high incidence of migration.  Researchers noted that approximately half of 
migrants had to take out loans to finance migration, though in some communities this was as high as 74% 
(Chan 2009).  
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uninterested in migrating to leave.  Migra-loans were common among my respondents, 
and often seen as the best or only way to wisely utilize newly available MFI credit. With 
a perceived (and usually real) ability to successfully make money through migration, 
household members were able to feel comfortable borrowing sums of money that would 
be impossible to repay through village-based work.  Moreover, MFI loans were a means 
of “making cake without flour” as one respondent put it; ensuring that families were able 
to make the purchases they wanted without having to first save enough to obtain them.  
Another woman noted this as a preferable strategy to ensure the act of saving, noting that 
it “kept the beer money small” a reference not only to the tendency of her husband to use 
extra cash around the house for alcohol, but more generally implying her preference to 
have help saving small amounts of money over time through loans.
59 
  
In contrast, loans were not seen as capital best used to start local microenterprise, 
expand agriculture or invest in income generating activities.  In part, this was related to 
the strong preference for migration already established in the village. Related, it was also 
a reflection of the predominate local perspective on village-based livelihood strategies: 
high-risk, boring, passive, unprofitable, and low status. With the frequency of 
environmental distress, the distance from markets, the low profit typical attained through 
animal husbandry and agriculture, and the risk perceived to be involved in rice 
intensification or crop diversification, there were few households who saw credit as 
opening new doors for profit at home. In contrast, most people in the village saw village-
based livelihood strategies, regardless of how they were financed as impossible, or 
unwise. 
Because it was difficult to make a consistent profit through local livelihood 
strategies, holding a loan was regarded as a liability, not an opportunity. As a result, loans 
were often seen as necessitating migration. A former migrant characterized the 
connections in this way: “The biggest problem is we can’t make a living here...If we 
don’t earn enough, our only choice is to borrow money from private banks, and then how 
                                                 
59 Though savings accounts were offered at a bank eight kilometers away, it was very rare among those in 
the village to hold savings accounts. 
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can we pay it back?  So we migrate.” A non-migrant, non-borrower respondent put it 
more simply: “we can manage in the village if we’re not in debt.   If we are in debt 
though, there’s no way.” Notably, I found that very few of my non-migrant respondents 
had borrowed money, and those that did had family members with other salaried jobs 
(with NGOs, or as civil servants). Because migration was the normative livelihood 
choice, those who stayed were strategic in their choice to remain at home and did not 
want to risk being “forced” into leaving through debt. Non-migrants often had successful 
household strategies that admittedly could have been expanded through credit and 
successfully repaid, but they didn’t want to risk being indebted.  Were something to 
happen-- an adverse shock, sickness, or something else—they felt that their only option if 
indebted would be to leave for Thailand or encourage someone else in their family to do 
so---something they explicitly did not want.   
 The three ways that I describe migrant households using credit are not unrelated, 
and often households experienced two or even all three of these credit/migration 
connections at once, or over a short period of time.60 For example migra-loans taken 
intentionally and enthusiastically could become problematic debts that compelled the 
migration of additional family members. Conversely an informal loan for the costs of a 
household member’s migration could be quickly repaid, leading family members to see 
the potential of remittances and take larger MFI loans shortly thereafter. The following 
individual cases offer examples of the typical connections between migration and credit, 
and offer some insight into the predominate relationships between migration and credit in 
Chanleas Dai.  
 
                                                 
60 These general connections between credit and migration are also evident in survey research 
documenting the use of remittances among migrant households in Cambodia. In the IOM’s household 
survey, 68% of migrant households receiving remittances noted that debt was a primary use of migrant 
remittances, accounting for nearly a third of remittance spending (Maltoni 2010).60  In CDRI’s 2007 study, 
Chan (2009) found that households reported 14% of remittances from Thailand going to debt repayment. 
Deelen and Vasuprasat (2010) in a study of 200 remittance-recipient households five provinces, found 
slightly lower levels, noting that 10% of remittances were used to repay debts.  Notably, this was a higher 
number than the amount of remittances used for productive investment. 
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Maly’s Story 
Maly is 46, and has five children. Only her youngest son is currently in the 
village, while the rest are living and working in Thailand. When I met Maly I had been 
intending to speak with one of her sons.  However when I arrived the day of the 
scheduled interview, I found he had taken a taxi that morning to Bangkok with his older 
brother.  The boys were anxious to leave, Maly told me, because they needed to make 
money to pay off the monthly interest on her debts.  “We owe so much--- so they have to 
go back….earn money soon so we can pay the interest rates. People were leaving this 
morning, so they left with them too.”  The debt Maly refers to is actually two separate 
loans, one she took out the month prior from a local moneylender for 30,000 Baht 
(approx. 900 USD) which she used to purchase a new Dream 2010 motorbike, and 
another for 5,000 Baht (approx. 150 USD) that she took out this morning to cover the 
cost of her sons’ migration.  Her sons were the driving force behind the motorbike 
purchase, pressuring Maly to take out a loan that would allow them to buy the bike over 
their recent trip home during Khmer New Year.  “I asked why they needed to buy such as 
expensive motorbike, but they just told me not to worry, they would go to work in 
Thailand to pay the loan.  They wanted it so much, and I felt bad for them, so I borrowed 
the money.”  Maly’s husband is gone too, working on a short project for his sister in 
Siem Reap and then probably will return to Thailand and join his sons as well. The 
motorbike, while they are all across the border, sits polished at the top of the stilt house. 
Maly is afraid someone will steal it, so she asked men from the village this morning to lift 
it onto the platforms of the house.  She won’t drive it, she tells me, not only because she 
doesn’t know how to drive a motorbike but also because she has nowhere to go.  She 
used to grow vegetables and make mats to sell in the markets, but these days she stays in 
the village taking care of her youngest child, still in school, and also her one-year-old 
grandchild, whose parents are across the border.  Maly isn’t concerned about repaying the 
loan, though she admits she isn’t happy to be indebted for so long.  “We will gradually 
pay it back, little by little.  But I need them to go work hard.” Because of the loan, she 
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encouraged them to go to Bangkok this trip to work in construction, where salaries were 
higher than in the agricultural job they had previously had just across the border.  
Maly considers her family to be very poor.  If her sons and daughter don’t send 
her remittances regularly, she doesn’t have enough resources to pay for her son’s school 
fees or purchase food for the two of them.   Their only means of making a living in the 
village is the annual rice yield, which has been nearly halved in recent years due to 
drought and flood.  She often resorts to selling her rice stocks for other daily needs, and 
acknowledges that even with the remittances that her family sends home, it can 
sometimes be hard to make ends meet. Without migration as an option for her family, 
Maly understood she would never have been able to take out such a large loan.  However 
her sons willingness to migrate, the examples of success she has seen in her community, 
and her confidence in their ability to be successful over time together allowed her to feel 
confident taking out the loan.   
 Maly’s story is one of the more explicit examples of loans used for consumption 
purpose intentionally financed through migration.  However it was not uncommon in its 
character, or the way that Maly perceived migration and borrowing as mutually enabling. 
While in Maly’s case it was children pushing parents to borrow and promising to repay 
debts through migration, a more typical example, highlighted through the story of Thy, 
worked in the opposite direction.   
 
Thy’s Story 
Thy first went to Thailand when he was seventeen, and was there nearly a year 
before returning home for a short visit. I met him just a few weeks after he had come 
home, and later learned that he returned to Thailand shortly after our conversation.  Thy’s 
life had been influenced by migration since he could remember, with both his parents 
away for varying periods of time since he was four years old.  Often, they migrated 
together leaving Thy and his older brother and sister to stay with relatives in another part 
of the village. When his older sister was old enough, she went with them as well. About 
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five years ago both of his parents returned abruptly.  His father had become severely ill in 
Thailand, and the couple returned home seeking treatment for him. Just after their return, 
before they could even find out the cause of his illness, he passed away. 
Soon after his father’s death, Thy’s mother returned to Thailand with his older  
brother, taking out a loan from moneylenders in the village for their migration. His sister 
had not returned home, and was still working abroad. After several years, Thy’s mother 
and brother returned home and took out a loan to build a new home, something his 
mother had wanted for many years. With the help of extended family, they built the 
house in only five days. The costs were enormous. They first purchased new land for the 
building, which took all of the 12,000 baht they had saved from work abroad.  In addition 
house itself cost more than 100,000 baht.  For these costs, they borrowed 14,000 baht 
from family members with interest and the rest from an MFI in Kralanh. At that time, 
Thy was still in school, but as soon as his mother borrowed for their home he began to 
feel pressure to leave for Thailand. His mother kept saying that she was feeling too old to 
migrate. This made Thy’s older brother anxious, aware that if his mother didn’t migrate 
there would be fewer salaries available to pay back their debts.  Concerned about the 
interest rates if they couldn’t make regular payments, and critical of Thy’s desire to stay 
in school for what he viewed as an education that would lead nowhere, he continually 
pressured his brother to go to Thailand with him.  Thy finally relented and left in the 
middle of his 7th grade school year, migrating with his brother only a few days after 
dropping out of school.   Only a year later, their home debts are all repaid, Thy’s mother 
told me, thanks to the children’s hard work abroad.  With the home debts repaid they 
have now taken out a second loan, this time 20,000 baht for a secondhand motorbike. She 
expects they will pay it back relatively soon, as young people can work fast, and early 
quickly abroad. 
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Migra-Loans and Microfinance 
The experiences of Maly and Thy were not exceptional in my fieldwork. Migrants 
often shared expectations of being consistently indebted. Being unintentionally 
overindebted was regarded as problematic, but migra-loans were often regarded as 
strategic low-risk investments, particularly for parents with children coming of age as 
“young people can earn fast over there.” Remittances were consistently used to repay 
debts, and debt often structured and sustained migration patterns even where migrations 
were not originally taken due to indebtedness. Many of those I spoke with utilized both 
informal (moneylender) loans and MFI loans, using the different types of credit in 
distinct ways. MFI loans were used to finance larger investments such as homes, 
motorbikes, and agricultural purchases, where informal loans were used to specifically 
finance migration, MFI interest payments, or health treatments.  In general, these 
distinctions are because of the limitations built into MFI loans. 
Microfinance providers clearly do not intend MFI loans to finance migration or 
for loans to be paid back through work abroad.  Their policies expressly prohibit loans to 
finance illegal or dangerous activities, 61  and most policies also expressly support local 
livelihoods in their target areas, for example requiring that the borrower be a permanent 
resident of the area, and/or that loans be used for productive investments. Moreover, 
MFIs, while they vary in their stated mission, all assert an interest in sustainable 
development, local livelihoods and investing in micro and small businesses.  Thus loans 
for distress (such as illness or injury) are not granted.  Every MFI provider I spoke with 
either confirmed or implied that their policies would not support financing migration.62  
Reaffirming their compliance with internal polices and best practices, MFI staff made 
                                                 
61 Nearly all migration from Chanleas Dai is irregular, though some individuals register for working 
permits with the Thai government upon arrival. The act of migration is also inherently dangerous, despite 
the fact that those in Chanleas Dai do not always speak about it as such. In 2012 a human rights group 
reported that Thai soldiers killed at least thirteen Cambodian migrants in the first three months of the year 
as they were crossing the border (Kunthear 2012). 
62 Several MFI providers refused to explicitly share their policies with me.  This is not uncommon in the 
MFI industry.  One provider noted that the secrecy around policies and interest rates is related to fears of 
competition.  That said my impression was that there was also a general sense of secrecy because of the 
growing controversy around microfinance in general.  In Cambodia several recent reports have questioned 
whether microfinance is a good thing for the rural poor, noting the prevalence of overindebtedness. 
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clear that they never explicitly or knowingly gave loans for migration, yet each staff 
member I spoke with also underscored that regardless, this happened with some 
regularity.  
Moreover, MFI providers in the area also openly acknowledged the importance of 
migration in allowing for borrowers to utilize their services.  Several noted that migration 
was the most stable and low-risk means of repayment for their rural clients. As one 
manager noted: “Certainly, a lot of people are doing that [i.e. borrowing and then 
migrating].  There are no jobs here, no work to do, so they borrow money and go to 
Thailand….it’s not a problem for us, since they all pay back their loans.”  MFI staff also 
admitted that microcredit loans were also often paid back by family members abroad and 
the remittances of sons, daughters, or brothers and sisters in Thailand, noting this as a 
“successful” strategy of loan repayment.  
This was particularly important, one branch manager noted, since it was not 
uncommon for small businesses by rural farmers to fail.  With limited training, resources, 
and markets, it was often difficult for the small-scale businesses people borrowed for to 
make enough, regularly, to repay loans. Though MFIs in the area told me they rarely had 
repayment problems, they knew that many of their loans were eventually repaid via 
migrations even when a small business was the original intent. As branch officials at two 
MFI’s noted: 
 
“Often, someone will borrow money for a small business venture---livestock or 
agriculture, or something like that.  Then if they are unsuccessful, they have to 
migrate in order to pay the loan back.  It happens like this often”    
 
“It’s not like they tell us they are going, but the loan officers know.  They pass the 
house and it’s all boarded up, the whole family has left.  But it’s not a problem for 
us, as long as they pay back their loans.  What’s important is that the money 
comes back.  Everything else, after we decide to lend, it’s beyond our 
control…It’s not the ideal situation of course, but we can’t control it.  And after 
we’ve made the loan the only issue is whether they can pay back the money, and 
of course they can.” 
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Looking at how this informs our understanding of microcredit, these findings 
suggest the need to further evaluate MFI practices in the context of development goals. 
Migration-financed repayment of MFI loans is not inherently problematic where 
migration is successful and safe.  But this is certainly not always the case.  Where credit 
is extended for large-scale loans, and the potential to earn money back via migration is 
threatened, the resulting over indebtedness could significantly increase households’ 
vulnerability and poverty.63 Moreover, MFI lending where repayment is primarily 
financed by remittances may not be in line with the goals that microfinance providers 
(and their development partners/international donors) are seeking to attain.  To the extent 
that microcredit and migration are used in tandem in other areas, this is a ripe area for 
future research. 
 
Migra-Loans and Migration 
These links also pose both theoretical and practical questions in the field of 
migration. The ways that credit and migration are used in tandem in Chanleas Dai 
underscore a weakness of the migration and development literature to date: its tendency 
to artificially separate migration and its determinants from a more general process of 
social and economic change (DeHaas 2010). For example, past research drawing on new 
economics of labor migration theories suggest that as access to credit expands in rural 
migrant sending areas, local investment will increase and thus curb migration patterns 
(Taylor et al. 1996; Taylor et al. 2003; Massey, Durand and Malone 2002; Rozelle, 
Taylor and DeBrauw 1999). Yet as we see in Chanleas Dai, the factors shaping decisions 
to migrate are the same factors which encourage credit to be used for further migrations, 
and explicitly not for local investment.  The risk of local production makes migration 
desirable and local investment less so.  Thus even when access to credit shifts, it doesn’t 
                                                 
63 Stoll (2010) argues that this is in fact occurring among the Ixil in Guatemala, who borrow money to 
migrate and often struggle to repay loans when migration fails, resulting in increasing vulnerability, asset 
sale, and land loss.  As Stoll refers to this as “ a chain of exploitation that may suck more value from the 
sending population than it returns.” 
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shift the factors which encourage individuals to value alternatives abroad over locally 
based livelihoods.  
While little formal research has highlighted these kinds of connections between 
microcredit (or expanded access to credit) and migration, there are strong indications that 
this pattern is relevant beyond Chanleas Dai and Cambodia.  In particular, research in the 
field of microfinance recognizes that borrowers often rely on household members with 
salaries, including internal and international migrants, to repay loans (Taylor 2011, 
Duffy-Tumasz 2009, Karim 2011).  In Cambodia Chan and So (1999) note that in the late 
1990’s as patterns of migration became more prevalent in border areas many poor 
villagers used NGO credit schemes to finance trips to Thailand, which was clearly not the 
purpose of the credit program. Further afield, Stoll (2010:1) argues that among the Ixil in 
Guatemala microfinance has become a “motor of migration,” both enabling and requiring 
international migrations to the United States. In Andhra Pradesh, India, Taylor (2011) 
argues that microfinance forces the most vulnerable deeper into contract labor, with the 
“compulsions of indebtedness” serving as “primary motivation for migration of all 
forms” (497).  Similarly, in Senegal Duffy-Tumasz (2009) describes how households 
regularly use micro-credit as a cash advance on forthcoming remittances from relatives 
living abroad.  In this context she suggests that micro-credit is not seen as a source of 
cheap credit for business expansion but rather a means of sustain the household in the 
context of uneven remittance payments.  Thus spanning a variety of contexts there is 
evidence to suggest that migration and microfinance can become mutually enabling 
processes. In the next section of this chapter I theorize why migra-loans have become 
prevalent in Chanleas Dai, pointing out why New Economics assumptions may be 
bounded in space and time, less relevant in places like Chanleas Dai than in other 
contexts. However it is useful to first consider alternative explanations, which could 
explain the complementary relationship between migration and credit but still align with 
theoretical assumptions about credit as a driving factor causing out-migration. 
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Is Microcredit Insufficient?  
One way that NELM theorists might explain the mutually enabling relationship 
between credit and migration in Chanleas Dai is by arguing that current MFI and 
moneylender credit are still insufficiently low-cost, or insufficiently accessible. Thus 
credit access is still inadequate to allow for the kind of low-risk borrowing needed to 
promote local investment. There is some support for this argument. Those studying 
microfinance have found that MFI loans often do not reach the poorest households, even 
in areas of high MFI penetration (Coleman 2006; Hulme and Mosley 1996; Mosley and 
Hulme 1998; Conning 1999; Lapenu and Zeller 2001). In Chanleas Dai this is also the 
case. MFI loans typically require collateral and assets of value equal to or greater than the 
size of the loan, making it difficult for those with fewer assets to access formal loans of 
any significant amount. 
Moreover, it may be even where households can access low-cost credit, the 
constraints of microfinance make it less appropriate for the types of agricultural 
production rural households seek out. For example on the basis of research in 
Bangladesh, Pellegrina (2011) suggests that MFI loans are ill-suited for agricultural 
inputs for rural farmers where loan contracts are routinized and inflexible. Similarly, in 
Cambodia while MFI credit is lower cost than most informal credit, MFI require regular 
interest payments that start immediately after the loan, making loans poorly suited for the 
kinds of long-term investments in rice production, animal husbandry, rice intensification 
and crop diversification that rural farmers are most likely to want to invest in.  Where 
would-be migrants are excluded from MFI credit markets, or seek investments that are 
difficult under MFI restriction, they are effectively limited to higher-interest informal 
loans.  These loans may be too costly in terms of interest requirements to effectively 
promote low-risk local investment. 
Finally, NELM scholars might point to microfinance as insufficient because 
interest rates remain high despite their downward trend, leading to vulnerability where 
microenterprises fail. Moreover, there are few checks on overindebtedness, meaning 
households can easily use the same assets for collateral with multiple MFIs. In situations 
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where households hold multiple debts they are unable to repay, or experience business 
failure, they may be required to sell of income-generating assets, leaving them in more 
cash-constrained positions after accessing credit (e.g. Mosely 2001, Phlong 2009, 
Bateman and Chang 2009; Karim 2011). Where interest rates or levels of 
overindebtedness are excessively high, households may be no more able to use credit 
towards productive investments than they are where credit is nonexistent.  
The above suggests that even though credit has become widely accessible, at 
lower-interest rates throughout the rural population, it may not be the kind of low-cost, 
credit that NELM theorizes would contribute to rural development in sufficient ways to 
impact migration. It may also be that because the area still lacks crop insurance, futures 
markets or adequate mechanisms for savings, households still have strong incentives to 
migrate, despite accessible credit. It is possible that these inadequacies are important in 
explaining part of the migration/credit relationship in Chanleas Dai. However my work 
points to an alternative explanation that resonates more powerfully with the lived 
experiences of those in Chanleas Dai.  
 
Alternative Explanations: Risk and Reward of Local Investment 
While the nature of MFI reach and efficacy may be important in understanding 
the potential for expanded credit to impact migration patterns, my work suggests that the 
social context is equally important in mediating the desire for local investment, through 
either credit or savings.  Specifically I argue that NELM understandings of credit as a 
driving force rest on assumptions that may be relevant only for a portion of migrant 
communities, those where rural households perceive meaningful, profitable, high-status 
and low-risk opportunities for local investment.  
Residents of Chanleas Dai express both pessimism about and distaste for financial 
investment in local livelihood strategies, which are seen as high-risk and low-reward in 
comparison to migration. Individuals defend these perceptions by pointing out the 
insecurity the environment, the lack of stable, secure markets for local products, and the 
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relatively low profits that even the most successful local strategy can bring in. Because of 
the potential for flood, drought, crop loss, animal death, and land conflicts, credit put to 
use for local investment is understood as inviting, not mediating household risk and 
vulnerability.
64 
 
In comparison, migration is clearly high reward, and perceived as relatively 
stable. Migrants can earn between 150 and 300 baht per day in Thailand (approx. 5-10 
USD) meaning a couple can typically save 10,000 baht (approx. 300 USD) in a month or 
two abroad. This potential profit is significantly higher than even the most lucrative local 
opportunity. Moreover, despite the inherent risks of irregular migration, those in 
Chanleas Dai have developed successful strategies over time to mediate much of the risk 
of irregular migrations. Migrants and their families feel optimistic about their ability to 
find and keep a job, avoid, and avoid being cheated by employers.  In addition to feeling 
in control over the jobs they can access, they have a clear sense of expected salaries, and 
how much average workers in each sector can save over time. Therefore loans are 
perceived as a relatively unproblematic for households with migrant members. 
Put more simply, in Chanleas Dai the expansion of low-cost credit has not been 
matched with adequate opportunities to use credit in low-risk, consistently profitable 
ways. Thus the best perceived use of newly available credit is to supplement the most 
successful, stable, and desirable strategy—migration. The strong preferences for 
continued migration in Chanleas Dai are also related to the culture of migration that has 
developed in the area, which is partially a consequence of the limited local potential for 
profitable and secure economic activities. Over time migration has become imbued with 
meaning beyond its economic promise, associated with status, modernity, filial 
responsibility, and idealized versions of both masculinity and femininity.  Young men are 
seen as model sons by leaving the education system from a young age to financially 
support their families, and young migrant women are described as more beautiful and 
desirable because of their ability to work indoors or in the shade and thus attain whiter 
skin.  Moreover the regular salary, working hours and days off, ability to participate in a 
                                                 
64 See Fitzgerald and Sovannarith 2007 for examples of this perception in other areas of rural Cambodia. 
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consumer marketplace, and the simple experience of being in the “more modern” world 
of Thailand all contribute to an increased status of migrant workers. In contrast young 
people who stay at home and/or in school, particularly young men, report feeling looked 
down on because of their choice to stay at home. Thus the lack of interest in local 
economic activity is also strongly related to a growing interest in a particular kind of 
lifestyle, one accessed easily through wage labor abroad and impossible to attain in the 
village. 
In this way the migration process itself is critical in understanding how context 
mediates interest in local investment and thus the relationship between credit and 
migration in Chanleas Dai. Those studying cultures of migration note the dynamic ways 
that local preferences, norms, value systems and indicators of status can be shaped by 
acts of migration (Reichert 1982; Massey et al. 1987, Kandel and Massey 2002, Cohen 
2004, Ali 2007). Theories of cumulative causation suggest that over time migration can 
become self-sustaining (Massey 1990). This occurs as “each act of migration alters the 
social context within which subsequent migration decisions are made” (Massey et al. 
1998:45).  Often these shifts can mean that the key driving factors for early migrations 
are substantively different from those which motivate later migrations within the same 
community. As migration becomes normative over time it can be seen as a rite of 
passage, a status marker, or way to participate in consumer lifestyle (Reichert 1982; 
Massey et al. 1998; Kandel and Massey 2002). As a result, in areas where migration has 
become a dominant or normative livelihood strategy even once credit becomes available 
it may not curb migration because a strong culture of migration is already firmly 
established. In other words, the pull of migration as a high-status, “modern” alternative to 
village life may hold such strong desirability that regardless of the potential for local 
investment, it is devalued.  Instead, in such areas expanded credit markets may serve 
primarily to expand or supplement, not to counter, migration as a livelihood strategy.   
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Conclusions 
The stories and discussion presented here unpack the multitude of ways in which 
credit and migration decisions interact in developmentally important ways, through what 
I argue is a mutually enabling process made possible within a strong culture of migration. 
In Chanleas Dai, the increased accessibility of credit, at least in the short term, is not 
serving to stem migration, but rather serving to supplement and facilitate it as a 
livelihood strategy.  Though it is likely that same processes of relative deprivation, 
increased conspicuous consumption, and increased valorization of migration would likely 
occur even in the absence of credit expansion, I argue that in this context easily 
accessible credit actually bolsters this process.  Lower interest rates make it possible for 
even the most destitute of households to borrow for middleman fees.  Moreover, the 
potential to pay back loans via migration of both individuals and family members 
actually prompts households to take out loans that would otherwise not be possible.  Thus 
loans that would have once been seen as impossible or too risky to seek out are given and 
taken with ease, and migrations that would once have been difficult to begin are easily 
financed. The migration streams from Chanleas Dai to Thailand are then inextricably 
linked to the increasingly accessible flow of loans by both informal lenders and 
microfinance institutions.   
A particularly important impact of the migra-loan trend in Chanleas Dai is its 
impact on encouraging youth migration.  In the next chapter I interrogate youth decision-
making around migration, exploring to what extent we can understand migra-loans and 
the relationship between borrowing and migration as encouraging youth migration. 
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CHAPTER 8: UNTIL I GO TO THAILAND 
 
“Knowing is not better than willingness” 
-Khmer Proverb 
 
  In 2009 I sat with the school director of Chap Thmei
65 
one of the primary schools 
in the Chanleas Dai educational cluster.
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 “At the beginning of the school year, we had 67 
sixth grade students,” he told me. “Now, only 34 will graduate.” He pushed his fingers 
into his temples as he described the increasing numbers of 4
th
, 5
th
, and 6
th
 graders who 
had quit school after Khmer New Year to follow their friends to Thailand for work. Some 
of them didn’t even tell their parents, he told me with a grimace.  Their fathers had to 
come to the school asking teachers where their children went.  Later, they found out that 
the students had borrowed money from several different people for fees to pay the 
meekjal who would transport them across the Thai border.  Their parents would be held 
responsible for their debts.  He continued: 
 
“I think we are going to be soon a forgotten village.  There is no one left but the 
very old and the children.  How can we continue to develop like this?  We have 
the World Food Program school breakfasts, we have teachers who come to 
school, we love the students, we have enough classrooms, but still students go to 
Thailand instead.”   
 
The school director considered the growing trend of student migration as central 
to the education challenges he faced at his school, attributing the pattern to the 
generalized poverty within the village, a lack of school scholarships, and few job 
opportunities or alternatives in the area.  Local officials, teachers, and non-profit workers 
throughout the commune reiterated his concern --that widespread migration of youth 
                                                 
65 Name changed 
66 As part of MoEYS policies, primary schools were grouped into clusters, for the purposes of information 
exchange, training, and administration.   
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would inhibit development in the community.  Viewing migration as a “problem,” albeit 
an inevitable one, community members both within and outside of the education sector 
lamented the fact that their villages and schools were being drained of young people. In 
contrast, young people would share with wide eyes their hopes of someday visiting 
Thailand and those who recently returned would share how proud they felt to support 
their families, the excitement of life abroad, and the relative lack of opportunity to build a 
future in the village. 
These contradictory voices underscore critical questions in the field of migration 
and development: how does migration allow for or inhibit the development of human 
capital in sending areas? And underlying this question, what factors structure, mitigate 
and constrain youth aspirations for migration?  Based on interviews and focus group 
discussions with current, former, aspiring and non-aspiring migrant youth, this chapter 
explores youth migration in Chanleas Dai, focused on expanding our understanding of 
how youth migration motivations arise within the context of a strong culture of migration. 
By describing how youth view migration choices in comparison with alternative 
education and livelihood opportunities at home, I explore how a strong culture of 
migration, coupled with the increasing problem of rural debt, shapes and mediates 
potential futures for young people.   
The Cambodian context offers a unique space to consider how a culture of 
migration influences youth decision-making, and the impacts this has on the potential for 
development in migrant sending areas, particularly those in the Global South. The vast 
majority of literature discussing cultures of migration focuses on Mexican migration to 
the United States.
67
 In contrast, the Cambodian case reveals crucial distinctions in how 
cultures of migration can frame youth decision-making around education and the 
alternative of work abroad. Specifically, I argue that in the context of a weak education 
system, strong cultural norms supporting child participation in economic life, and high 
levels of household indebtedness, young people feel compelled towards migration in 
                                                 
67 Notable exceptions include Ali 2007; Connell 2008; Horvath 2008; and Kalir 2005 
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ways that are substantively different, and more constraining, than the migration 
motivations of youth in other contexts.  
The first section of the chapter contextualizes my study by discussing the links 
between international migration, human capital, cultures of migration, and youth, 
exploring why the area where these intersect is an important, yet relatively neglected 
point of inquiry. I then share the stories of several youth migrants, highlighting the 
various meanings that migration holds for rural youth, the constraining factors arising out 
of a culture of migration that promote migration over other alternatives, and the 
competing narratives around pursuing education as an alternative to migration.  
 
Youth Migration 
As discussed in Chapter 2, human capital is one mechanism through which 
migration is expected to contribute to development at home, in part through increased 
investments in education by the children of migrant parents.
68
 However, evidence 
suggests two contrary patterns related to migration and human capital.  While migration 
can allow for greater household income to invest in education, it also sets a powerful 
example for youth, such that they may value or aspire to migration over other viable 
alternatives. Moreover, though remittances may allow for increased education attainment, 
in at least some contexts, a strong culture of migration has been shown to substantially 
mitigate the likelihood of youth investment in education.  
Relatively little research inquires directly into either youth migration patterns, or 
youth aspirations for migration within migrant sending communities. Yet the migration of 
children and youth is a critically important phenomenon, particularly with respect to the 
migration and development dialogue (Tienda et al 2007). Young people under the age of 
twenty represent an estimated 18% of all international migrants from developing 
countries, yet very little research focuses specifically on the unique challenges of youth 
                                                 
68 In this chapter I do not discuss migrant skills gained abroad and put to use back home, which is another 
significant thread of discussion in the migration/human-capital dialogue.   
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and child migration (UNICEF 2010).  Though many young people are migrating with 
families, a significant number of youth are labor migrants (McKenzie 2007).  For these 
young people, in some contexts migrating independently as early as age 13-15, migration 
choices are often made at a crossroads where continued education is a viable competing 
alternative. At this time of transition, choices to continue or stop participating in formal 
education can reduce or expand life choices to a significant degree.  Thus, the large-scale 
migration of young people can alter the human capital landscape of a village 
dramatically. Where youth are making choices between education and migration 
specifically, their choices and processes of decision-making are critical to focus on as 
areas of research. 
Research globally highlights the relationship between economic development and 
education (Schultz 1961; Rao 1964; Lee and Psachaopoulos 1979; Psacharopoulos and 
Woodhall 1985), highlighting the importance of education as means of increasing income 
(Mincer 1972; Blaug 1972; Jencks et al 1979), facilitating higher agricultural output 
(Lockheed et al 1980; Hayami and Ruttan 1970), reducing fertility (Cochrane 1988; 
Jeffrey and Basu 1996), improving health, hygiene and nutrition behaviors (Colclough 
1982), improving income inequality (Tilak 1989), and facilitating other attitudinal 
changes which are related to economic development (Colclough 1982). Thus education is 
universally recognized and firmly established as means of escaping from or remaining 
out of poverty (Tilak 2002).  Recent research also highlights that it is not only primary 
schooling but also secondary education that is important for poverty reduction, improved 
health outcomes, and economic growth (Tilak 2005). 
In Cambodia empirical research, while limited, supports the same finding, 
showing that education matters in terms of wage labor and farm productivity, as well as 
the likelihood of being poor in the future. Findings from the 2004 Cambodia Socio-
Economic Survey suggest that education is related to increased farm productivity and 
greater household consumption in rural Cambodia, that these returns are substantively 
and statistically significant, and that they increase over time (World Bank 2006). 
Consistent with prior national surveys, the CSES also shows that the likelihood of being 
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poor significantly falls with the completion of each successive level of schooling, and 
that parent education has a significant effect on children’s education attainment (World 
Bank 2005). Moreover, adult employee wages for salaried employees are also 
significantly positively related to higher levels of education (CSES 2004). Others have 
noted that in the Cambodian context education is significant in predicting better child 
health outcomes (Miller and Rodgers 2009), higher household expenditures, and 
increased levels of schooling for children (Fujii and Ear 2002). With such significant 
positive returns to education, it is developmentally important to understand the context of 
rural youth migration decisions. Yet there is relatively little research on youth migration 
motivations, in part because the experience of youth migration is often quickly subsumed 
under the category of “trafficking”, or focused on exploitation, thus motivation, or 
agency, are disregarded. 
69 
  
However we know that in communities where migration is common, young 
people often have strong migration aspirations from an early age (IOM 2011; Horvath 
2008; Kandel and Massey 2002; Kandel and Kao 2000). These aspirations are amplified 
within strong cultures of migration, which can be particularly powerful for youth where 
migration becomes perceived as a critical step in the transition to adulthood (e.g. Kandel 
and Massey 2002). Where migration is normative it can structure, valorize and legitimize 
further migrations in powerful ways. This is not to say that migrations are determined 
within strong cultures of migration, but rather, that like all social processes, migration 
patterns are often reproduced and validated by society in such a way that individuals are 
orientated towards particular paths of action.  
In this chapter I show how social context shapes and mediates youth decision-
making in Chanleas Dai.  In doing so, I focus not only on the generalized valorization of 
migration and related pessimistic concern about village-based strategies described in 
Chapter 5, but also on the specific constraints that often make migration feel obligatory 
specifically for young people: namely household debt, cultural norms around youth 
                                                 
69 Pearson 2006 is an example of this type of work in the Greater Mekong Subregion.  
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participation in the household economy, and a lack of meaningful alternatives through 
education. 
 
General Trends and Prevalence 
Empirical studies on migration in Cambodia highlight that a significant portion of 
migrants to Thailand experience their first migration during youth (Jampaklay and 
Kittisuksathit 2009), and that migration is common among children and young people in 
migrant sending regions (ILO 2005; Morris 2007; Acharya 2003). For example in a 
household survey in Banteay Meanchey province, just east of the Thai border and only 
fifteen kilometers west of Chanleas Dai, twenty-eight percent of randomly sampled youth 
had prior experience working in Thailand.  The same survey found that there has been a 
nine-fold increase in the number of school dropouts in the past five years, which the 
researchers related to the increasing prevalence of migration to Thailand. Youth reported 
that the top two factors leading them to leave school were parents needing help with work 
and parents specifically asking them to leave school, presumably also for work abroad or 
at home.  
In Chanleas Dai, recent school drop-out rates offer a general indicator of the 
prevalence of youth migration. Until recently it has been relatively rare for young people 
in the area to move past 6
th
 grade. To do so meant an 8-20 kilometer commute to the local 
secondary school, on an unpaved road that was particularly unforgiving to bicycle tires. 
Moreover, school was costly, as teachers routinely collected informal fees for required 
tests, extra classes, and attendance. In 2009, the government constructed a lower 
secondary school, at the center of the commune, within walking distance or a short bike 
ride for most students.  PEPY, the organization I worked with also began supplementary 
classes and projects at this site, including a Khmer library, English classes, XO computer-
based “creative learning classes” and various other projects. Though over one hundred 
students enrolled in 7
th
 grade in 2009, in April 2010 only two thirds of those returned to 
8
th
 grade.  With one exception, the principal reported that they had all left school to 
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migrate to Thailand.  As reported by school principals, most who finished 6
th
 grade but 
did not continue on to lower secondary school were also in Thailand working.   
Though school attendance and drop-out rates are notoriously manipulated by 
school directors to improve their numbers and/or seek greater national funding, I obtained 
valid recent statistics from one primary and two lower secondary school through NGO 
staff and teachers in the area.70 I asked not only about dropout rates, but also the reason 
given for the student’s drop out, which teachers nearly always knew.  Table 8.1, below 
shows the drop-out rates for each grade from the start of the school year in October 2010 
and its completion in July 2011, with the percentage of students who reported migration 
to Thailand as the cause for dropping out. Though very high, this number likely 
underestimates the importance of migration, as for several students, the alternative 
reasons reported were also, albeit indirectly. For example, several students noted they 
were needed at home to take care of younger siblings or older grandparents, as their 
parents were in Thailand.  It should also be noted that this school has significantly higher 
enrolment and retention rates than lower secondary schools in nearby communes, as a 
result of of PEPY’s NGO programming. Other nearby schools with similar populations 
had a starting Grade 7 enrollment that was less than 30% of the enrollment at Chanleas 
Dai Lower Secondary, and one nearby secondary school was in danger of closing as a 
result of migration patterns and attrition. 
Table 8.1: Chanleas Dai Lower Secondary Drop-Outs, October 2010- July 2011 
 Year Start Year End Drop-Outs % of drop-outs reporting 
migration as cause  
Grade 9 45 35 10 90% 
Grade 8 76 55 20 70% 
Grade 7 117 77 40 65% 
                                                 
70 At others, school directors gave statistics that were blatantly wrong, either noting that no students had 
dropped out, or that only one or two had.  Based on discussions with teachers and my own observations this 
was clearly incorrect.  There are understandable reasons for this dishonesty, as school budgets are given by 
the Ministry of Education, Youth and Sport on the basis of the reported numbers of enrolled and retained 
students.  Thus school directors have incentives to inflate attendance and enrollment figures, and do so 
regularly. 
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Statistics from the primary school (Grades 1-6) indicated lower numbers of out-
migration among students but still noted migration as being the primary reason for drop-
outs.  One area primary school reported that all students who dropped out had migrated to 
Thailand.  At another school, dropout rates for each grade were between 15-25%, 
meaning that a roughly one in four to five students didn’t complete the school year. 
Approximately half of the students who had dropped out in each grade had done so to 
migrate to Thailand, typically with family members.  Moreover, often students would 
finish out the year and then migrate, a pattern that teachers noted was common and led to 
generally shrinking class sizes over the course of primary and secondary school (notable 
in Table 8.1 also). 
 
Youth Aspirations 
As I spoke with young people about Thailand, I found that migration holds a 
variety of diverse and often contradictory meanings for youth . Most commonly, youth 
told me they “had to go”, that there was “nothing for me here”, that “poverty” or “my 
family’s situation” “made me go”.  Yet underneath the oft-cited primary motivation of 
chronic household poverty, youth shared a wealth of factors that prompted their 
migrations.  Often in the course of our conversations they admitted that these secondary 
factors were as or more important than the catch-all “poverty” reasoning that was most 
often given as the impetus for migration.  They also articulated a contradictory love/hate 
relationship with their own migration experiences.  
Migration was “a last resort,” but also “a lucky opportunity”; the “best way to 
wealth,” but also “the only thing we can do here”; a “way to support the family” and also 
a “way to be on my own,” an “alternative to boredom,” a “chance to live an exciting life,” 
“the way we become beautiful,” a “dangerous risk” and also “an easy life,” complete with 
working hours and days off.  Often, it was all of the above within a single conversation.  
As one teenage migrant put it, going to Thailand is “half easy, half difficult; half fun, half 
terrible.”  Though the tension between wanting to remain in the village and the draw of 
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migration pulled differently for each person I spoke with, there was a consistency in the 
way that most youth visualized their future: Thailand. 
In order to show the diverse and ambivalent meanings that migration holds for 
young people, in the next section of this chapter I share pieces of the migration stories 
from youth from Chanleas Dai.
71 
Their contradictory justifications, family situations, 
dreams and migration experiences represent both the thematic similarities and unique 
voices I came across during my research. Each show, in a slightly different way, the way 
that individual desires mix with external constraints, including family expectations, 
household debt, a lack of viable alternatives, and pressures for social mobility via 
migration. By exploring how youth view opportunities abroad in relation to alternative 
education and livelihood strategies, I show how a strong culture of migration shapes and 
mitigates potential futures for young people.  I further argue that this culture of migration 
shapes the potential for development in Chanleas Dai, as young people are encouraged 
towards and then become invested in future migrations rather than village-based 
alternatives.   
 
Phia’s Story 
Phia a 16-year-old, first migrated when she was eleven or twelve, alongside her 
parents who were working in the construction industry. She has been back and forth 
several times since and plans to return shortly. Our conversation was typical of the way 
young people described migration decisions: full of contradiction and a complex mix of 
individual desires and family pressures.   
 
I lived with my parents here in the village, but they wanted to go to Thailand and so 
I stayed with my grandmother for a bit and they went first.  There was nothing for us 
here, so they left…..The first two or three times [that I went to Thailand] I wanted to 
go there myself, but then I didn’t want to go back.  That’s when my parents asked 
me to go, encouraged it again.  I felt bad.  I knew it was unfair; I was living in the 
                                                 
71 The two young people highlighted, Sinut and Phia are each former migrants who were on “breaks” back 
at home, and planned to return soon. 
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village while my parents were out working hard under the sun.  I was eating and 
sleeping and doing nothing else, living happily.  It wasn’t right.  So, I decided to go 
back too…I had no choice and I needed money to buy food to eat….Every year I 
would tell my parents that I wanted to register for school. Each time I saw people 
riding their bikes to schools, I was a little disappointed in myself. I always dreamed 
of getting a high education and then going to work in some business or organization.  
Mostly I feel unlucky----because I didn’t have the chance to finish my studies and 
had to take care of my younger brothers and sisters.” 
 
Phia has migrated both with her family and alone, and has worked alongside 
relatives close to the border, with her parents in Bangkok, and also by herself in the 
tourism industry in Pattaya, working as a cleaner in an upscale hotel.  She’s also been to 
school, though intermittently.  In the past, whenever she has returned for periods of time 
to the village she will join classes, though she thinks she is too old for this now. Phia’s 
initial justification of her migration highlights several important themes, which each were 
common among young people I spoke with: a strong curiosity about Thailand, a 
perceived lack of opportunities for work in the village, and an internalized accepted 
obligation to contribute to the household economy.   
 
Someday You’ll go to Thailand too 
In Cambodia, most children are involved in productive work from the age of ten 
or younger (World Bank 2005; UCW 2006; Chan and Acharya 2002) and within 
households there is a tacit understanding that children have a responsibility to help their 
parents make ends meet. Whether spoken or not, young people in Chanleas Dai are 
clearly expected to contribute to the household economy, in whatever ways their 
particular household makes ends meet, most often helping with farming, taking cows out 
to graze, or looking after younger siblings or household work while parents are away at 
the fields or markets. Cultural expectations and social norms around children’s expected 
contributions hold considerable power in influencing youth decisions when parents 
suggest or encourage migration. It is not uncommon for parents to exert pressure on 
children, either explicitly or tacitly, to support both stability and social mobility for the 
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family. As Vean, the parent of a young migrant, noted parents often “wish their children 
grew up faster” so they could start contributing to the household economy sooner. 
Though youth were often hesitant to directly express to me that their own migrations 
were the result of parental pressure, when I asked about the reasons that other young 
people migrated, the most common response referenced parents’ desires.  For their part, 
parents admittedly encouraged migration, though this was not perceived as exerting 
undue influence or power, but rather an acknowledgement of the household’s situation 
and young people’s responsibilities within it. Savy, the mother of several migrant youth 
who noted she was happy with her school-age children migrating for work, expressed a 
typical justification for supporting her children’s desires to migrate:   
 
“I don’t force them to go.  If they want to go, I will let them go.  It depends on 
them, as I can’t give them any money.  They can make their own decisions.  If 
they want to make money, they can go.  If they don’t want to make money, they 
can stay in the village.  I don’t say anything at all.”  
 
Yet parents’ opinions mattered a great deal, and most youth migrants reported 
some kind of perceived family pressure to migrate, though often indirect.  In contrast, 
those who stayed in school often reported their parents explicitly not allowing them to 
migrate. Where parents exerted influence, in either direction, they were typically 
successful, a reflection on the traditional family hierarchy still present in most of rural 
Cambodia. Most social structures in Cambodia have strong and well-understood 
hierarchies built into them, with power dynamics and expectations a direct reflection of 
one’s position in family, institutional, or social hierarchies (Jacobsen 2008).   
Sobin, a primary school teacher, noted that these influences are understood even 
when, and perhaps especially when, unspoken. For Sobin, the culture of rural Cambodia 
and the low perceived value of education within it means that a parent’s expressed neutral 
position is a tacit push for children to leave school and migrate. Valuing education over 
work and household contribution is simply not the norm.  Therefore saying nothing, he 
believed, is just as effective as explicitly encouraging youth to go.  Moreover, when other 
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influences were openly encouraging youth migration, parents didn’t need to pressure 
youth overtly, since that culture, which parents are highly attuned to, pushes them 
towards Thailand.  He noted: “some people say things [to students] like why do you want 
to study while your parents are working hard in Thailand, working hard for you?  
[Hearing that], of course they want to go.”  Moreover, Sobin argued, many parents show 
their tacit support for migration through a clear example: their absence. He estimated 
forty percent of students in primary schools in the area have one or more parents abroad 
in Thailand and are in the care of extended family.
72 
 
One particular exchange highlighted just how common it was for youth to be 
oriented towards Thailand by parents even from a young age. I was visiting with Sami, 
nineteen and a nursing mother, as she rocked her 6-month-old daughter Mao to sleep.  
Sami had been to Thailand once, when she was just a teenager but her husband, who 
works for a local NGO is against her going again.  “He says I have to choose between 
him and Thailand.  But I think maybe sometime I will still go.”  She laughs as if she’s 
joking, but her comments underscore the strength of her interest and her expectation. The 
conversation was interrupted for a moment, as the baby gurgled and spit and Sami picked 
her up and held her. “Sometimes,” she smiled looking more at her daughter than me 
“sometimes, I sing her to sleep…[by singing] Mao, you will go to Thailand too when you 
grow up someday.”   
That parents suggest, encourage, and influence migration decisions is not unique 
to the Cambodian context. Research with transnational families in the United States 
suggests that adults have considerable influence over when and how children migrate 
(Orellana et al 2002). Moreover, research suggests that families are often strategizing 
collectively through seeking out migration opportunities either with or explicitly for their 
children (Orellana et al 2002).  While traditional western views minimize (and rightfully, 
problematize) the collective interests of families as a category of analysis, collective  
                                                 
72These estimates, or ones close to it were repeated by other teachers and NGO workers. Past research in 
Cambodia research supports that the physical presence of adult parents in the household increases 
children’s propensity to attend school (World Bank 2005). 
 173 
connections and the improvement of a family’s future position as a unit is often vitally 
important in understanding how parents exert influence (Orellana et al 2002).  As 
Orellana et al (2002: 587) note: “Sometimes families may temporarily neglect the needs 
or presumed needs of their children (or, in the eyes of some observers, appear to be 
neglectful) in order to open up possibilities for their futures.”  In the context of Chanleas 
Dai, parents perceive few options for young people beyond Thailand, thus their 
influences are to promote alternatives which will bring more collective status, mobility, 
wealth, and security to households.       
  
People here are Ambitious 
 Alongside Phia’s desire to contribute to the family economy, (and her guilt when she 
was not) she also had individual aspirations of her own which made migration valuable, 
aimed at reducing both real and imagined relative status vis-à-vis friends and neighbors.  
These centered on both economic potentials and non-economic intangibles. Phia planned 
to return to Thailand again shortly, explaining to me “[If] we work here, we can’t earn 
almost anything. I mean we can earn enough to survive; but we can’t afford buying 
houses or other things….People here are ambitious – we want to have more.”    
 Phia’s perception of ambition as central to “the way people are” in the area was 
stressed frequently by young people, with numerous references to the common desires of 
youth to “be as rich as others”; “avoid being looked down on”; “have cool things”; “show 
off”; “buy expensive things”; “build a big house”; and “have as much as others have”. 
These ambitions were only attainable through migration.
73
 However like most research 
                                                 
73 These stated desires are in relatively strong contrast to traditional conceptions of Khmer culture.  In 
2000, the historian Philip Short wrote: “Theravada Buddhism never placed much value on the acquisition 
and consumption of wealth.  [Former King] Sihanouk has recounted the experience of an American aid 
expert in the 1950s who convinced a group of villagers to use chemical fertilizer, promising it would enable 
them to double rice production:  ‘Sure enough, at harvest time, the yield was doubled.  Everyone was 
delighted…[But] when the official came back [the following year] he was horrified to find that each 
peasant had cultivated only half his land.  ‘Why,’ said the peasants ‘cultivate the entire area when you can 
get just as much by cultivating half?’’… Once the peasant farmers he employed had earned enough for the 
year, they stopped work, and neither blandishments nor the promise of more money could make them start 
again.  ‘From their point of view it was logical…Once they had paid their family’s expenses—seed for the 
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that explores the consequences of a dominant culture of migration, my discussions with 
youth highlight that migration is valued both for its potential to bring economic gain as 
well as its non-quantifiable social benefits. Ambition was not only about money, but also 
about worldliness, status, and accessing a more modern life and exciting. Though Phia at 
one point in our conversation told me that all she wanted was to stay in the village, and 
that she “never experienced happiness” in Thailand, for most of our discussion she was 
excited and animated describing her lifestyle abroad.   
 
“It was so exciting that I almost forgot Cambodia.  There were big supermarkets 
like I’ve never seen.  We had jobs, so we always had money in our pockets.  With 
20 baht we could buy whatever we liked-- a cup of ice cream or a piece of cake.  I 
always had 1,000 baht each time I went to the markets.  I sometimes spent all the 
money in one day.  I saw beautiful clothes and foods, so I bought things.   In the 
past I had no money for expensive things like jewelry, but now I have many 
things.  In Thailand we can do whatever we want.  Now, when I think about 
farming, I’m just so tired.  City life is so exciting.” 
 
Phia was clearly proud of the things she could purchase with her wages, noting 
that now she “had money to spend” and had “expensive clothing and jewelry like 
everyone else.”  She was animated, admitting that she often spent everything she earned 
quickly, and talked at length about the stylish things she could find in the markets and 
streets.  Across the village young people typically returned home with trendy Thai 
haircuts, cell phones, stylish clothing, jewelry, piercings, and at times large tattoos.  
Many (by their own description) had whiter skin than before, an indication of beauty and 
status attained by virtue of working and living in the shade.
74
 When migrant youth 
returned, they provided a compelling example for their peers, a visually stunning 
                                                                                                                                                 
next planting; fertilizer; clothing; offerings to the monks; school fees for the children—what would they 
spend it on?  There was nothing more they wanted (Short 2004: 295).  To what extent this is a valid 
interpretation of Khmer culture is arguable, however Short’s interpretation mirrors the way that village 
elders described life from the early 90’s to around 2004, when migration began growing more 
exponentially and influxes of migrant wealth led to greater perceptions of disparity and relative deprivation 
74 Pale or light skin color is often associated with beauty in Cambodian culture, but also is a symbol of 
wealth and status, as it is linked to work indoors, and thus distinguishes those with higher status jobs from 
those working in agriculture. 
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different potential future. Non-migrant young people described their migrating peers with 
hints of awe and respect. Srey Chen, a twenty-two year old non-migrant, comes from a 
family where no one works in Thailand, a result of her parent’s strong will against it.  
Both Srey Chen and her older brother have had migration aspirations, and her brother 
once even packed his things and called a meekjal. However their mother pleaded with 
him not to leave, and after a sleepless night, he decided to stay. Srey Chen never went so 
far as to pack her bags, but when she talks about Thailand her eyes tilt down and her 
words become soft :  “[migrants], they have money, they get to play and hang out at 
night, and they’re beautiful too.  If they work inside in the factory, their skin is so light 
when they come back, you see them so beautiful with money, and you want it too.”   
While home, migrant youth complained about the boring, unexciting food, the 
lack of things to do, the dust and dirt, the distance to the market, and the lack of friends 
and young people around. As one young man put it: “It’s so silent here.  And here it’s so 
dusty that I can’t wear my nice clothes, because they get too dirty.”  Often young people 
reported feeling ill at ease in the village, unsure of how to comport themselves after 
having been in such a different environment.  Parents noticed as well, remarking that 
their migrant children often didn’t know what to do in the village, and didn’t like to 
remain at home very long before returning.   
Similarly, Phia plans to return shortly, ostensibly to help her family earn money 
for a new wooden home, though she admits that in part it’s simply that she wouldn’t 
know what else to do.  She’s missed too much school for that to be an option and she 
wouldn’t know how to make a living in the village.  Thailand is what she knows best, in 
some ways, all she feels comfortable with.  She thinks migration has been good for her 
family, and explicitly tells me they are better off.  Yet she recognizes that she has given 
something up, though I wondered if she was saying this only for my benefit, knowing of 
my role in PEPY’s education programs. “We earn money in Thailand, but we are 
illiterate in return….Nothing is good about migrating to Thailand, except money. We 
learn nothing.”   
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Debts and Headaches 
Research to date focusing on youth and cultures of migration affirms that even 
within areas with a strong migration tradition, where dispositions are shaped by the 
overarching presence of migration, youth exhibit agency to resist migratory pressures. 
75 
Individual agency is also clearly expressed by young people in Chanleas Dai, with a 
substantial minority choosing to remain in school or simply to stay in the village despite 
the pull of peers and “the modern life”, and often at the exasperation of family members 
seeking extra income.
76 
 Yet a complicating factor for many youth is debt; either theirs 
individually of that of their family.
77
 In Chanleas Dai, debt necessarily compels 
migration, as there is little secure potential to earn the kind of regular income that 
monthly (or even annual) interest payments require, except via wage labor abroad or the 
sale of assets, typically a last resort. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, many households in Chanleas Dai are 
indebted, either to village-based moneylenders, microfinance institutions, or both.
78
  For 
some, indebtedness is a result of agricultural shock, illness, or failed migrations.  
However in recent years household loans have also grown increasingly common for 
home construction/renovation and the purchase of motorbikes.  These purchases are 
related to a desire for social mobility; spurred by visible migrant successes and the sense 
that household remittances will be relatively secure sources of income to repay loans.  
They have been made possible through the rapid expansion of microcredit throughout 
Cambodia over the past decade, in a context that Bateman (2010) calls the ideal example 
of a “microfinance saturated country.”  In Chanleas Dai, these newly accessible loans are 
                                                 
75 In a similar vein, research supports that child and youth migration decisions are also expressions of 
agency, rather than passive decisions made by parents and forced on young people (See Iverson 2002) 
76 This had particularly shifted in recent years through the construction of a new secondary school in the 
village and strong NGO programming aimed at young people.   
77 Young people cannot typically borrow either formally or informally until they have families of their 
own.  Yet some youth had loans they understood as their responsibility, for purchases they wanted and 
persuaded their parents to borrow for on their behalf.  
78 Chanleas Dai is no outlier in this respect, high levels of household indebtedness are common throughout 
Cambodian rural areas (Chan and Acharya 2002) 
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typically taken with the explicit intention of being repaid through the migration of one or 
more household members, most often youth.    
Whether indebtedness is a result of a shock or failures, or an intentional choice to 
build a home, household debt leads to tremendous pressure on young people to migrate.  
Parents, when discussing these types of loans, not uncommonly 100,000-200,000 baht 
(3,000-6,000 USD) note that “young people can earn money fast over there” such that 
there is little concern about holding large amounts of debt. Many youth migrants I spoke 
with noted that household debt played a role in their migration in some way, whether 
spurring their initial migration, or serving to sustain it later on.  Chanleas Dai’s culture of 
migration arguably sustains and enables rural indebtedness, as households begin and 
continue borrowing in ways that would be impossible relying only on village-based 
strategies. When village-based strategies (or migrations) fail and households are driven to 
borrow or unable to repay current debts, migration is considered the only viable option to 
regain wealth, or to guard against land or asset sale.  
This then also shifts the opportunity for youth agency- constraining choice such 
that young people feel compelled towards migration in powerful ways, related not only to 
peer or status pressures but also to household obligations.  One young man noted that 
even being at home for a short break made him anxious, knowing the debts of his mother 
continued to rack up interest while he spent time at home without a wage. “I can’t sleep 
well here. I always have a headache when I think of [our debt].” Another young woman, 
commenting on how her spending habits in Thailand have led to an initial migration debt 
spiraling out of control, noted that she felt like she would be migrating forever, “paying 
back debts until my head is bald.” 
Parents often encouraged children to migrate to repay household debts, sometimes 
subtly, at other times more explicitly. Leat, in her mid-40’s has three children, all of 
whom are now in Thailand.  The family has two hectares of land, but with the high costs 
of fertilizer and two years out of the past three where drought and flood led to crop 
failure, she went to Thailand a few years ago to repay her debts, alongside her husband 
and oldest son.  Once they had paid back loans and saved a bit, they returned home and 
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constructed a new house, costing in total more than 100,000 baht (3,000 USD).  Half was 
paid through saved migration money and the sale of two prize cows, and Leat borrowed 
the rest, an advance on the remittances she knew her children would quickly earn.  Leat 
encouraged their two daughters to go to Thailand with the rest of the family to help repay 
the loan more quickly.  While the younger daughter complied, the oldest fought her 
mother, continuing to ride her bike to the lower secondary school each day.  Leat gave 
several tsks when she told me about her strong-willed oldest daughter and her aspirations 
for education.  In this case, Leat eventually got her way.  After a period of time, and 
explicit pressure from the family, her older daughter left school and followed the rest of 
the family abroad.  With several sets of hands working and earning, they repaid their 
initial debts quickly.  Leat, now back in the village permanently, has continued to borrow, 
“for this and that” she says, including additions to the home, several pigs, and food.  Her 
children and her husband continue to remit money home to repay the principal and 
interest rates on her loans. 
Even when debt doesn’t specifically compel migration, it often ensured its 
continuation.  Sinut, in his mid-twenties, is younger than me but jokes that his face looks 
so much older than mine.  It’s true that his face shows more stress and years in the sun 
than it should for his age. He smiled as he told me “I think I look old because I’m always 
carrying heavy things.  That work, it’s like it sits on my face.” While he is being literal, 
Sinut also carries a metaphorical burden of debt.  He has migrated more times than he 
remembers, beginning when he stopped schooling in Grade 5 and migrated only weeks 
after. Overage for his grade, he thinks he was sixteen or so at the time. He acknowledges 
that there was an implicit assumption that his family expected him to migrate once he 
was old enough to earn, but also tells me that it was something he wanted for himself.  
“It’s both, he said. “When we see others earning money, we want to earn some money 
too.”  Shortly after Sinut started migrating alongside his brothers and sisters, his parents 
built a new house, primarily financed through two loans; one informal loan mortgaging 
their rice fields for cash to a local moneylender and another through a microfinance 
institution in Kralanh.  Building their home ensured Sinut’s continued migration, as he 
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understood that repaying the debts depended on his and his siblings work abroad.  “If we 
don’t go to work in Thailand, we will become slaves
79
….These days we’re all borrowing.  
And then there’s nowhere to earn, only in Thailand.” 
Recent increases in large-scale household borrowing are related to patterns of 
migration, but are also influenced by the growing ease of borrowing in the area, through 
the recent and rapid expansion of Cambodia’s microfinance sector. Area microfinance 
organizations, actively seeking portfolio expansion, encourage household borrowing, 
regardless of how funds are repaid. While unable to explicitly encourage the migration of 
borrowers as a debt-repayment scheme for loans, loan officers considered the migration 
of borrowers’ children a “successful strategy” for loan repayment.  One sub-branch 
manager of an area MFI reported that in one of the villages in the commune 70% of his 
borrowers had children working in Thailand to help repay loans, noting this as a positive 
example of strategic borrowing. 
Like the vast majority of others in the community, Sinut has no intention of living 
and settling in Thailand. “I’d be homesick,” he says.  “I’d miss the fields, my parents, 
everything.”  Yet he imagines he will keep going for the rest of his life.  “I suppose I’ll 
go until I can’t work anymore, (laughs) then, I’ll have to stop.” Yet he clearly appreciates 
the ease of life abroad.  He spoke at length about the running water, the electricity, the 
lack of need to cut firewood, the cleanliness, the feeling of participating in something 
modern, and the general simplicity of life.  Even after nearly a decade of travel between 
Thailand and Cambodia, he still spoke as if he could hardly believe the difference 
between his experiences abroad and the current realities he saw around him in the village.  
“Every vegetable is available in every season …there is shade everywhere and you can 
get everything you need no matter where you are. The rural areas are just like the cities.”  
While his wife used to make mats and grow vegetables, now they just rely on the 
harvest and Sinut’s work abroad. In her option, the other small, piecemeal work she used 
to do doesn’t seem profitable enough to be worth the work. The family holds just half a 
                                                 
79 A reference to the potential loss of land if he cannot pay back loans 
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hectare of rice fields, and after eight years abroad, Sinut still has only the most basic 
equipment for farming, no food security for his family in the village, no toilet or water 
filter, and relies on pump water from about a kilometer away. But he feels migration is 
improving his life. Just on his last return home, this month bought a 1,600 dollar 
motorbike—a Honda Dream 2010.  When I asked what it was for he smiled and told me 
“To ride. To go to the market, or to go around the village”.  Sinut says he’s saved for a 
long time for this---when he goes to Thailand his folks will keep the motorbike at the 
house for him.   
 
I’ll keep studying and then I’ll go to Thailand 
A further issue constraining the perceived choices of young people is the context 
of Cambodia’s education system. Two diverging narratives, both affected by migration, 
framed discourses around education among young people in Chanleas Dai and their 
parents. The first highlighted the promise of education, but the difficulties in achieving it; 
pointing to the high cost of schooling, the difficulty of success on national exams, and the 
competing needs families had for youth to work, pay back debts, or help out around the 
house.  Education was considered valuable, but not accessible given the high costs, and 
the rest of the demands of daily life, particularly debt.  A second, competing narrative, 
(one less commonly articulated outright), viewed education as yet another non-viable 
strategy, promoted by governments and NGO’s but of no use in actually providing for 
mobility or leading to jobs. These discourses focused on the low quality of teaching and 
the lack of available jobs even for those who did complete education.  They also 
highlighted that few jobs were as lucrative as work abroad. 
Looking at examples of graduates from the village, there was some truth in both 
narratives.  Clearly education was associated with the ability to get a job.  Those with 
jobs in Siem Reap or in the village with schools or NGOs held at least 9
th
 grade 
certificates, if not 12
th
 grade degrees.  Most government posts required higher education, 
and it was difficult obtain one of the few paying jobs in the district without some level of 
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education.  Yet while those with jobs typically had credentials, credentials didn’t mean 
immediate or ideal jobs. Twelfth grade graduates of the local high school often completed 
their education and returned to the village jobless, remaining so for months, and at times 
years. Most commonly, they were aspiring teachers, but it was nearly impossible to pass 
the national teacher exam and several students had tried and failed multiple times. While 
higher skills did lead to a wider option of jobs, the links to finding and attaining those 
jobs were elusive, slow, and often costly.  Moreover, even the jobs one could get with 
education in the area didn’t compete in terms of salary with what one could make doing 
manual labor across the border.  As one 6th teacher lamented, his drop-out students, 
without a primary education could make more money in a month than he could after ten 
years as a teacher. 
Thus while education was understood as desirable and a means towards long-term 
mobility, it was simultaneously regarded as a risky, problematic investment. 
80 
Together, 
these two narratives structured most decisions prioritizing migration over continued 
education.  Even students who described themselves as motivated to achieve a high 
education and those with NGO or government scholarships often chose to migrate rather 
than complete a lower or upper secondary degree. Where students did continue their 
education, there was often a sense that this was simply delaying the inevitable. Sary, one 
of the three young people studying in high school in her village shared with me her 
dreams for the future.  “I really want to continue my education” she began.  “It is 
important for me and I love studying.  I’ll study until I finish grade 12, and then I’ll go to 
Thailand.”  Her mother, who had just expressed her frustration to me that her daughter 
was still pursuing her education, nodded approvingly. 
Many youth migrants recognized that dropping out of school limited their choices, 
at times expressing regret. One young man, who dropped out in 7
th
 grade, returned home 
and told his teacher he had chosen the wrong path, “trading fun for his future” as reported 
                                                 
80 International discourses mirror the competing narratives above and highlight the problematic nature of 
the relationship between education and labor opportunities: that job creation requires high skilled 
individuals yet that high skills won’t become valuable until they are complemented by expanded, decent 
job opportunities. (See Morris 2007 for an example of this type of discourse). 
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by his teacher. The teacher tried to convince him to return to school, but the student felt it 
was too late, as he was too old for his grade now and had missed too much.  Another 
young woman, Serei, who had reached 9
th
 grade before dropping out put it this way  
 
“[migration] is cool, but just for a short time.  When we study, it’s for a long time.  
When we finally get to do something, it is really something.  It’s like a plant.  The 
ones who go to Thailand is like planting morning glory, or spinach where we get a 
quick result but it’s finished quickly.  For the ones who study, it’s like planting a 
mango tree.  When it grows up, it becomes fruitful.  Even if we don’t water it, it 
still provides.”   
 
Certainly, the problem of school attrition is not only present in migrant 
communities. Primary and secondary school attrition is common across rural Cambodia,
81 
and work, either at home, in another province, or abroad often pulls children away from 
school.
82
 Yet the decision-making frames around completing school vs. work in 
communities where migration is a viable, common alternative is substantively different in 
several important ways. Research in Cambodia increasingly shows that in rural 
communities young people can and often do participate in both household/agricultural 
work and schooling together successfully (Kana et al 2010). Thus as quality of education 
improves and incentives to complete education increase, we might expect to see higher 
levels of school retention, without problematic trade-offs to children’s ability to 
contribute to the household economy.  In other words, where they are incentivized to both 
complete school and contribute to household work, children often manage to do both with 
relative success.  Yet this navigation is near impossible when work expectations are 
abroad.  
Moreover, the potential for social mobility through migration and the status 
associated with work abroad substantively change the perceived trade-off of education, 
                                                 
81 National data from CSES in 2004 indicate that while school enrolment has increased since the 90’s, 
rates of primarily and lower secondary enrolment remain low, at 76 percent and 16.4 percent respectively 
(Kim 2009).   
82 In both 1999 and 2004 children’s work activities were the most frequent reason for non-attendance (Kim 
2009).   
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and clearly matter to young people. Where uneducated youth can make a higher salary 
than the typical high school or college graduate in Siem Reap, there is little incentive to 
invest time and resources into formal education. 
Increased disparities of wealth with in the village and the resulting feelings of 
relative deprivation also matter, not only for youth but also for parents and the way they 
orient and promote particular choices for their children.  That relative deprivation matters 
for education has been empirically verified through the World Bank’s 2005 finding that 
in Cambodia school drop-out rates are higher in communes with higher levels of 
inequality (World Bank 2005). 
 
Conclusions 
This chapter has argued that social context shapes youth decision-making in 
Chanleas Dai, not only through the generalized valorization of migration, but also 
through specific social, cultural and economic constraints youth perceive as obligating 
migration; namely household debt, cultural expectations around child contribution to the 
household economy, and a lack of meaningful alternatives through education.  These 
findings complicate common perceptions and expectations of how households seek to 
invest in children through education.  In 1998, Basu and Van published an article in the 
American Economic Review hypothesizing what they called the “luxury axiom” 
according to which parents send their children to work only if poverty forces them to do 
so, and when given the choice would always opt for educating their children. As they 
note:  
“children's leisure or, more precisely, nonwork is a luxury good in the household's 
consumption in the sense that a poor household cannot afford to consume this 
good but it does so as soon as the household income rises sufficiently.” (Basu and 
Van 1998: 415) 
 
International organizations in Cambodia suggest that parents use a similar rational 
calculus of decision-making: 
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Even if parents are in favor of educating their children, their decisions are likely 
to be influenced by the given labor market returns to education. When making 
choices, parents also consider the relationship between education outcomes (e.g. 
years of education completed) and schooling time, as well as the supply and 
quality of school inputs…Parents must finally adjust their choices to what the 
household can afford at a given point in time, particularly if access to credit is 
limited. (World Bank 2005: 50, emphasis added) 
 
When I began my research, I expected to find a similar pattern with regards to 
youth migration in Chanleas Dai.  I assumed that children would migrate only when it 
was necessary for the survival of their family, and that adult migration likely was used as 
a strategy to promote education or opportunities for younger generations.  What I found 
was a much more complex and nuanced picture, one in which children’s dreams and 
desires, consumption and debt, parent’s networks and past migrations, peer pressure, 
education quality, and environmental realities encouraged the sustained migration of 
young people.  Poverty, and its counter of krop (enough, sufficiency) were self-defined, 
relative, and significantly influenced by migration.  Moreover, instead of credit allowing 
access to education and consumption smoothing to allow youth to remain in school (an 
expectation implied by the World Bank quote above), credit access often spurred the 
migration of young people, encouraged to migrate to pay back household debts.    
These findings resonate with recent research on child work and schooling in 
Cambodia. Kim (2009) notes that while child work is common across Cambodia, children 
from wealthier households began working at earlier ages than those in the lowest wealth 
quintiles.  Moreover, households with more land were more likely to have higher rates of 
child work.  Kim argues that with reference to the child work and poverty discourses, this 
suggests a disconnect between the “conventional wisdom”83 of policy makers and the 
realities of rural families, arguing that Cambodian policy makers overestimate the extent 
to which child work or child labor is driven by poverty.  
My work suggests a similar disconnect.  While youth migration is at times a 
response to severe distress and poverty, the argument that youth migration is obligated 
                                                 
83 Galbraith 1958 
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primarily by poverty simplifies a much more nuanced and complex reality.  Rather, as I 
have shown in this chapter, youth migration is linked to a web of social expectations, 
cultural norms, and individual desires. Young people express strong ambivalences 
towards migration, pointing out the benefits they enjoy while abroad but also the 
perceived lack of alternatives they have beyond Thailand.  Most articulate that their 
migration choices were constrained, not by an objective level of poverty but by a web of 
interconnected orientations: their individual desires for money, status and a more modern 
life; the social expectations of parents around contributing to the household economy 
whether for survival, stability, or social mobility; the anxiety around increasingly 
common household debts; and perceptions about a lack of meaningful alternatives 
through education or village-based production. The availability of migrant remittances 
and “easy money” from short-term work in Thailand strengthens this disposition, leading 
to strong pressures for consumer goods, the accumulation of family debt and parental 
encouragement of youth migration to help pay for debt principals and interest, possible 
only through migration. Even where alternatives may be present and possible, they are 
perceived as temporary, risky, or less ideal because of the social and cultural context 
around education, child work, and debt.  
Thus beyond the compelling draw of modern life and valorization of wage labor 
abroad, youth often migrate in the context of very constrained alternatives. As livelihoods 
have become more precarious in the village, migration is seen as the least risky 
alternative.  At the same time, as migrations are successful, feelings of relative 
deprivation and desire for social mobility via migration encourage continued migration, 
and often continued borrowing. This culture of migration has implications not only for 
the persistence of migration patterns but also for the potential that migration has to 
contribute to the development of human capital in migrant sending areas. 
  Certainly, human capital is not built exclusively through formal education.  
Migration could, and in some ways certainly is building the human capital of adult and 
youth migrants alike.  While working in Thailand, most people acknowledged that they 
have learned new skills, many of which are relevant in their home communities.  Often 
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young people learn Thai to a functional fluency, and can use this skill to gain better 
positions and jobs within Thailand or in border areas of Cambodia.  Many also learn 
practical skills such as pig farming, pineapple planting, or cooking which can then be 
used in the future in different capacities. Yet these skills are valuable for sending 
communities only in as much as they are recognized and put to use upon return. During 
my fieldwork I saw rare examples of this among young people.  In an insightful example, 
during a focus group discussion with teenage migrants home for the Khmer New Year 
holiday, I asked six young people to describe to me some of the skills they had learned in 
Thailand during their time there. “I haven’t learned anything” one girl told me.  When I 
probed about the work she had been doing, and asked if any of these skills were new to 
her, she admitted that there were things she had learned.  “But nothing that would be any 
use here,” she countered.  “Even if it’s the same thing, that I could do here, it’s not 
possible to make a living doing anything here.”  Her friend, a young man who had 
returned from a year working as a cement mixer in Bangkok countered that he had 
learned some new things.  “Before, I didn’t know how to dance or how to dahling (hang 
out, or play).  I didn’t know how to drink either.  Now I know,” he laughed, and 
instigated a fit of giggles from his peers. The extent to which young people see little 
meaning or potential in the skills they have learned, besides to dance and dahling, 
highlights their focus on migration as an end in itself, not a means to any kind of alternate 
end.   
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CHAPTER 9: LOOKING ELSEWHERE 
 
“If you plant mangoes, you cannot get papayas” 
-Khmer Proverb 
 
In Chanleas Dai both migrants and non-migrants are continually negotiating 
migration choices: to go or to stay, when and for how long, how to spend remittances or 
migra-loans, how to justify remaining at home, and how to ensure that household goals 
are met either through migration or some alternative. Within these discourses, migration 
is generally valued beyond its economic potential for a complex web of reasons: the 
perceptions of the village as a non-productive and relatively risky space for investment, a 
culture of migration that confers status and position to migrants, a widening gap between 
wealthier and poorer households that incites shame and leads to increased desire for 
consumption, a growing access to credit allowing for (and explicitly encouraging) this 
type of consumption but requiring wage labor to sustain it, and a strong desire for wage 
labor, to the point that doing nothing is often preferable to the types of small-scale 
piecemeal livelihoods tradition to the area.   
Given these perceptions and goals, the most feasible livelihood strategies are 
perceived as elsewhere; that is, anywhere besides the village.  In the case of Chanleas 
Dai, that elsewhere is Thailand.  In the case of other similar rural communities around the 
country, it is Phnom Penh, Vietnam, or the garment factories of in Kandal and Takeo. 
While Chanleas Dai is relatively exceptional in the scope of its migration, its experiences 
of environmental distress and in its relative remoteness to urban centers, I expect that it is 
an illustrative example representing a multitude of similar communities both within and 
outside of Cambodia, particularly those characterized by low levels of infrastructure, 
economic or environmental marginality, weak education systems, and poor infrastructure. 
While explicitly and solely about Chanleas Dai then, this dissertation is not only 
the story of one community’s culture of migration.  Rather, it is a story of how migrants 
and non-migrants are influenced by both the local and the global as they seek out security 
and status in communities where local livelihoods are precarious.  By highlighting 
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migrant and non-migrant perceptions of education, investment, consumption and 
borrowing, I have argued that social context is critical in understanding how migration 
decision-making. When migrants make choices; about migration, about consumption, 
about productive investment or education etc., they consider not only the risk, insecurity, 
status, and reward of leaving, but also the risk, insecurity, status, and reward of local 
alternatives. This can vary dramatically over both space and time, and can be quite 
dynamic.  However better accounting for the role of context in mediating decision-
making is critical we want to better understand either migration choices or the impacts of 
migration on development. 
In my introduction I stated that this case study sought to explore situations where 
the realities of local experiences are contrary to what existing theory would predict. In 
this concluding chapter I return to this idea, clarifying some of the disconnects between 
theory and the lived experiences of migrants in Chanleas Dai, and using these disconnects 
to argue that a more complete understanding of decision-making processes is important in 
understanding the potential for development in migrant communities. 
 
Present, Perceived, Preferred Alternatives 
Much work focused on migration and development makes arguments and 
recommendations which build on the assumption that households will see their rural 
communities as places able to support and sustain productive investments. Thus typical 
recommendations from both academics and policy makers focus on making migration 
work for development through improving the quality of institutions, based on the belief 
that the best way for governments to ensure growth through migration is to ensure that a 
greater proportion of remittances are channelled effectively back to local investment 
(Catrinescu et al 2009).  In Maltoni’s (2010) report on Cambodian migration for example, 
the policy recommendation highlights that governments could improve the situation of 
migrant workers by focusing on legalizing the status of temporary migrants, giving acces 
to formal banking channels and improving economic and business environment at home.  
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Where migrants can retain more of their earned income, and more easily put it to use 
productively at home, migration will have more lasting positive impacts on households 
and communities. Similarly, Hing et al (2011) recommend agricultural assistance (rice 
intensification, crop diversification), strengthening public services, development 
assistance and microfinance services for areas of high migration. 
Hopefully the work of the preceding chapters has led readers to problematize the 
simplicity of some of these recommendations for places like Chanleas Dai, based on how 
they resonate with migrant and non-migrant perspectives, and how relevant they are for 
remote or environmentally distressed areas. Certainly legalizing the status of workers and 
improving financial services such that migrants can retain greater portions of their wages 
can mediate some of the inherent vulnerabilities and risks of irregular migration. Yet the 
efficacy of programs aimed at expanding access to formal banking services, or improving 
economic and business opportunities at home will only be as effective at encouraging 
productive investment in as much as they line up with household preferences, perceptions 
of risk, and the realities of resource, land access, and environmental patterns. This isn’t to 
suggest that the above are poor policies, but rather to suggest that programs which simply 
seek to make local productive investment easier (small-scale agriculture training, 
microfinance, etc.) without challenging the risk, low-profit, or low status involved in 
these pursuits are unlikely to sufficiently challenge local distaste for them.  
Put simply, migration and remittance spending decisions are intimately connected 
to the alternatives present, perceived, and preferred for individuals at home. Policies tend 
to focus on the former, shifting what options are present without being adequately 
concerned with how new alternatives are perceived and preferred. This is a critical area 
for reflection as there is evidence of migrant sending communities around the globe 
similar to Chanleas Dai in their character, where the there is a local consensus that 
investing in that which is local is impossible, worthless, or unwise.  In a study of Cape 
Verde, Carling and Akesson (2009) note the general local perception of “nothingness” of 
the homeland, a result of environmental “god-given conditions” that made upward 
mobility impossible.  In that context, the authors argue that migration decision-making 
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“was not about possibilities for ‘making it’ in Cape Verde. On the contrary, it was 
presented as a choice between settling with modesty, within the limits permitted by the 
land, and yearning for what is seen as impossible on the islands.”  Kalir (2005:176) 
writes about similar sentiments in Ecuador, discussing the “prevailing consensus about 
the hopeless situation of their country” a sentiment that was not based only on a harsh 
economic condition, but rather informed by the sense of relative deprivation and the 
material benchmarks set by former successful migrants. 
 Hope, hopelessness, and the potential reward perceived in migration alternatives 
will necessarily mediate any policy initiative aimed at discouraging migration, mediating 
vulnerability, and/or encouraging local investment and production.  Over the course of 
my time in Chanleas Dai I encountered several compelling examples of this type of 
conflict, where policy or aid initiatives aimed at development intersected with local 
perceptions that problematized the intended outputs of those initiatives.  In each case, 
what our theories of migration or development might have assumed was strongly 
mediated by the culture of migration present in the area.   
 
Credit: Risky Business 
Credit is the area of disconnect which I have discussed most extensively in this 
work.  Microcredit in rural Cambodia is widely touted by NGOs, government, and 
microfinance organizations as a livelihood enhancing tool, meant to provide households 
with greater opportunities to expand production or to diversify income sources through 
entrepreneurship. Moreover well-accepted theories of migration argue that expanding 
access to credit within migrant sending areas will likely mediate the need for out-
migration. Yet whereas microfinance institutions, migration theories, and policymakers 
expect credit to expand the potential of local investment and entrepreneurship, my data 
suggest that individuals in Chanleas Dai see credit as primarily of use in supporting 
migration-based strategies, and perceive borrowing as highly risky when it is not 
accompanied by the migration of a household member. Though the number of MFIs in 
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the area and their loan portfolios have risen consistently over the past ten years, this has 
done little to encourage households in Chanleas Dai to invest in local production instead 
of migration.  In contrast MFI saturation and migration rates have risen in tandem 
according to local officials. As these chapters have shown, this has led to many 
households putting migration and borrowing to use as complementary livelihood 
strategies.  Rather than being perceived both as diversification or investment strategies, 
both migration and borrowing are seen as strategies of coping with a lack of local 
alternatives, with one often requiring the other.   
Perhaps the best way to understand why credit and migration have grown to be 
mutually enabling processes, rather than supplements as some theories would suggest, is 
in terms of relative risk.  Migrant sending areas vary dramatically in terms of their 
infrastructure, envirnmental factors, demographics, culture, value systems, and labor 
markets, all of which organize the decisional context within which households choose 
livelihood strategies.  In some areas, investing in what is local, regardless of credit access 
or infrastructure is far more of a gamble than the inherent risk of work abroad.  Others 
have made this point explicitly as well:  
  
“What seems essential is that remittances, just like any other source of additional 
income, potentially give migrants, households and communities greater freedom 
to concentrate their activities and to allocate investments to those economic 
sectors and places that they perceive as most stable and profitable. Thus, 
depending on the specific development context at the sending end, remittances 
may enable households to retreat from, just as much as to invest in, local 
economic activities…. Under unfavorable conditions remittances may hardly lead 
to investment and development, but instead to a retreat of migrants and their 
families from social and economic activities in the sending countries simply 
because remittances give them the freedom to do so (De Haas 2005: 1275).” 
 
In Chanleas Dai, my evidence suggests that migration has allowed for a retreat 
from local economic activities, as migration is understood as more stable and profitable 
than that which is based on land, education or local markets. Scholars of rural 
development and those studying the peasant economy have long argued that rural 
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households are risk averse, and as a corollary, that the differential risk of particular 
investments or strategies will have an impact on their likelihood of being used 
(Binswanger and Sillers 1983; Katz and Stark 1986). In many cases, this means that 
strategies which might be perceived as lower risk, such as wage labor, might be chosen 
by individuals or households even when they are not as profitable in the long run as 
higher risk options, such as entrepreneurship or crop diversification (Morduch 1994).  
Yet these lessons have not been adequately incorporated into the policy prescriptions, and 
theories of migration and development, which often implicitly suggest that migrants will 
make productive investments in village based strategies, without adequately 
problematizing how and to what extent local investments are understood as stable, risky, 
or meeting local development goals.  
This disconnect is particularly apparent in the oft-repeated suggestion that 
expanding access to credit could serve to stem migration.  For example Rozelle, Taylor 
and DeBrauw (1999) suggest that reforming the formal rural credit sector may mitigate 
household members’ propensity to migrate, in particular as credit would allow alternative 
means of financing farm investments (see Massey Durand and Malone 2002; Taylor et al 
1996 for similar suggestions).  This type of recommendation rests on the assumption that 
farm investments are a household goal, and also that the combination of loans and local 
investment is a low-risk strategy, relative to migration. Certainly there are many places 
where this assumption may be correct.  However there are also many areas where these 
assumptions may be critically flawed, either because of environmental factors, a lack of 
markets, a culture which valorizes wage labor over piecemeal livelihood strategies, or the 
limitations of credit programs themselves. In fact, a growing body of evidence in the field 
of microfinance suggests that the poor will be most likely to borrow for coping or 
protection, given the insecurities they perceive around borrowing for future based 
investments (Hulme and Mosely 1996; Khandker 2005).  Connecting these two fields of 
study offers compelling evidence that the connections between access to credit and 
migration are strongly mediated by context. 
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My research highlights that in Chanleas Dai, rather than being perceived as a 
strategy to mitigate risk, credit is understood as often increasing household risk and 
vulnerability.84 Moreover, my work suggests that individuals largely use and understand 
both credit and migration as means towards something other than local production and 
investment, in part because of the inherent risk perceived in any kind of village-based 
investment and also because of the status afforded to migration. In this case, 
understanding the relationship of either microcredit or migration to livelihood 
improvement requires a nuanced analysis of decision-making, based on both the 
opportunity structure around local production, and the differential risk of local production 
versus migration.  
 
Agriculture: Risk and Control 
Agriculture is another area where development ideals and the culture of migration 
present in Chanleas Dai highlight a policy vs. perception disconnect. Research on 
environmentally forced or motivated migrants has made the suggestion that aid projects 
around adapted land management techniques at home may be important in mediating the 
kind of vulnerability the causes migration (Renaud et al 2011).  Similarly, increased rice 
production, and the expansion of small scale agriculture is widely regarded as a key to 
national development policy in Cambodia, and a means of addressing environmental 
vulnerability (MoE and UNDP 2011).   
Agriculture programs were ever-present in Chanleas Dai and over the past decade 
a wide range of government and non-governmental programs have been implemented in 
Chanleas Dai in attempts to develop and expand agricultural output. Mainly these 
programs have focused on techniques for improved rice yield, sustainable farming 
practices, crop diversification, and strategies for marketing products. Yet as discussed in 
Chapter 5, most people have a pessimistic perception of local agriculture, related to both 
the number of environmental shocks over the past decade and the inadequacies of local 
                                                 
84 See Fitzgerald and Sovannarith 2007 for examples of this perception in other areas of rural Cambodia. 
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markets and infrastructure to guarantee the profitability of investments. Thus migration, 
and the corresponding disinterest in more risky, less profitable village based strategies 
has been a main challenge to the success of each of these projects. The discourses around 
the local NGO development projects in the area offer another means of understanding 
how migrant and would-be migrant households perceive local livelihood strategies and 
environmental distress in relation to migration.  
One of the most holistic and long-term projects in the area was an international 
NGO focused on water, sanitation, and food security. As part of their project, the 
organization worked to train model farmers, doing projects of rice intensification and 
crop diversification with motivated individuals interested in improving their own food 
security.  The goal of the project was to have several model farmers who over the course 
of the year would be successful in ventures often viewed as risky.  Model farmers were 
given seeds, resources, and training and were to become de facto teachers and models of 
success for others interested in learning from the same techniques. Though official 
reports show success in higher rice yields and vegetable production, commune officials 
argued that these programs were only effective at influencing the model farmers 
themselves, and had little impact outside of the households who received the free seeds, 
training, and materials.  While the reasons behind the lack of adoption were complex, 
NGO officials noted that a major factor was the inability of the programs to mediate 
environmental insecurity, since they did not include structural improvements that would 
allow for irrigation or decreased reliance on rainfall. In good years, model farmers did 
significantly better than those using traditional techniques, but in years of flood or 
drought they lost similar percentages of their harvest.  In contrast, those who migrated 
over the same period of time often had much more visible and impressive financial 
success.  
Because of these challenges, a commune official shared that the relationship 
between farmers and agriculture programs was generally tense. At a meeting with 
commune officials and a new agriculture organization doing a needs assessment, one 
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officials mused about whether they could even find interested model farmers to commit 
to remaining in the village through the length of any new project.  
Most plans to improve local production were relatively unsuccessful; “failures” he 
called them.  However he didn’t blame the projects themselves for these failures. In 
contrast, he believed that agricultural development programs were limited in their 
potential for success as a result of the harsh environment, and the availability of easier, 
more secure wages abroad.  Most people had already started looking to Thailand for 
easier ways to make money, he argued, a mindset that was only narrowed when flood, 
drought and crop failures occur.  He noted: 
 
It’s a challenge for us [as leaders] to handle.  For example if there is a training 
program about new methods of rice farming, and it takes several months to see 
any benefit….people won’t do it.  When people follow the technique it seems to 
work.  But people don’t think that we can get benefits from farming.  It takes 
time, and they can’t do other work [abroad] in the meantime.  So they just throw 
their rice in the ground without using the new methods and go abroad. 
 
Organizations were regularly trying to support systems of rice intensification and 
other diversification projects.  But he observed that it was difficult for them to motivate 
farmers.   
“If we call a meeting about agriculture, only a few people show up.  Sometimes 
they just walk away from the meetings, especially if they don’t get anything [i.e. a 
stipend] from it…..[In the past] everyone was farming, and then suddenly now everyone 
stops-- to go to Thailand. When one stops, the others see and get an impression that 
[farming] isn’t worthwhile.  Sometimes organizations even give rice seeds to farmers but 
the farmers won’t work to collect the harvest.  I don’t want to blame our people, but 
they’re really not eager to take advantage of work locally. Frankly, I’d say that 90% of 
them wouldn’t be willing to take on [agricultural] projects that involve any kind of new 
methods or technology.”   
He explained this disinterest by referencing the potential profit one could earn 
abroad, in juxtaposition with the recurring droughts, crop losses, and floods that the 
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community had experienced. Without either crop insurance or sufficient institutionalized 
government security nets, the history of environmental challenges made any new 
agricultural venture feel like an unwise investment.  
A way of making sense of local decision-making processes around migration vs. 
agriculture is through the perceived and real trade-offs in risk.  A critical and yet often 
ignored aspect of risk-calculation is the consideration of control.  Risk as a concept of 
analysis not only presumes a particular set of values and a calculation of costs and 
benefits, but also relates to how much control one feels they have over the chances of 
influencing any particular outcome (Giddens and Pierson 1998: 109).  In Chanleas Dai, 
individuals both feel and realistically have little individual control over the annual rains 
which sustain their rice fields, the viruses which can infect their livestock, and the 
markets in which they can sell their produce.  As noted earlier, these perceptions are 
strongly grounded in the environmental realities and insecurity of the area.   
In contrast, households and individuals can control their movements, their 
worksites, their earning and spending abroad, and their image in the village through 
pursuing work abroad.  Thus the village, a space known but vulnerable to external shock 
often feels more risky than the alternative: an unknown, but manageable and more secure 
potential in Thailand.  The security that individuals have about their earning potential 
abroad is a direct result of an increasing culture of migration, which allows a seamless 
transfer of information about opportunities abroad, often without potential migrants even 
seeking out information. The continued stream of news, warnings, and wisdom is 
accumulated through the experiences of others, offering a relatively balanced picture of 
what is possible abroad. This is in stark contrast to the lack of information that 
community members have about weather patterns, new crop markets, systems of rice 
intensification, financial management, and small business management. In reality, 
migrants often know more about the Thai system of migrant registration than they do 
about agriculture market dynamics, successful pig farming strategies, finding an 
education scholarship, or how to access markets in nearby Siem Reap.   
 
 197 
Final Thoughts 
Despite the sometimes overwhelming presence of NGO’s,85 and the number of 
development reports created by commune councils for government purposes, it is 
difficult for individuals to not feel marginalized from national development policy in 
Chanleas Dai. Increasingly, it is also difficult for them feel secure in the environment to 
provide for anything more than basic needs. And as migration has grown in prevalance, 
offering a visible route for improvement, it has grown more and more common to want 
for, and seek out more.   
Accordingly, migration is understood as both a strategy both to mitigate distress 
and to achieve mobility. In contrast, it is rarely seen as a way of moving towards a more 
secure ability to make ends meet at home. Similarly, while migration does diversify 
household labor, it not understood as a strategy useful to mediate the risk of investing at 
home, rather it is primarily viewed as serving to replace investment at home.  
These perceptions suggest a few tentative conclusions about how we might expect 
migration to continue to impact opportunities for development and poverty reduction in 
Chanleas Dai.  Migration, according to those who seek it out, will lead to a house, a 
motorbike, a means of repaying debts, and higher status, but not increased food security, 
skills, or opportunities to make ends meet at home.  While these end goals are very much 
valued, they are not seen as feasible given the structural and environmental realities of 
Chanleas Dai.  Thus the benefits of migration are rarely put back to use in expanding the 
productive capacity of village-based livelihood strategies, which are widely perceived as 
too risky to be worthwhile. This is not to say that opportunities for productive investment 
in Chanleas Dai don’t, won’t or can’t exists, rather my research indicates they aren’t 
widely perceived to exist or valued as such, and that they are risky, particularly for 
already vulnerable populations. The distinction is critical.  The counter examples 
discussed throughout this dissertation point out that it is possible to make ends meet, and 
even attain limited mobility through the types of small-scale entrepreneurship and local 
                                                 
85 More than a dozen local and international NGOs explicitly include Kralanh District in their target area.  
This does not include government ministries and development partners who implement short-term or one-
off projects in the area. 
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investment that some families are investing in.  Similarly, education clearly can bring 
opportunities to young people who continue through secondary education.  The long-term 
focus required for these types of investment, and the risks they entail, however, make 
them less compelling options for most.  
Throughout this dissertation I have had two main goals, first to voice migrant 
perspectives in Chanleas Dai, and second to argue for the importance of these 
perspectives in informing our theories and policy prescriptions around questions of 
development.  My research suggests that there is a general disconnect between the idea 
that remittances, migration, and also microcredit will necessarily promote productive 
investments, and the perceptions that most individuals articulate of the village as a space 
incapable of this type of development.  Moreover, where development dialogues in both 
microcredit and migration literature stress the potential around small scale 
entreprenruship and informal sector jobs, individuals see these industries as increasingly 
risky, with such low payoffs that it is often not worth the investment.  In contrast, they 
desire, seek out, and valorize wage labor, and secured market relationships/contracts.   
What does this mean for the potential for positive change through migration?  For 
families in Chanleas Dai?  When I was doing interviews, I always ended conversations 
with a question to my respondents “what questions do you have for me?”  In the majority 
of interviews, people asked why I was doing this research.  What would it produce?  Did 
I have a motivation?  Was someone paying me? Was this related to the NGO 
programming I had been involved with?  What did I think of migration?  Some answers 
were the same over time: I hoped it would produce a book, plus many conversations, and 
a broader understanding of processes of migration for myself and others.  No one was 
explicitly paying me at the time but my university was supporting me to do research. It 
wasn’t directly related to PEPY’s work but I planned to share my results with their staff 
in the hopes that it would better inform their programming. And my motivation was 
threefold: because I thought it really mattered, because I thought that a better 
understanding of migration might lead to the kinds of shifts that people told me they 
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wanted for their community, and because it was required for my PhD, which I hoped 
would get me a job. 
 However the question of what I thought of migration shifted over time. And 
admittedly I was often grateful to language skills as an excuse to why I wasn’t always 
articulating my own perceptions and views clearly. I often tried to explain my perspective 
on migration: that is neither good nor bad, but that it is problematic when it involves a 
lack of choice or exploitation. Thus to the extent that rural vulnerabilities, indebtedness 
or a lack of meaningful local alternatives required migration, I felt it was problematic.  In 
line with this perspective, some interviews left me deeply disturbed and pessimistic, the 
result of encounters where I heard about abuses from migrant employers abroad, listened 
to the realities of acute economic and environmental distress, or spoke with a young 
people about deeply emotional regrets or constraints. At other moments I felt a strong 
sense of possibility---one often shared by my respondents.  The possibility of wage labor, 
at higher rates than one could find in Phnom Penh, for anyone who wanted it, relatively 
safely, was considered a tremendous opportunity. And it was.  The fact that there were 
tens of thousands of dollars coming into this community every month from Thailand---for 
a community designated as one of the poorest in the country, was nothing short of 
tremendous. At these times I would often share with respondents the stories I knew of 
Mexican hometown associations, and other uplifting stories of transnational change that 
migrant groups had organized and created.  I saw, and still do see, a remarkable potential 
in this relatively new pattern of migration to make changes that can have a lasting 
positive impact.   
At the time of writing this conclusion, I position myself as having settled into a 
category I understand as skeptical, but ultimately hopeful, a perspective that I think many 
individuals in Chanleas Dai share.  I am skeptical of what I see as simplified and under-
informed policy prescriptions, both for development projects in general and specifically 
for increasing migration’s potential to achieve it. Related, I am deeply skeptical of credit 
as a panacea, of NGOs as the primary means for change, and of government and NGO 
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programs that aren’t grounded in or informed by the lived experiences of those they are 
aimed at.  
And yet there are clear positive changes. I see that migration can and has 
improved standards of living for many families in ways that are locally important, leading 
to feelings of empowerment, contribution, and increased security. Although most people 
in Chanleas Dai are supremely disappointed with the potential of their local environment 
to provide opportunities to “develop,” they are making their way towards their goals 
regardless, using migration to seek out the kinds of improvements they see as most 
possible and most important.    
There are also promising indications of change and progress in the fields of 
health, education, and in the infrastructure surrounding the Kralanh area that are 
indicative of a slow but real evening of what have been very uneven patterns of national 
growth.  Though these shifts have been slow to expand local views of what is possible at 
home, there is no doubt that they are important in expanding both real and perceived 
opportunities.  Likely, as Chanleas Dai becomes relatively less “remote” by virtue of 
increased links to both Siem Reap town and Phnom Penh, the economic possibilities both 
within and outside of Chanleas Dai will continue to improve, mediating the extent to 
which families in Chanleas Dai feel a need to look elsewhere to sustain their lives. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: SEMI STRUCTURED INTERVIEW RESPONDENT CHARACTERISTICS 
No. 
Pseudonym/
Position 
Age Sex Migration Status Other Status Village 
1 Alin 24 F Former Migrant   A 
2 Chamnap 21 M Former Migrant   A 
3 Chanthy 53 M Former Migrant Parent of Migrant C 
4 Chhunny 19 M Former Migrant   A 
5 Chiva 27 F Former Migrant   A 
6 Choeuy 47 F Former Migrant Parent of Migrant A 
7 Chrey 47 F Former Migrant Parent of Migrant B 
8 Chuon 31 F Former Migrant   B 
9 Davin 28 F Former Migrant   A 
10 Hout 28 F Former Migrant   A 
11 Kea 30 F Former Migrant   B 
12 Leat 43 F Former Migrant Parent of Migrant A 
13 Maly 46 F Former Migrant Parent of Migrant B 
14 Morn 30 M Former Migrant   A 
15 Mouyli 28 F Former Migrant   A 
16 Nor 50 M Former Migrant Former Meekjal - 
17 Noun 21 M Former Migrant   B 
18 Phairath 25 M Former Migrant   B 
19 Phasy 55 F Former Migrant Parent of Migrant C 
20 Phia 16 F Former Migrant   C 
21 Ponleu 26 F Former Migrant   A 
22 Romdoh 45 M Former Migrant   B 
23 Sak 26 F Former Migrant   C 
24 Salong 52 F Former Migrant Parent of Migrant C 
25 Saly 39 F Former Migrant   A 
26 
Sambath 
50 M Former Migrant 
Telephone Remittance 
Operator A 
27 Saren 37 F Former Migrant Parent of Migrant C 
28 Sarom 18 F Former Migrant   C 
29 Savy 45 F Former Migrant Parent of Migrant B 
30 Seiha 25 F Former Migrant   C 
31 Serei 24 F Former Migrant   B 
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32 Sinath 42 F Former Migrant Parent of Migrant A 
33 Sinut 26 M Former Migrant   B 
34 Sokchea 62 M Former Migrant Parent of Migrant A 
35 Sophal 28 M Former Migrant   A 
36 Sophea 35 F Former Migrant   A 
37 Sou 36 F Former Migrant   C 
38 Srey Li 23 F Former Migrant   A 
39 Srey Nit 35 F Former Migrant   B 
40 Srey Sor 27 F Former Migrant   A 
41 Srey Sorit 30 F Former Migrant   C 
42 Srey Vouen 30 F Former Migrant   B 
43 Thida 32 F Former Migrant   C 
44 Thy 18 M Former Migrant   B 
45 Van 30 M Former Migrant   B 
46 Vanna 25 M Former Migrant   B 
47 Vean 50 F Former Migrant Parent of Migrant D 
48 Veasna 36 F Former Migrant Parent of Migrant C 
49 Vey 32 M Former Migrant   D 
50 Village Chief 50 M Former Migrant Parent of Migrant D 
51 Vuthy 18 M Former Migrant   C 
52 Yeut 26 M Former Migrant   C 
53 Bon 78 M Non Migrant Village Elder A 
54 Channy 26 F Non Migrant Teacher A 
55 
Commune 
Official 56 M Non Migrant Commune Official A 
56 
Commune 
Official 50 M Non Migrant Commune Official A 
57 Hanty 47 F Non Migrant Parent of Migrant A 
58 Leakena 40 F Non Migrant   D 
59 Mab 52 M Non Migrant   C 
60 Phally 35 M Non Migrant Teacher C 
61 Pheng 51 F Non Migrant Parent of Migrant C 
62 Saleath 50 F Non Migrant Parent of Migrant A 
63 Saream 49 F Non Migrant School Official A 
64 
School 
Director 55 M Non Migrant School Director A 
65 Seav 55 F Non Migrant Parent of Migrant A 
66 Sinoun 73 F Non Migrant Parent of Migrant A 
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67 Sobin 23 M Non Migrant Teacher A 
68 Srey Chen 22 F Non Migrant Teacher A 
69 Srey Mao 27 F Non Migrant NGO Worker A 
70 Srey Na 42 F Non Migrant   B 
71 Srey On 51 F Non Migrant   A 
72 Thearb 74 F Non Migrant Village Elder A 
73 Village Chief 48 M Non Migrant   A 
74 Village Chief 55 M Non Migrant   D 
75 Village Chief 50 M Non Migrant Parent of Migrant B 
76 Village Chief 60 M Non Migrant   C 
77 Village Chief 50 M Non Migrant Parent of Migrant D 
78 Village Chief 50 M Non Migrant Parent of Migrant D 
79 Village Chief 50 M Non Migrant   D 
80 Village Chief 50 M Non Migrant   D 
81 Village Chief 50 M Non Migrant   D 
82 Yong 26 M Non Migrant Teacher A 
83 MFI Staff - M Non Migrant Sub Branch Manager - 
84 MFI Staff - M Non Migrant Sub Branch Manager - 
85 MFI Staff - M Non Migrant Branch Manager - 
86 MFI Staff - M Non Migrant Branch Manager - 
87 MFI Staff - M Non Migrant Sub Branch Manager - 
88 Moneylender - F Non Migrant 
Market-based 
Moneylender - 
89 Moneylender - F Non Migrant 
Village-based 
Moneylender A 
1. As noted in Chapter 1, a number of my interviews included observer-respondents, who were 
not initially intended to be interviewed but at times became vocal participants in the interview 
process.  These observer-respondents are not included here.                                                                                                                                                                                          
2. Ages were often reported as approximation, common in Cambodia particularly among older 
generations                                                                                                                              
3. Villages A, B, and C are the study villages.  However at times I interviewed individuals 
outside of the primary study villages but within the commune, either because respondents were 
local officials, relatives of focus group youth respondents, or because I was told they had 
"alternative" or unique migration stories. Villages noted here as "D" represent non-study 
villages within Chanleas Dai commune.  Where villages are not identified as A,B,C or D 
individuals are from nearby areas, but not Chanleas Dai commune 
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APPENDIX  B: CHANLEAS DAI IN PHOTOS 
All photos taken by the author except where otherwise noted. 
 
 205 
 
 
 206 
 
 207 
 
 
 208 
 
  
 209 
APPENDIX C: MAPS OF CHANLEAS DAI 
Note: Red Star indicates approximate location. 
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